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The Determinants of Malay Ethnic Alignment

Mohd-Noor Mansor

**A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
University of Bristol in the Faculty of Social Sciences.**


31 July 1992

Abstract

The strength of ethnic alignment can usefully be measured only by comparison with other group alignments (such as class, national, religious, etc.,) or with individual motivations (such as those of self-interest or personal obligation). Osman's study (1981) showed that the strength of ethnic alignment can vary from one situation to another. In some situations, ethnicity prevailed over class or religious alignment, while in others it articulated with class, was complicated by religious obligations, or was considered of less relevance than individual taste and preference. Osman compared one kind of group loyalty with another. He did not investigate the tension between group loyalty and individual interest. This study has attempted to do that by measuring the relative importance which respondents believe a representative Malay (Husin Ali) would attach to conflicting goals. The manner in which such a person resolves the conflict between individual desires and peer-group expectations will depend on his social position, his own sentiments and his belief about how his peers will interpret his behaviour. Thus, the technique used in this research has enabled the research worker to investigate the priority individuals ascribe to ethnic loyalty relative to self-interest (either material or associated with social status), personal obligation and, to some extent, religious obligation. It is the actions of individuals in choosing whether or not to align themselves with others of similar ethnic origin that strengthens, maintains, or weakens ethnic boundaries. Sometimes individuals feel that they have no real alternative but to align themselves in a particular way, but there is still an act of will on their part. In so far as groups continue over time it is because their members are motivated to maintain characteristic forms of behaviour. When they change, it is because individual motivations have changed. No group of any size, be it a nation, a 'race', a class, a congregation or a family, maintains itself automatically.

Memorandum

In accordance with the Regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol, I declare that full reference has been made to all published and unpublished sources used, and that all advice and assistance received has been acknowledged. Otherwise, this thesis is the original work of the author. It has not been previously presented for a degree at this or any other university.


.....

31 July 1992

Acknowledgement

I have always felt apprehensive of scholarly works and discussions on ethnic and race relations in Malaysia. The scenarios often presented were ones of tension and hopelessness; racial riots being the inevitable. Such views are exaggerated, but they are not totally misleading either. There have been tensions and riots, but no continuing state of ethnic crisis. The last riots were in 1969 and the latest tensions felt nationally were in 1987. Five years ago, in the midst of a political crisis between the youth wings of UMNO and MCA-DAP over educational issues, an incident occurred where a Malay army private ran amok in the predominantly Chinese Chow Kit area; killing two Malays and a Chinese. I was surprised as to how Malays and Chinese reacted to this political crisis and the shootings. Tensions were running high and rumours were being spread of a potential riot, but life in Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya and other urban areas proceeded normally. I was intrigued to discover what it was that held and bound the Malays, Chinese and Indians together despite the danger of a near riot situation. The country had a speedy return to normalcy. I think many commentators on Malaysian ethnic and race relations had been blinded to the trends that were changing the nature of ethnic relations between the main groups.

I want to thank Professor Michael Banton in supervising the thesis. I have benefited tremendously from his academic foresight and experiences, especially in assisting me to identify the problems of the research enterprise and formulating the conceptual framework I have utilised. His patience in understanding my ups and downs as I strove to understand my own self, my own ethnic group and the Chinese was most appreciated. I enjoyed the supervision given by him while collecting the data, analysing them and the weekly meetings during the writing stage where we went through my drafts. I also wish to thank my family and friends for the emotional support that saw me through my stay in Bristol.

Abstract	i
Memorandum	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Contents	iv
List of Tables	viii
Map	xii
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Arrangement of Chapters	2
Chapter 2 The Prediction of Ethnic Alignment	4
Sanusi Osman's Contribution	5
<i>Permission for Ethnic Out-Marriage</i>	
<i>Scholarship Allocation</i>	
<i>Squatter Settlements</i>	
<i>The Textile Workers' Strike</i>	
<i>Political Leadership</i>	
Lesson Learned	15
Chapter 3 Other People's Expectations of Ethnic Alignment	18
Collection of What Seemed Realistic Conflicts and the Selection of Questions	18
General Assumptions	20
Expectations : General Hypotheses	21
Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Self-Interest of the Material Kind	22
<i>Shopping Choice</i>	
<i>The House Key</i>	
<i>Renting Out the House</i>	
<i>Child Minding</i>	
Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Self-Interest of the Status Kind	28
<i>The Zoo Trip</i>	
<i>Skin Complexion</i>	
<i>Child Adoption</i>	
<i>The Wedding Invitation</i>	

<i>Halimah in a Volvo</i>	
Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Personal Obligations	38
<i>Supporting the Boss</i>	
<i>Indian Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party</i>	
<i>Child's Playmate</i>	
<i>Bringing a Friend Home</i>	
<i>Mother's Wishes Concerning Marriage</i>	
Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Religious Obligations	48
<i>The Treasurer's Post</i>	
<i>The Students' Union Election</i>	
Conclusion of the Alignment Question	54
 Chapter 4 Research Methodology and Ethnic Relations in Petaling Jaya	55
Petaling Jaya and the Study Area	55
Interview	57
Ethnic Relations in Petaling Jaya	62
<i>The Residential Area</i>	
<i>Commuting to Work</i>	
<i>The Office Break</i>	
<i>The Covered Market, the Supermarket and the Shop</i>	
<i>Night Life</i>	
<i>Recreational Activities</i>	
<i>Festivals</i>	
<i>Education</i>	
Conclusion	77
 Chapter 5 The Strength of Self-Interest Relative to Ethnic Loyalty	
as Determinants of Alignment	79
The Hypothetical Social Situations: Self-Interest of the Material Kind	80
<i>Shopping Choice</i>	
<i>The House Key</i>	
<i>Renting-Out the House</i>	
<i>Child Minding</i>	
The Hypothetical Social Situations: Self-Interest of the Status Kind	85
<i>The Zoo Trip</i>	
<i>Skin Complexion</i>	

<i>Child Adoption</i>	
<i>Wedding Invitation</i>	
Discussion of the Findings	91
Conclusion	99
Chapter 6 The Strength of Personal Obligation Relative to Ethnic Loyalty	
as Determinants of Alignment	101
The Hypothetical Social Situations	101
<i>Supporting the Boss</i>	
<i>Mother's Wishes Concerning Marriage</i>	
<i>Child's Playmate</i>	
<i>Indian Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party</i>	
<i>Bringing a Friend Home</i>	
Discussion of the Findings	107
Conclusion	113
Chapter 7 Ethnic Differences and Similarities	114
Questions and Expected Resolutions of the Counterbalance	
Questions to Ethnic Loyalty	114
<i>Language Usage</i>	
<i>Ethnic Contacts and Piety</i>	
<i>Rukunegara, the Six Statements and the National Problems</i>	
<i>Relations between Ethnic Groups</i>	
<i>The Preferred Political Party</i>	
General Hypotheses Underlying the Expectations	127
Overview of the Findings	127
The Findings of Ethnic Difference and Similarity	128
<i>Age, Residence and Language Usage</i>	
<i>Ethnic Contacts</i>	
<i>Rukunegara, the Six Statements and the National Problems</i>	
<i>Ethnic Relations</i>	
<i>The Preferred Political Party</i>	
Discussion of the Findings	152
Conclusion	156
Chapter 8 The Problem of Pluralistic Ignorance	157
Pluralistic Ignorance Concerning Husin Ali	159

Plularistic Ignorance Concerning Malay Mother's Generation	165
Discussion of The Findings	172
Conclusion	173
Chapter 9 The Determinants of Alignment	180
Appendix I <i>Questionnaire</i>	198
Appendix II <i>Other Findings</i>	211
Appendix III <i>Other Findings</i>	214
Appendix IV <i>Chi-Squared Analysis</i>	227
Bibliography	231

Table 2.1	: Permission for Ethnic Out-Marriage
Table 2.2	: Scholarship Allocation
Table 2.3	: Squatter Settlements
Table 2.4	: The Textile Workers' Strike
Table 2.5	: Political Leadership
Table 3.1	: The Shopping Choice - Expected Responses
Table 3.2	: The House Key - Expected Responses
Table 3.3	: Renting Out the House - Expected Responses
Table 3.4	: Child Minding - Expected Responses
Table 3.5	: The Zoo Trip - Expected Responses
Table 3.6	: The Skin Complexion - Expected Responses
Table 3.7	: Child Adoption - Expected Responses
Table 3.8	: The Wedding Invitation - Expected Responses
Table 3.9	: Halimah 's Volvo - Expected Responses
Table 3.10	: Supporting the Boss - Expected Responses
Table 3.11	: Attending a Wedding Party - Expected Responses
Table 3.12	: Child's Playmate - Expected Responses
Table 3.13	: Bringing a Friend Home - Expected Responses
Table 3.14	: Mother's Wishes Concerning Marriage - Expected Responses
Table 3.15	: The Treasurer's Post - Expected Responses
Table 3.16	: The Students' Union Election - Expected Responses
Table 4.1	: Enumerators and Respondents Interviewed
Table 4.2	: Interview Sample
Table 5.1	: Shopping Choice, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.2	: Shopping Choice, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.3	: House Key, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.4	: House Key, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.5	: Renting-out the House, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.6	: Renting-out the House, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.7	: Child Minding, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.8	: Child Minding, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.9	: Zoo Trip, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.10	: Zoo Trip, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.11	: Skin Complexion, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.12	: Skin Complexion, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.13	: Child Adoption, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.14	: Child Adoption, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 5.15	: Wedding Invitation, by Ethnic Group
Table 5.16	: Wedding Invitation, by Ethnic Group and Gender

Table 6.1	: Supporting the Boss, by Ethnic Group
Table 6.2	: Supporting the Boss, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 6.3	: Mother's Wishes, by Ethnic Group
Table 6.4	: Mother's Wishes, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 6.5	: Child's Playmate, by Ethnic Group
Table 6.6	: Child's Playmate, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 6.7	: Attending a Wedding Party, by Ethnic Group
Table 6.8	: Attending a Wedding Party, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 6.9	: Bringing a Friend Home, by Ethnic Group
Table 6.10	: Bringing a Friend Home, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.1	: The Expectations of Language Usage
Table 7.2	: The Expectations of Contact Questions
Table 7.3	: The Expectations of Public Opinion Questions
Table 7.4	: The Expectations of Ethnic Relations
Table 7.5	: The Preferred Political Party to Govern a Multi-Ethnic Malaysia
Table 7.6	: Age Composition, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.7	: Age Composition, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.8	: Residential Composition, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.9	: Residential Composition, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.10	: Residence During Childhood, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.11	: Residence During Childhood, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.12	: Piety, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.13	: Piety, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.14	: Language Spoken, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.15	: Language Spoken, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.16	: Newspaper Reading, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.17	: Newspaper Reading, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.18	: Television Viewing, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.19	: Television Viewing, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.20	: Malays - Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.21	: Malays - Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.22	: Chinese - Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.23	: Chinese - Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.24	: Malays - Places of Contacts, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.25	: Malays - Places of Contacts, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.26	: Chinese - Places of Contacts, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.27	: Chinese - Places of Contacts, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.28	: Malays - Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.29	: Malays - Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group and Gender

Table 7.30	: Chinese - Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.31	: Chinese - Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.32	: Rukunegara, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.33	: Rukunegara, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.34	: National Anthem, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.35	: National Anthem, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.36	: Racial Discrimination, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.37	: Racial Discrimination, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.38	: Government Programmes, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.39	: Government Programmes, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.40	: Indonesian Migrants, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.41	: Indonesian Migrants, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.42	: The Dissatisfied Should Emigrate, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.43	: The Dissatisfied Should Emigrate, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.44	: Malaysia is not Just for Malays, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.45	: Malaysia is not Just for Malays, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.46	: Major National Problems Faced, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.47	: Major National Problems Faced, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.48	: Current Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.49	: Current Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.50	: Current Ethnic Relations in Locality, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.51	: Current Ethnic Relations in Locality, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.52	: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia in the Next Five Years, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.53	: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia in the Next Five Years, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.54	: Ethnic Relations in Locality in the Next Five Years, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.55	: Ethnic Relations in Locality in the Next Five Years, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 7.56	: Political Party Best Suited for a Multi-Ethnic Malaysia, by Ethnic Group
Table 7.57	: Political Party Best Suited for a Multi-Ethnic Malaysia, by Ethnic Group and Gender
Table 8.1	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.2	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.3	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.4	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest, Husin Ali's generation

Table 8.5	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toPersonal Obligation, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.6	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toPersonal Obligation, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.7	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to theMaterial Self-Interest, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.8	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.9	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.10	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.11	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toPersonal Obligation, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.12	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Personal Obligation, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.13	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.14	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toUniversalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.15	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.16	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toUniversalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.17	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.18	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.19	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's generation
Table 8.20	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.21	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative toUniversalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation
Table 8.22	: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation

Map

Map 4.1 : Petaling Jaya in Relation to Other Urban Areas in the Klang Valley

It is sometimes said that a spectator sees more of the game than does any of the players. In the course of their lives, Malaysians are engaged in many 'games', in their families, workplace and communities. Each game is played according to rules that the players take for granted. One fiercely contested game is that in which Malaysians divide themselves into ethnic teams, with the Malay and Chinese teams struggling over the distribution of the benefits produced by an expanding economy. The sociologist aspires to be a neutral spectator who analyses such struggles and discovers how the actions of the players often have consequences which they do not anticipate.

It would be unwise to press this analogy of the sociologist as spectator very far, but it may help dramatise one conclusion of the research reported in this dissertation. Economic growth in Malaysia has meant the introduction of new technology, like motorcars and traffic, which creates new relationships that are not defined ethnically. Malay and Chinese drivers have to obey the same universalistic rules; there is no place on the highway for particularistic norms which encourage people to differentiate between those of their own ethnic group and those who belong to other ethnic groups. The growing importance of universalistic rules is changing the nature of Malaysian society, but Malaysians, like the players in a game, take it for granted that technological requirements are non-ethnic. Because they are so busy playing their roles, they do not see what is happening in other parts of the playing field or how, over time, the nature of the game itself is changing.

New technology introduces new rules that everyone has to observe. These effects are direct. However, in a changing society there are also indirect effects. Malays and Chinese meet in situations which are governed partly by universalistic and partly by ethnic norms. To find out how one is balanced against the other, it is necessary to look further into the nature of universalism and in particular into the way in which economic growth encourages individualism and the pursuit of self-interest of one kind or another. It is then possible to devise ways of measuring the weight individuals attach to universalistic norms relative to ethnic loyalty. This dissertation shows that individuals in Petaling Jaya vary in the importance they attach to ethnic loyalty relative to other

norms, the variations being patterned by ethnicity, sex and other variables. It helps define the nature of some of these new norms. It shows that Malays and Chinese are only imperfectly aware of the changes in their society and that their ignorance of them is also socially patterned.

Arrangement of chapters

This introduction is followed by other eight chapters, beginning with an analysis of Professor Sanusi Osman's work on "The National Unity Policy And Ethnic Relations In Malaysia With Special Reference To Malacca Town", shifting from an emphasis on searching for group alignment to that of individual alignment. Individual motivations of self-interest of the material and status kinds, and personal obligation were employed to measure individual as well as group alignment as the subjects confronted and might experience conflict with ethnic loyalty. Chapter Two discusses the prediction of ethnic alignment. This research starts where Professor Osman left off, where he attempted to measure the relative strength of group loyalties in Malaysia. Chapter Three discusses the other people's expectations of ethnic alignment. Chapter Four describes the research methodology employed and offers a general account of ethnic relations in Petaling Jaya. Section 14 of Petaling Jaya was selected as the study area because it is a cosmopolitan area suited to a study of the influence of the new universalistic norms. After the data had been cleaned, the replies of 302 Malay and Chinese respondents were selected for further analysis.

Chapter Five discusses the strength of self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty as determinants of alignment. The predictions of the Malays and Chinese about the strength of self-interest of the material and status kinds are presented. Four hypothetical social situations bearing on self-interest of the material kind were selected for the study, viz., the shopping choice, the house key, renting the house and child-minding. Four other hypothetical social situations bearing on self-interest of the status kind were posed to the respondents, viz., the zoo trip, fair skin complexion, child adoption and wedding invitation. The findings in the self-interest of the material kind showed that, on the measures employed, Malays placed material gains above the concern for ethnic loyalty. Status gains relative to ethnic loyalty seemed undeveloped for Malays. The

chapter shows that the respondents' predictions of the strength of self-interest of the material and status kinds relative to ethnic loyalty could be employed to measure individual and group alignment. In Chapter Six, the strength of personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty as determinants of alignment is discussed. Five hypothetical social situations bearing on personal obligation were short-listed for the study, viz., supporting the boss, marriage, mother's wishes, child playmate, workmate's daughter's wedding party and bringing a friend home. These social situations suggested that as individuals come into contact with one another, even across ethnic boundaries, the bonds established are strong enough to displace the norm of ethnic loyalty.

In Chapter Seven, ethnic similarities and differences of the Malays and Chinese will be discussed. The questions selected in this did not relate directly to ethnic alignment but pertained to age, residential composition, language-used, inter-ethnic contacts, national questions, social perceptions of ethnic relations, etc. In Chapter Eight, the problem of pluralistic ignorance among Malays and Chinese will be discussed. Respondents misjudged and held unwarranted assumptions about Husin Ali's and his mother's reactions to the alignment questions asked. Chinese often underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty. The Malay group in Petaling Jaya is shown to be more sympathetic to universalist norms than individual members of the group realised. Lastly, Chapter Nine presents what other sociologists have been blinded to; that individual Malays and Chinese are being increasingly absorbed into a non-ethnic universalist sphere. Ethnic loyalty is of restricted importance in the new sphere, but some relations are governed by both norms, while in others, gender and other considerations come into play. The changing nature of the Malay-Chinese relationship has tremendous implications for our understanding of ethnicity as a theoretical tool and in Malaysia's search for national unity.

In a polyethnic society, individuals at times align themselves with other individuals of the same ethnicity. There may be occasions when, instead, they align with individuals of the same class or religion, even if they are not from the same ethnic group. While at other times, class or religious alignment may operate within the same ethnic structure. Whatever the alignment, much depends upon the stimulus which evokes the alignment and which result in individuals defining the situation as one in which their behaviour should be governed by ethnic, class or religious obligation. It would be possible to study the processes involved by observing individuals over a long period of time, but it is simpler to ask people how they or others would act in imagined but realistic situations. Ethnic alignment, as it is here conceived, is the reaction to stimuli designed to indicate whether or not, in real situations, people's behaviour would be governed by ethnic loyalties.

In some societies ethnic groups occupy a distinct territory within which their language and culture are dominant. Within the ethnic group there may be divisions of class or religion. The government of the state may tolerate this so long as ethnic alignment does not run contrary to the citizens' obligations to the state. It is possible to envisage a series of group alignments constituting a hierarchy. The government could insist that in certain spheres all citizens must align themselves nationally; but within the nation there could be ethnic alignment and, within that, class or religious alignment. Some writers maintain that in the long run class alignment will be the prime divider to which the others will be progressively subordinated. Religious believers often look to a world in which the profession of their faith will be the most important, tolerating other social divisions only within a religious framework.

When ethnic groups no longer occupy distinct territories, this kind of hierarchy is less likely. People may find that it is in their interest to learn other languages or to understand the culture of other groups. Other kinds of alignment compete with ethnicity. Much will depend upon the circumstances of the group encounters. If ethnic groups are in competition for political power or economic resources, there will be pressure on individuals to align themselves ethnically in very many situations. Nevertheless, individuals may resist such pressure. They may act in accordance

with what they see as their self-interest rather than express ethnic loyalty. They may also subordinate ethnic loyalty to their personal obligations to someone who is not of the same ethnicity as themselves.

The study of ethnic alignment has therefore to distinguish group and individual obligations. An individual may act in a way which apparently expresses an obligation to fellow members of a nation, an ethnic group, a class, or expresses a religious obligation. The strength of any such obligation, and the priorities given to different obligations, will vary with the circumstances. Equally, an individual may act in a way which suggests that he or she gives higher priority to a personal obligation or denies any group obligation and defines the situation as permitting the pursuit of self-interest.

Sanusi Osman's Contribution

The most systematic study of the relative strength of group loyalties in Malaysia is that conducted by Professor Sanusi Osman in Malacca town in 1981. He chose Malacca town as the study area because of its multi-ethnic population. Malaysia's major ethnic groups such as the Malays, the Chinese, the Indians and especially the Portuguese are represented there. The town itself is one of the oldest and the most historic places in Malaysia. It was founded in the beginning of the fifteenth century by a Malay ruler, becoming a major entrepot centre for the region, and was ruled successively by colonial masters such as the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and the Japanese. Thus, Malacca town became the meeting place for different ethnic groups, and different cultures, religions, languages and various ways of life. In the research, 428 heads of households in Malacca town were interviewed; 47 percent Chinese, 31 percent Malays, 14 percent Indians and 8 percent Portuguese.

a) Permission for Ethnic Out-Marriage

The respondents interviewed were asked, among other things, to respond to five questions touching upon ethnic alignment. the first described a situation in which the daughter of

a Malay padi planter asked her father's permission to marry a Chinese boy who was working in the same factory. The respondents were asked:

Mr. Razak is a paddy planter. His daughter who is working in a factory has asked for his permission to marry a Chinese boy who is working in the same factory. The boy's father is a taxi driver.

Should Mr. Razak allow his daughter to marry that boy?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Do not know
- 9. No reply

In a polyethnic society like Malaysia, the rate of inter-ethnic marriage and the attitudes of individuals towards it, are important indicators in measuring future trends of ethnic relations. It was hoped that the above hypothetical problem of inter-ethnic marriage would throw some light on this.

Table 2.1: Permission for Ethnic Out-Marriage (%)

Answers	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Portu- guese	All
Yes, he should	81	87	83	89	85
No, he should not	8	9	12	8	9
Do not know	9	3	2	3	5
No reply	2	1	3	-	1
Number of Respondents	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Sanusi Osman 1981: 255, table 6.1

Table 2.1 shows that the respondents in all the ethnic group studied believed that Mr. Razak should allow his daughter to marry the Chinese boy. As the table shows, their approval varied between 81 percent and 89 percent. The Malays put conversion to Islam as the condition for the Chinese boy's acceptance. By income grouping, similar degrees of acceptance were observed, but some elements of class alignment were noticeable, since the upper and the middle income groups tended to offer least resistance to the marriage. This may be because the higher

income group members have more experience of other ethnic groups and this makes them more tolerant of ethnic differences.

In the above analysis, though the Malay respondents' picture of what Mr. Razak should do was complicated by the identification of ethnicity and religion, and some elements of class alignment were also observed, the replies given by the respondents indicating that ethnic alignment was subordinated to some other value. What can that be? It seems as if many respondents valued an individual's right to choose a marriage partner and thought that a father must respect his daughter's wishes. In this sense, personal desires and father-daughter obligations were more important than ethnicity.

b) Scholarship Allocation

A second question read as follows:

There are four students who have passed their Higher School Certificate Examination with equally good results. The students are Bakar bin Samad (a son of a Minister); Low Boon King (a son of a tin miner); S.Subramaniam (a son of a rubber tapper) and George de Souza (a son of a fisherman). Four of them have applied for government scholarships to study in the university.

Can you tell me who really deserves the scholarship?

1. Bakar bin Samad
2. Low Boon King
3. S. Subramaniam
4. George de Souza
5. All of them
9. No reply

In Malaysia, scholarship allocation is being utilised by the government to promote national integration and unity by closing the gap in educational opportunities among the regions and the ethnic groups. Those who lived in urban areas, especially the non-Malays have better access to such advanced educational facilities and explained one of the main reasons for their

higher proportion of enrolments at the tertiary level. Positive discrimination in allocating scholarships to Malay students is one of the steps taken to restructure inter-ethnic educational imbalances.

Table 2.2 shows that all the ethnic groups, by percentages varying between 75 percent and 84 percent, indicated that the scholarship should be given to the fisherman's son who is a Portuguese. The respondents favoured not a person from their own ethnic group but instead selected a boy from a poor family. The response pattern suggests that personal merit and a concern for poverty can override ethnic alignment.

Table 2.2: Scholarship Allocation (%)

Answers	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Portu- guese	All
Bakar Samad (Malay: Minister's son)	2	3	-	-	2
Low Boon King (Chinese: tin-miner's son)	-	1	-	-	0
S. Subramaniam (Indian: Rubber-tapper's son)	76	67	72	36	68
George de Souza (Portuguese: Fisherman's son)	84	79	75	83	80
All of them	10	14	15	14	13
No reply	2	1	-	3	2

Source: Sanusi Osman 1981: 268, table 6.6

N.B. Figures do not add up to 100% as they were individually analysed per row by ethnic group

c) Squatter Settlements

The third question was:

About a month ago 180 illegal settlers at Johor Bahru held a demonstration in front of the Johor Government Office in Johor Bahru. The settlers asked the government

not to destroy their houses which they had built on government land without the government's permission. The government however, dismantled all the houses and arrested all those who were involved in that demonstration. In this situation whose action was right?

- 1. The Government's
- 2. Illegal settlers'
- 3. Do not agree to both sides
- 4. Do not know
- 9. No reply

In the years preceding the study, there had been publicity about the undesirable consequences of illegal settlements. Coming from an impoverished countryside, and looking for employment opportunities in the urban areas, these migrants build wooden shacks on government land on the outskirts of the towns. The state authorities from time to time evacuate these illegal settlers. The authorities pursue such action in order to ensure that proper neighbourhoods are planned. In some of these evacuations, the public and the university students come to give their support to the squatters, and the mass media often provide extensive coverage of such incidents.

Osman thought it would therefore, be interesting to observe the resulting pattern of alignment. Who would align themselves with the government? Who would sympathise with the squatters?

Table 2.3: Squatter Settlements (%)

Answers	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Portu- guese	All
The Government was right	36	54	58	80	51
The illegal settlers were right	40	22	22	11	27
Do not agree to both sides	17	17	15	6	16
Do not know	5	4	5	3	4
No reply	2	3	-	-	2
Number of Respondents	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Sanusi Osman 1981: 278, table 6.9

From Table 2.3, it was observed that the non-Malay respondents overwhelmingly supported the government's action in evicting the squatters (80 percent Portuguese, 58 percent Indians, 54 percent Chinese), whereas the Malay respondents registered a low 36 percent. The Malays, at 40 percent, expressed the most support for the squatters. The Malay upper and middle income groups, at 50 percent and 44 percent respectively, supported the government action by comparison with 31 percent support from the lower income group. Class alignment was much more marked among the Malay (and to a lesser extent, the Indian) respondents than in other groups.

d) The Textile Workers' Strike

Osman's fourth question was also designed to compare ethnic and class alignments. It ran as follows:

Two weeks ago about 150 workers from a textile factory held several strikes at their factory and work was stopped. These strikes were held because the workers were not satisfied with their present pay and facilities provided by their employer. They demanded better pay and better working conditions from the employer. Their employer, Mr. Boon Siew, however, refused to consider these demands and as a result, he threatened to expel all those workers who were involved in the strikes. Despite this threat, the workers continued striking and pledged not to stop it until all their demands were fulfilled. In this situation, whose action is right?

1. Mr. Boon Siew
2. The workers
3. Both sides
4. Do not know
9. No reply

Trade unions as social institutions can do much to bring together people of different ethnic origins. In Malaysia, the stability of the country's political and economy is said to be more important than effective collective bargaining and this argument has been used to justify laws and regulations that control and weaken the powers of trade unions. Despite these restrictions, within the regulations allowed, workers do, at times, manage to demonstrate their grievances.

Table 2.4: The Textile Workers' Strike (%)

Answers	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Portu- guese	All
Employer is right	5	5	13	17	7
Workers are right	68	48	45	56	54
Both sides are wrong	23	37	42	22	32
Do not know	3	7	-	5	5
No reply	1	3	-	-	2
Number of Respondents	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Sanusi Osman 1981: 288, table 6.11

In the hypothetical situation above, Table 2.4 shows that the socio-economic dimension proved more important than the ethnic dimension. Only 5 percent of the Chinese respondents supported the Chinese employer, the same percentage was also observed among the Malays, with the Portuguese and Indians at 17 percent and 13 percent respectively. The biggest support for the workers came from the lower income group, at 65 percent. Respondents from all ethnic groups identified with the workers, but the percentage of support was associated with class, being 65 percent in the lower income group, 44 percent in the middle income group and 17 percent in the upper income group. In descending order, with 71 percent at the top, 39 percent in the middle and 21 percent at the bottom of the income ladder, the respondents blamed both sides for the stalemate.

Thus, Chinese respondents were no more likely to side with the Chinese employer than were the Malays or the other ethnic groups. Respondents with higher income, irrespective of ethnic background, were less likely to support the workers and more likely to blame both sides for the strikes. There are some ethnic differences between them, but the conflict is seen primarily in class terms.

e) Political Leadership

Osman's final question invited the respondents to choose a political leader. The question was as follows:

Which one of the following persons do you consider would be a better leader to Malaysian people and why?

- i) Mr. Halim is a son of a royal family, educated at a university in England, served many years in the Malaysian Civil Service, entered the Parliament and became the leader of his party.
- ii) Mr. Ong Cheng Piau is a son of a big businessman, educated at a university in England, active in business and commerce, entered the Parliament and became the leader of his party.
- iii) Mr. Zulkifli is a son of a rubber tapper, educated at the University of Malaya and then at a university in England, active in trade unions, entered the Parliament and became the leader of his party.
- iv) Mr. Wong Ting Seng is a son of a factory worker, educated at a university in England, active in trade unions, entered the Parliament and became the leader of his party.

Which one would you choose?

- 1. Mr. Halim
- 2. Mr. Ong Cheng Piau
- 3. Mr. Zulkifli
- 4. Mr. Wong Ting Seng
- 5. Do not know
- 6. Anyone of them
- 9. No reply

In Malaysia, an exercise such as above is bound to be complicated by ethnic differences, as members of each ethnic group may prefer to support their own candidate. Does this always happen? Are certain leadership attributes more important than ethnicity? In the above question, four candidates coming from the Malay and Chinese ethnic groups, with similar

educational and political experiences, but differing from each other in terms of family background and working experiences, were presented to the respondents for selection. They were described so as to tap both the ethnic and class variables.

Table 2.5: Political Leadership (%)

Answers	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Portu- guese	All
Mr. Halim - (Malay: Royal family)	11	10	13	28	12
Mr. Ong Cheng Piau - (Chinese: Businessman)	1	5	5	-	3
Mr. Zulkifli - (Malay: Rubber-tapper)	69	31	43	44	46
Mr. Wong Ting Seng - (Chinese: Worker)	4	18	11	3	11
Do not know	10	15	11	19	14
Anyone of them	5	17	15	6	13
No reply	-	4	2	-	1
Number of Respondents	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Sanusi Osman 1981: 295, table 6.13

Table 2.5 shows that respondents in all the ethnic groups preferred the low status Malay, Mr. Zulkifli, ranging from a high 69 percent to 31 percent. Ethnic alignment was visible, and among the Malay respondents a class alignment within that framework, but middle and high income Chinese were more inclined than were the low income Chinese, to prefer the low status Malay trade unionist, apparently believing that someone with such a background was more likely to be able to provide effective leadership. This suggests that the answers reflected something more than ethnic alignment. They also reflected a rational assessment of the requirements of the political situation of the country, subordinating personal preferences to assessment of long term self and national interests. The political culture of the country is Malay-based and such responses

may highlight an acceptance of Malay hegemony. This may explain why personal preferences are being subordinated to a long term assessment of self and national interests.

Osman's study supports the view that in a polyethnic society, individuals at times align with other individuals of the same ethnic group, but on other occasions align themselves differently. It is important to note that in the allocation of scholarships, ethnicity is considered much less relevant than individual merit and personal desert. The same pattern of response is observable with regard to the inter-marriage question. Individual rights to choose and the needs to respect the obligations arising out of a father-daughter relationship override ethnic boundaries, though Malay alignment is complicated by religion. It is also noted that as one climbs the social ladder, the lesser the resistance to inter-marriage. Thus, class alignment may also influence a person's choice with regard to inter-marriage. In the squatters' case, the highest support came from the Malays, especially the low income group. In this case, ethnicity and class alignments articulate with one another. The worker-employer conflict was accepted by all the individuals from the ethnic groups studied as being not an ethnic issue but rather an industrial relations problem. Favouring the workers as a group or the employer was more associated with class. Thus, the higher someone moves up the social ladder, the less he is likely to support the workers' action and vice versa. In choosing a political leader, it is generally accepted that a Malay will be most effective. In this situation, a long term perception of self and national interest is given priority. These analyses indicate that the significance of ethnicity varies from one situation to another.

This brief summary of one part of Professor Osman's work should serve to show how complicated research may need to be if all the variables are to be controlled. To take the fourth question discussed earlier, on strike action, it would be desirable to pose to members of each of the four ethnic groups, situations in which the employer belonged to each of these four ethnic groups and then to vary the ethnic composition of the labour force in order to measure the extent to which ethnicity was influencing alignment. If in this fourth question, the respondents were to be asked whom would they support in an industrial conflict in which the employer was a Malay and the workers Chinese or Indians, then it would be possible to compare the results with the previous

findings and this would illuminate an additional aspect of the interplay between ethnicity and class alignment. This question would then need to be changed to feature representation of each group in each inter-ethnic role. There are simply too many variables for this to be done in a study dependent upon the co-operation of members of the general public. Pressed for time, most respondents will continue with the interview only so long as they can understand its justifications. If there are to be more than five questions of this kind then it is better to link them so that the respondents can pass more easily from one to another.

Lesson Learned

The research has had the benefit of starting where Professor Osman left off. Any attempt has to be very selective because of the multitude of variables to be controlled. This study therefore, concentrates upon ethnic alignment among the Malays only. It is hoped that some future research workers may devise modified sets of questions so as to study ethnic alignment among people of other ethnic groups and to compare their findings with those presented here. Another strategic decision faced was the choice of the kind of stimulus question to be phrased. Was it desirable to pose a situation of choice of alignment and then ask the respondent as to how he or she would choose? Or would it be better to ask the respondents to say how they thought a representative Malay would choose? The second alternative was chosen in the belief that it is simpler. When the respondents are requested not to think of their own action but as to how they thought a representative Malay would behave, then this may ease the difficulties of respondents who want to explain that these situations could never have happened to them. Even more important, the second alternative made it possible to ask Chinese respondents as to how they thought a Malay would choose. Thus, instead of comparing Malay and Chinese choices, it becomes possible to compare Malay and Chinese expectations about what a Malay would choose, which is conceptually simpler. Will Chinese and Malays have the same expectations of Malay responses? Do Chinese overestimate or underestimate the extent to which Malay behaviour is governed by ethnic loyalty? The chosen approach also makes it easier to explore the factor of pluralistic ignorance as an influence upon behaviour, a matter to be discussed in Chapter Eight.

The second alternative also recognised the problem that people often do not do what they say they will do; the discrepancy observed between sentiments and acts. "We still do not know much about the relationship between what people say and what they do - attitudes and behaviour, sentiments and-acts, verbalisations and interactions, words and deeds" (Deutscher 1966:242). The first study which examined the relationship between human behaviour and expressed attitudes was the classical study by LaPiere (1934). LaPiere travelled through the United States with a Chinese couple, stopping at many hotels, motels, and restaurants, but they were refused service only once. In a follow-up study, he mailed questionnaires to the proprietors of the establishments visited in order to find out if members of the Chinese ethnic origin would be accepted as guests. Approximately 93 percent of the restaurants and 92 percent of the sleeping places indicated that they would not accept or accommodate Chinese people. A control group of other restaurants and hotels were also sent questionnaires, and almost identical results were obtained.

LaPiere concluded that factors entirely unassociated with ethnic group were, in the main, the determinant of significant variations in their reception. The attitudes of the American people, as reflected in the behaviour of those who for pecuniary reasons were presumably most sensitive to the antipathies of their white clientele, were anything but negative towards the Chinese. Viewed from the perspective of social distance, LaPiere also concluded that native Caucasians were not averse to residing in the same hotels, auto-camps, and tourist homes with Chinese guests and would with complacency accept the presence of Chinese at an adjoining table in restaurant or cafe. It does not follow that there is revealed a distinctly positive attitude towards the Chinese, that Whites prefer the Chinese to other whites. But the facts as gathered certainly preclude the conclusion that there is an intense prejudice towards the Chinese. A less intense prejudice was observed in an action-situation which an individual's pursuit of his self-interest defined the situation in a non-prejudiced manner but a reverse was noted when the subject was

asked to express to his own group peer his sentiment toward a Chinese . LaPiere's work does have some weaknesses; the questionnaire used to measure attitudes toward the Chinese dealt with general prejudice indices and was not necessarily comparable to the behavioural situation in the study, his presence with the Chinese couple probably had a considerable biasing effect and different results would have been obtained had the couple gone across the country alone, and lastly, he did not focus on the problem of pluralistic ignorance.

One solution to Deutscher's problem would have been to take an anthropological approach, staying with the respondents over a long period of time and covering a small sample size. Such an approach, however, has weaknesses of its own which the research worker would wish to avoid despite its benefits. One of the reasons why people often do not do what they tell an interviewer they would do, is that, they are influenced by what they believe to be the interviewer's expectations. This influence is strong when the interviewee is asked what he or she would do; it is less strong when the interviewee is asked what he or she thinks a third party would do. Hypothetical social situations of a representative Malay caught in a realistic conflict between the pursuit of individual motivations against that of ethnic loyalty were presented, to which the respondents could identify with the possible behavioural actions that could take place. Furthermore, other techniques of questioning were also employed in the questionnaire; the direct and counterbalancing questions to measuring the relative strength of individual motivations against ethnic loyalty. The research worker's also relied on field observations to account for the observed behavioural patterns of social and ethnic relations between Malays and Chinese who lived in Petaling Jaya. The time period was limited, but the observations made strengthened the methodology employed and, thus, ensured the reliability and validity of the data collected. The research worker being aware of Deutscher's irritation to the discrepancy between sentiments and actions had taken steps to balance and reduce the possibility of such occurrence. The second alternative, therefore, is not weakened so much by the discrepancy between expressed sentiments and actions. It has other advantages too.

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Note:

Insert at line 17

Then, there is the problem of group and individual obligations, or the absence of them. In the process of designing the questionnaire, a series of possible stimulus questions was considered, some of them balancing ethnic against class or religious loyalties, and others balancing ethnic alignment against individual motivations. Some possible questions centring upon football games, street accidents, and political corruption were considered but eliminated in favour of the sixteen questions eventually selected.

The hypothetical social situations focused on a middle class Malay actor and his family, representative of the social milieu of the study area. The hypothetical social situations created were easily identified by the respondents as reflecting concrete social experiences in their own lives. Taking some of the questions posed as examples, the question on shopping choice reflects a situation where respondents could easily identify as they continuously battle between self-interest and ethnic loyalty. The question on which wedding party to visit first, between the high status Chinese and the low status Malay, reflects a situation often faced in many people's everyday life. The question on possibility of marriage pits the determinants of ethnicity against status and personal desires as well as against religion. The question on the workmate's daughter's wedding dinner, was chosen to test the respondents' reactions as they tussle with personal obligations stemming from obligations generated in the workplace. These and other questions will be described in Chapter Three.

To judge from the respondents' replies, the technique employed has not only generated rapport with the respondents during the interviewing process, maintaining their interest and alertness, but has also helped to solve the problem of sensitivity when studying the question of ethnicity. The delicate and controversial nature of ethnicity is framed within hypothetical social situations. In order to avoid the possibility that respondents might manipulate the answers so as to suit what they believe is the investigator's interest, the alignment questions to balance ethnic loyalty were not presented in sequence; first with self-interest and then with personal obligation, but were scattered randomly.

Table 2.6: Osman's Leadership Question,
by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali	
	Malay	Chinese
Mr. Halim	9	10
Mr. Ong	-	10
Mr. Zulkifli	84	38
Mr. Wong	-	26
Other	7	16
TOTAL	100	100

Table 2.7: Osman's Leadership Question,
by Ethnic Group and Gender(%)

	Husin Ali			
	Malay		Chinese	
	MM	MF	CM	CF
Mr. Halim	4	13	11	10
Mr. Ong	1	-	9	10
Mr. Zulkifli	85	83	46	26
Mr. Wong	-	-	20	36
Other	10	4	14	18
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

It may appear in retrospect that the selection of stimulus questions and the presentation of the questionnaire could have been more systematic. However, since there were so few previous studies to provide guidance, it was thought important to concentrate on questions likely to evoke the interest of both male and female respondents even if there was a risk that extra variables might complicate the interpretation of the findings. Professor Osman's question about political leadership was repeated to facilitate comparison with his findings. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that a similar pattern of response was observed to that of Osman's Table 2.5. Despite the change in the location of the study from Malacca town to Petaling Jaya, responses were basically

similar. It is hoped that this attempts to refine and extend Osman's work will provide a better understanding of the processes of change within Malaysia's polyethnic society. If so, it will illustrate the utility of an anascopic, or 'bottom-up' approach and the value of the methodology developed.

Professor Osman's study indicated that in a polyethnic society individuals at times align with other individuals of the same ethnic group, but on other occasions align themselves differently. Thus, ethnic boundaries do not necessarily maintain themselves. The actions of individuals in choosing whether or not to align themselves with others of similar ethnicity help to explain the strengthening, maintaining or weakening of ethnic boundaries. In this study, the strength of ethnic loyalty is measured by comparison with individual motivations such as self-interest and personal obligation.

Self-interest and personal obligation are not constant that can be abstracted from social contexts and used to build a general theory. However, they can also be used to formulate and group questions that measure the relative importance attached to conflicting goals. This enables the research worker to investigate the price individuals put upon ethnic loyalty.

Collection of What Seemed Realistic Conflicts and the Selection of Questions

In order to achieve what has been discussed above, judicious selection of imaginary situations that evoke the desired kind of response from the subject is demanded. Questions that depicted a clear-cut and realistic conflict were finally inserted in the questionnaire employed. A number of questions formulated which did not meet these requirements were dropped.

Those questions selected were grouped in five categories, balancing individual motivations against ethnic loyalty, viz., self-interest of the material kind, self-interest of the status kind, combination of self-interest of the material and status kinds, personal obligation, religious obligation and Osman's leadership question balanced against ethnic loyalty.

Nine of the questions were intended to measure the strength of ethnic alignment by comparison with self-interest. Four of these posed a choice between ethnicity and material interest in the form of monetary income, cheaper purchases, or security of property. Four posed a choice between ethnicity and a gain in social status by association with persons of higher social rank or fairer complexion. One combined status with possible monetary advantage. Five

questions posed a choice between ethnic and personal obligation. Two questions were directed at the influence of religious affiliation upon ethnic alignment, one of them by referring to the issue of corruption. Before 1976, prominent Malaysian leaders found to have behaved corruptly were put under pressure to resign from their posts, but more recently such persons have been prosecuted. One of the most colourful cases was that of a prominent Malay leader caught embezzling funds placed in a bank. When this came to light, some Malays were inclined to defend him, apparently on the grounds of ethnic loyalty. The leader's concerned was quiet and calm throughout the nineteen-month legal process, but his Malay followers drummed up support for him up and down the country. Kuala Lumpur became a nervous city as for weeks rumours circulated that his supporters would go on the rampage. So, one of the questions was designed to see whether endorsement by an Islamic group would have any effect on a candidate's chances in a situation tainted by previous corruption.

A prime feature of this technique is that the research worker, when selecting what seem realistic conflictual social situations, must provide a reasoned account of why he expects a particular pattern of response to a question before it is put to the test. The expectations of the research worker can then be compared with the findings of the survey so as to improve understanding of underlying principles and thus, to generate predictions about trends in the strengthening, maintenance or weakening of ethnic boundaries.

Before turning to the hypothetical social situations, an analytical framework has to be presented. Taking the shopping choice question as an example, the research worker was interested to know if Husin Ali would patronise Ah Kow's shop or change to Ahmad, and whether Husin Ali's mother would wish her son to do so, his mother having been chosen to represent pressures generated within the family and the ethnic group. Whatever the expectations made by the research worker or the preference made by the respondents, this question assumes that Husin Ali might be motivated by considerations of self-interest of the material kind to patronise the shop where prices were lower or by considerations of ethnic loyalty to patronise the Malay shop. When devising this question the research worker thought the four categories of respondents

identified, viz. Malay males, Malay females, Chinese males and Chinese females, could be asked to predict Husin Ali's behaviour and his mother's wishes. It is also important to note that there are three levels of expectation of Husin Ali's behaviour and of his mother's wishes when discussing each of these questions, viz.,

- i) these questions were selected because the research worker expected they would reveal conflict of alignment,
- ii) the four categories of respondents expected Husin Ali to behave in particular ways, and,
- iii) Husin Ali's behaviour would be influenced by what he thought others would expect of him.

General Assumptions

The research worker asked himself how he thought most Malays would predict Husin Ali's resolution of the problem facing him in such questions as whether to continue using Ah Kow's shop or to change to Ahmad's. He repeated this question for Malay females', Chinese males' and Chinese females' likely predictions. He then asked the same for each of these four categories regarding the other fifteen alignment questions. The next task was to explain why he expected these answers, to make explicit what had up to this point been his implicit assumptions about the determinants of alignment. Preliminary consideration suggested that there were three general assumptions related to differences of (a) ethnicity; (b) gender; and (c) generation, namely:

- (a) Malay and Chinese predictions would differ in accordance with their views of the Malays' claim to special privilege;
- (b) Male and female predictions would differ because males would be more involved in the commercial value of the workplace;
- (c) The grandparents' generation (represented by Husin Ali's mother) would be more influenced by older (pre-1969) values than the parental generation (represented by Husin Ali and his wife).

A fourth assumption, of a slightly different kind, needs to be added to this list. Malays are predominantly Muslim and their views of ethnic contact may be governed by Islamic norms.

These norms are often in conflict with the commercial norms relevant to (b). So, for Malays only, gender differences in response may also be influenced by religious commitment.

Expectations : General Hypotheses

1. Ethnic loyalty will be less salient in workplace relations compared with the domestic sphere.
2. Since males are usually the breadwinners, they are likely to be more career-minded than females, and will, therefore, attach more weight to self-interest.
3. Malays, as Muslims, are likely to be hesitant about food pollution from Chinese.
4. Malay females will be more concerned than Malay males about observing religious obligations.
5. Chinese, being more involved in the commercial culture, are likely to give higher priority to self-interest than are the Malays.
6. The Chinese are likely to project their own values when predicting the responses of a representative Malay.
7. No gender difference among Chinese was expected comparable to that based upon religious commitment among Malays.
8. Husin Ali's mother as a female representative of an older generation with less experience of non-Malays and of workplace relations, would be perceived as someone likely to be more suspicious of contacts with the Chinese and, therefore, as more strongly expecting Husin Ali to align himself ethnically.

9. It was expected that female respondents whether Malay or Chinese would be more likely than males to see Husin Ali's mother in this light.
10. The Malays have been influenced by the political campaign to encourage Malay entrepreneurship in competition with the Chinese.

Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Self-Interest of the Material

Kind

a) Shopping Choice

Husin Ali has been patronising Ah Kow's grocery store, noted for its cheapness and nearest to his house. Husin Ali has been informed that in a week's time, Ahmad will be opening a second grocery shop in his neighbourhood.

- i) Where will Husin Ali go?
 - [1] Ahmad's shop
 - [2] Ah Kow's shop
 - [3] Other
- ii) Where would his mother wish him to go?
 - [1] Ahmad's shop
 - [2] Ah Kow's shop
 - [3] Other

This question was designed to measure respondents' expectations of the relative strength of self-interest (SI) and ethnic loyalty (EL) as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. The two influences sometimes are in conflict with one another. At the time of Malaysia's independence, the Chinese were in virtual control of the commercial sector of the economy. This posed political dangers. The new government promoted Malay economic advancement by programmes which offered financial support and encouragement to Malay entrepreneurs. Malays' pride in their economic advance has also been influenced since 1975 by the growing Islamic revival. Islamic teachings about food pollution have reinforced the preference of some Malays for buying foodstuff from Malay grocers. As a result, there are now some Malay customers who deliberately plan their shopping so as to patronise fellow Malays almost

irrespective of distance, convenience and cost. For others, self-interest and ethnic loyalty can conflict when they make decisions about shopping.

Experience suggests that Chinese are, in general, more strongly motivated by self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty than are Malays. It was therefore, supposed that they would project their own views when predicting Husin Ali's behaviour, and expect him to continue to shop where the goods were cheap. The Chinese themselves are less affected by the issue of pollution, but their experience with Malay customers especially over this issue has made them more sensitive to the views of the Malays. In most Chinese shops, the arrangement of food items now reflects an awareness of pollution beliefs, so halal foods are stocked, and Malay sales persons are employed. These beliefs are better respected when the female Malay assistants have their heads covered.

Just as the ethnicity of the respondent may affect a prediction about Husin Ali's behaviour, so may the respondents' gender. It seemed likely that among both Chinese and Malays, males would be more inclined to see shopping as a relationship governed by the economic norm of self-interest. The males are the main breadwinners and have a tendency to be concerned with the 'bottom line' in their financial account. Males are also more career-oriented. Their occupational involvement covers a longer time span and brings them into constant contact with members of other ethnic groups who share the same life sentiments and interests. Moreover, the Malay females seem to be more influenced by Islamic revivalism than the males. Women outnumber men in membership in most of the contemporary religious movements such as the Islamic Youth Front, Islamic Party and Darul Arqam, to name but three. Even religious schools and Islamic courses at the institutions of higher learning registered more female students than their male counterparts. These women adhere more closely to Islamic tenets as exemplified in costume and in voluntary segregation when sitting in lecture halls at the universities and on public transport. Although other variables are involved, it is reasonable to expect that Malay females will be more inclined to predict that Husin Ali will make ethnically based decisions. When it comes to

predicting Husin Ali's mother's responses, it was supposed that Malays and females would be more likely to see her as favouring ethnic loyalty.

Table 3.1 : Question 3 : The Shopping Choice :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	EL

The previous paragraphs have set out the authors' expectations for each of the four categories of respondents as to whether they will expect Husin Ali to be motivated primarily by self-interest and continue shopping with Ah Kow, or, primarily by ethnic loyalty, thus, switching his patronage to Ahmad. They can be summarised as in Table 3.1 above.

b) The House Key

Husin Ali has to leave his house in a hurry to fetch his own family from the hospital. He has been expecting his sister to come at any moment to assist his family, but he has waited as long as he could. He wonders whether to leave his front door unlocked or to leave the key with his next door Chinese neighbour.

- i) What will Husin Ali do?
 - [1] Leave the front door unlocked
 - [2] Leave the key with his next door Chinese neighbour
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
 - [1] Leave the front door unlocked
 - [2] Leave the key with his next door Chinese neighbour
 - [3] Other

In the above question, the relative strength of self-interest and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay are expected to be conflictual. Malays migrated to the Chinese-dominated urban areas in the 1970's in response to the government policy of restructuring. They were attracted by the job opportunities and modern facilities opened

to them. With economic mobility, Malays are moving not only into the low cost, but also the prestigious, housing schemes.

Thus, Malays being themselves recent migrants to the urban areas and in adjusting to a social scene dominated by Chinese and their cultural practices, are likely to be influenced by a feeling of ethnic loyalty as they compete for home-ownership and adjust to the Chinese habits of keeping dogs, eating pork, ancestral worship, etc. Question 7 envisages a conflict, as distrust could develop between them over home-ownership and cultural differences when deciding to leave the house key with his next door Chinese neighbour.

It is supposed that the Chinese, as a commercially minded group, will be more strongly motivated by self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty and that they will project their own view onto Husin Ali. The experiences of Chinese in urban residential living may also have taught them to rely on and trust their neighbours, and to be alert to the possibility of theft. Under such understandings, the Chinese would expect Husin Ali to put aside ethnic loyalty and safeguard his property instead.

As argued in question 3, the males would be more inclined to see Husin Ali's predicament as a relationship to be governed by the economic norms of self-interest. The Malay females would be least likely to leave the house key with the next door Chinese neighbour because they are less socially mobile than their male counterparts, and thus, less used to establishing relationships with people outside the community.

Table 3.2 : Question 7 : The House Key :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	EL

However, Malays and females would be more conscious that Husin Ali's mother might be suspicious of a Chinese. These expectations can be summarised as in Table 3.2.

c) Renting Out the House

A Chinese accountant with two young children and his wife wants to rent Husin Ali's house. The house has been left unoccupied for the past six months.

- i) Will Husin Ali say yes?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to say?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

In selecting this question so as to compare the relative strength of self-interest and ethnic loyalty, it was assumed that Husin Ali's response would be governed by self-interest if he were to rent out the house or otherwise be motivated by ethnic loyalty in rejecting the offer.

To a Malay, a house is both a material property and a setting for worship. The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to keep dogs, eat pork, and place deities on a wall of the house. Such things are religiously prohibited to Malays and might prevent them renting their houses to Chinese as they have experienced difficulty in evicting Chinese tenants who sometimes sublet out the house to other boarders and even illegally convert the residential home into a small scale factory.

Table 3.3 : Question 15 : Renting Out the House :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	EL	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	EL

Thus, the Malays might expect Husin Ali to place ethnic loyalty above monetary return in order to avoid religiously polluting his house. The Chinese, motivated by the economic norms of self-interest, might not fully understand Husin Ali's feelings. However, the Chinese females were expected to recognise that Husin Ali's mother would exert an influence that would come before to material interest. These expectations can be summarised as in Table 3.3.

d) Child Minding

Husin Ali has a niece whose husband works as a school gardener. Theirs is a big family, living in a small rented Malay house next to a housing scheme. The wife supplements the meagre earnings of the husband by taking care of four tiny tots. One day, a young Chinese school teacher came to her house inquiring if she could take care of her one year old son as well.

- i) Will Husin Ali's niece say yes?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali's mother wish her granddaughter to say?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

In the above question, the relative strength of self-interest and ethnic loyalty as influences on the behaviour of a representative Malay were expected to be in conflict. The Malays, being recent migrants to the urban areas, and often not in close contact with other ethnic communities, such as by taking care of a Chinese tiny tot, might be faced with a dilemma as whether to accept the child and be governed by the economic norm of self-interest or reject the offer for reasons of ethnic loyalty. The Malay females would expect Husin Ali to reject the offer as they also fear that accepting a Chinese tiny tot would cause them to be seen by other Malays as too friendly towards Chinese. The Malay males and all Chinese were expected to put the monetary aspect first. As in the previous question, it was thought that Chinese females might identify Husin Ali's mother as being opposed to inter-ethnic contact.

The expectations can be summarised as in Table 3.4 below:

Table 3.4 : Question 16 : Child Minding:				
<u>Expected Responses</u>				
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	EL

Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Self-Interest of the Status Kind

a) The Zoo Trip

Husin Ali is going to bring his children to the zoo this coming Sunday. Husin Ali's son has been pestering his father to take along one of his friends on this trip.

- i) Whom will Husin Ali suggest to his son to take along on the trip?
 - [1] Ah Seng, a doctor's son
 - [2] Ali, whose mother works as a housemaid
 - [3] Other
- ii) Whom would Husin Ali's mother wish his son to take along this trip?
 - [1] Ah Seng, a doctor's son
 - [2] Ali, whose mother works as a housemaid
 - [3] Other

An individual can gain social status if he or she is seen associating with someone of high status. The same individual can lose social status if he or she is seen associating with someone who belongs to a rival ethnic group. There can, therefore, be a conflict between a desire for higher status and a desire for social approval. The way individuals resolve this conflict will depend upon their beliefs about how members of their group will interpret this behaviour.

Question 2 was designed to measure the relative strength of a presumed self-interest in the higher status that would be derived from association with persons who have themselves a higher status and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. It

was expected that these influences would not affect Husin Ali in an either/or choice situation but could affect his priorities.

The Malays, the Chinese and the Indians have never constituted three layers in an ethnic hierarchy. Each ethnic group coexists as an incipient whole society interacting with one another. They have their own systems of distributing esteem within the group. None of these ethnic groups are dominant and decisive in defining the relations of super-subordination. The Malays might be dominant politically, but subordinate to the Chinese in the economic sphere. Unlike the Malays, the Indians and the Chinese belonged to a cultural tradition of world eminence. Socially, the Malays have been in a backwater in their own country. Theirs is a society represented more by low esteem subsistence farmers, fishermen and labourers. Only a few Malays have managed to become technicians, teachers and administrators and to have entered the middle class. The top echelon has always been the preserve of the aristocracy and the political elites. Some Malays felt that political independence did not uplift their social esteem, but saw the growing solidification of the economic status and political rights of the Chinese and Indians. Scholars have pointed out that the social inequality between the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians was insufficiently explained by cultural differences, but was due more to an urban-biased developmental policy which failed to make modern amenities and opportunities available to Malays. As educational and occupational opportunities were improved, many Malays experienced social mobility. They moved from the rural to the urban areas; from the traditional subsistence agricultural sector to the tertiary and industrial sectors; from being manual labourers to executives and directors, some changed their political allegiance from a conservative to a democratic position; others joined the exclusive social clubs or lived in the high class residential areas of Damansara Heights, among others, which once had been 'foreign territories' to Malays. Despite these changes, some Malays found their rising expectations unfulfilled. The affirmative action policies taken were declared insufficient. The 'sons of the soil' mentality of the Malays make them feel that only they have the total rights to the country; some cultivated an idea of a Malay society as it was in olden days. Given such social trends, one could expect Malays to experience conflict between their self-interest in the higher status that could be derived from

associating with the doctor's son and ethnic loyalty towards the Malay boy who was a housemaid's son.

The Chinese experience of high status mobility may have made them more conscious than Malays of the possible status gain resulting from association with high status persons. On this reasoning, it seemed probable that in the circumstances envisaged in question 2, the Chinese would attach more weight to self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty than would the Malays. When the Chinese migrated to the then Malaya, some possessed skills and some came from an impoverished background, but through their efforts, they exploited their opportunities and participated in the development of the mining areas, the rubber plantations, the commercial sector and the towns. Their status system was dynamic with family and clan members distributed in all the strata. It was a pyramid in structure but not a disproportionate social esteem system as the Malays experienced. There were the urban labourers who formed the low esteem group, but they also had bookkeepers, dentists, retailers and teachers who represented the middle class. The top businessmen, professionals and the managerial group, apart from the political elites, formed the cream of their system of social esteem. To ensure mobility and obtain access to economic or political resources, many Chinese established social links with high status Malays, either through exclusive social clubs or home visiting. These link helped them establish joint ventures. The Chinese might well project their own views and expect Husin Ali to favour association with a person of higher status.

The sex of a respondent might also influence predictions about Husin Ali's behaviour. It seemed probable that the males would be more inclined to see choosing a friend for a weekend trip to the zoo as a relationship governed by status because they are more involved than females in possible status mobility at the work place. The Chinese and the Malay males were the main beneficiaries of any social changes in the country. They formed the bulk of the doctors, managers and the administrators. Membership of most exclusive social clubs is male-dominated. Social and political organisations might have more women as their members, but they are the ordinary members, as the males control the power structure. The women are left behind in the rural areas

to assist the male relatives to tend the agricultural activities. If the women were to migrate to the urban areas, at most they would become factory workers, having incomes little above the poverty line. Those who had better educational qualifications and higher prestige jobs, might not necessarily regard work as a career. Therefore, females might be governed more by ethnic loyalty rather than a presumed self-interest in a higher status.

Table 3.5 : Question 2 : The Zoo Trip :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	EL
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	EL	EL

For similar reasons and in line with arguments set out earlier, it was expected that Husin Ali's mother would favour ethnic loyalty.

b) Skin Complexion

Husin Ali is arranging a marriage for his son to one of his cousin's daughters. Given a choice, which will his son choose - the fairer but elder sister or her dark skin younger sister?

- i) Which will Husin Ali's son choose?
 - [1] The fairer but elder sister
 - [2] The dark skin younger sister
 - [3] Other
- ii) Which would Husin Ali's mother wish her grandson to choose?
 - [1] The fairer but elder sister
 - [2] The dark skin younger sister
 - [3] Other

The above question tried to measure the relative strength of a presumed self-interest in skin complexion and the age of a person as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. Both Malays and Chinese were thought to consider fair skin colour more important than a younger age. They would expect Husin Ali to have similar feelings.

Anthropologists listed the Malays as belonging to the Malay-Polynesian group. Their skin colour is generally brownish. The political definition of a Malay extends beyond such comprehension. It includes not only the other sub-ethnic groupings as the Javanese, Minangkabau, and others, but other ethnic groupings too, such as the Arabs and Indians who are Caucasians, and the Thais, Cambodians, and the Chinese who are Mongoloid within its defined orbit. The range of skin colours is thus, tremendous. Yet it is generally observed that the Malays preferred a fair skin complexion. Thus, expressions of pleasure are often heard when a new-born baby is fair or it is learned that a future son or daughter in law has a fair complexion. The status system of the Malays also indicates a gradation of colour variations with social position. The Malay elites, especially the aristocrat class, have fair skin complexion. The teachers and administrators of the middle class possess brownish skin complexion. While the bottom social group of Malay labourers, farmers and fishermen are darker in complexion. Often fair skin women tend to marry higher status men.

Table 3.6 : Question 8 : Skin Complexion :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	SI	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	SI	SI	SI	SI

These observations speak for the Chinese community too. When the Chinese initially migrated to Malaysia, they left their womenfolk behind. Chinese males married local Malay women, while retaining their ethnic identity. Such practices could be observed in Malacca and Penang. As the sex ratio balanced up, the practice of marrying Malay women came to an end. The progeny of such relationships produced later generations of Chinese who had a brownish skin colour. As a fair skin complexion is culturally preferred and the Chinese relative to Malays are motivated more by the economic norm of self-interest, they might identify a fair complexion as conferring social esteem. As observed in the Malays' perception of skin colour, the eagerness of

the Chinese is motivated by materially supported belief that skin colour variations do represent status variations too. Thus, skin colour is not only a cultural preference but also related to a presumed self-interest in a person's status. Hence, Husin Ali and his mother were predicted by both Malays and Chinese to favour the sister with the fair skin complexion despite being older in age.

c) Child Adoption

Husin Ali wants to adopt a child. The Social Welfare Department has sent him some forms to be filled and two colour photographs of a fair Chinese child and a dark skin Malay child.

- i) Which will Husin Ali choose?
 - [1] The dark skin Malay child
 - [2] The fairer Chinese child
 - [3] Other
- ii) Which would his mother wish him to adopt?
 - [1] The dark skin Malay child
 - [2] The fairer Chinese child
 - [3] Other

In this subsequent question, the relative strength of a fair skin colour complexion as presumably reflecting self-interest was balanced against ethnic loyalty. These influences were expected to come into conflict with one another as the behaviour of a representative Malay responses to the problem of child adoption above.

The Malays prefer a fair skin complexion especially in women. Malays themselves have experience a fair skin as a potential passport to marriage with a person of higher social status. It is observed that the higher status Malays are fairer in skin colour than their middle class counterparts while the bottom group of labourers and agriculturists are darker in complexion. Despite being an asset, a fair skin colour combined with an ethnic difference produces a conflict. The Chinese boy adopted might have a fair skin, but the epicanthic eyelid would make other Malays realise that the child is an adopted Chinese. Though it is a frequent practice among the

Malays to adopt a Chinese child rather than an Indian, informal disapproval of such action is among the pressures which give rise to conflicts.

The Chinese would not see such a choice as conflictual, a fair skin colour child being most preferred. Being an infant, there would not be any cultural hindrance for a Malay to adopt the Chinese child as from infancy he could be socialised to become an ethnic Malay. These perceptions of the Chinese would cause them to predict that Husin Ali would be governed more by the presumed self-interest in skin colour.

The Malay females are likely to have other priorities, in which fear of ethnic pressure may prevail over the cultural preference for a fair skin complexion. Experiences the Malays have with the Indian Muslims who have reaped the political benefits of being Muslim, but in terms of cultural identity have oscillated between being Indian and being Malay, have raised doubts about the benefits of absorbing other ethnic groups. The Malays have faced a similar problem with Chinese who have converted to Islam. Malays doubt the Chinese search for salvation, fearing the reason for conversion being to exploit the material benefits of being counted as a Malay. Child adoption and converting the Chinese to Islam may thus, be counter-productive strategies for strengthening the Malays' ethnic domination, as other ethnic groups who become Malays might weaken the Malay domination from within. Historical experiences in Thailand and Indonesia have shown the Malays that the indigenous groups could still lose out to the assimilated Chinese migrants both economically and politically. Such fears influenced Malays to think that Husin Ali's mother's would view negatively any decision to adopt the Chinese child and thus, be governed by ethnic loyalty.

Table 3.7 : Question 10 : Child Adoption :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	SI

d) The Wedding Invitation

Husin Ali received two wedding invitations which happen to fall on the same day.

- i) To whom will he go first?
 - [1] Leong's house, a company director
 - [2] Ismail's house, who works as a storekeeper
 - [3] Other
- ii) To whose house would Husin Ali's mother wish him to go first?
 - [1] Leong's house, a company director
 - [2] Ismail's house, who works as a storekeeper
 - [3] Other

The question about wedding invitations was designed to measure the relative strength of a presumed self-interest in associating with a person with a higher status and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a Malay. These influences are often in conflict with one another. Malays have often avoided attending a wedding reception given by a Chinese as they feared food pollution. The Chinese have displayed roast pork on the eating table and the foods offered were not free from pork, lard, whisky and other non-halal things. However, as some Malays experienced social mobility and started climbing the social ladder, an invitation by a higher status Chinese could be an esteem-booster signifying class acceptance. Furthermore, attending such a gathering would bring them into contact with other high status persons; they might become valuable contacts for their working careers or business activities. Often job changing and business ventures were initially established from such informal situations. These Malay social climbers found out that fear of food pollution was a generalisation of the past as Chinese had of late been hiring Muslim cooks to prepare meals for their Malay guests. These Malay social climbers were also well aware and sensitive to the views of the other Malays who would frown upon them for being pro-Chinese and losing a sense of their own ethnic identity. So a Malay would expect Husin Ali to be in conflict as to whether to go to the director's wedding invitation first or to the storekeeper, as he is being confronted with a conflict between self-interest in a higher status and ethnic loyalty.

The Chinese who are generally more motivated by the economic norm of self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty than Malays, would expect Husin Ali to behave like themselves; to associate first with a person having a higher status. The Chinese are not only the social seekers of material success but proud social climbers as well. They have attended national gatherings and invitations from Malay elites as such gatherings confer status recognition and provide meeting places for future material gains. In reciprocating to such class exchanges, the Chinese have been made aware of the Malay aversion from pork.

For reasons set out earlier, the Malay females predicted Husin Ali to be motivated more by ethnic loyalty as questions of food pollution and ethnic identity clouded their minds. Such prediction is plausible as the Malay females are peripherally affected by the process of social mobility going on and most committed to the traditional interpretation of Islam. With regard to Husin Ali's mother, apart from the Chinese males, the rest would expect her to be governed by ethnic loyalty relative to the presumed self-interest in a person with a higher status. Thus, the mother was expected to be more inclined to go to the storekeeper's wedding party first.

Table 3.8 : Question 5 : The Wedding Invitation :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	SI
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	SI	EL

e) Halimah in a Volvo

Husin Ali's daughter, Halimah, who works in a factory making electronic components was seen going out with her company's assistant personnel manager, a Chinese, driving a silver metallic Volvo 340.

- i) How will Husin Ali react?
 - [1] Approve
 - [2] Disapprove
 - [3] Other

- ii) How would Husin Ali's mother wish him to react?
 - [1] Approve
 - [2] Disapprove
 - [3] Other

The above question tapped sentiments of both material interest and status as it was expected that the assistant manager might propose marriage to Halimah. The question was designed so as to measure the respondents' expectations of the relative strength of self-interest and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay.

Inter-ethnic marriages are rare. Resistance to them might be weakest in the case of Chinese-Indian unions. When inter-ethnic marriages involve a Malay partner, the pattern is almost always for the member of the other ethnic group to be converted to Islam and for the offspring to be identified as ethnic Malays. Without doubt, the marriage of the Chinese assistant manager and Halimah, a factory operator, would bring status and material security to her and her family, but the ethnic pressure might bring the couple more hardship than happiness. A crisis might be avoided if the Chinese assistant manager not only loved Halimah, but earnestly converted to Islam, and lived a Malay cultural life. Thus, Malays would expect Husin Ali to be in conflict as he tussles with the idea of putting the self-interest in status and material gains over ethnic loyalty.

The Chinese being motivated relative to Malays more by the economic norm of self-interest would predict Husin Ali to be swayed by the advantage of allowing Halimah to marry the Chinese assistant manager. The latter would have to be converted to Islam, which would be a gain from the Chinese, but the move would bring higher status and material gain to the Malays.

The females would expect Husin Ali to give priority to ethnic loyalty. The Malay females would fear cultural differences as hindering the couples from having a happy life. The Chinese females would feel a sense of loss as a male member, the basis of a patriarch family order, was to marry a female from and be a part of another ethnic group. Sometimes questions of status and material gains, of altruistic value of love and cultural hindrance are trivial influences compared to the demands of ethnic loyalty among the Malays. They fear their group would stigmatise them for

selling out to the Chinese for allowing a daughter to marry a Chinese. Realising such strength of ethnic loyalty with the Malays, all categories would expect Husin Ali's mother to respond more in ethnic terms.

Table 3.9 : Question 9 : Halimah 's Volvo :

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	SI	EL	SI	EL
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	EL	EL

Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Personal Obligations

a) Supporting the Boss

Mr. Tay, a mechanical engineer who graduated from Oxford, has been the head of Husin Ali's Mechanical Department for the past three years. A Malay group within his department is trying to replace his boss with a Malay candidate.

- i) Will Husin Ali support his boss?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

The question was designed to measure the respondents' expectations of the relative strength of personal obligations and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. The two influences can come into conflict when there exists one set of norms governing the mutual obligations of people who work together and another set governing relations defined in ethnic terms.

The geographical advantages of being born and raised in the urban areas helped give the non-Malay communities, especially the Chinese, better access to modern educational and

training facilities available. Thus, even before the country gained independence, the Chinese and the Indians had been filling up the professional and the technical levels of both the government and the private sector as doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, etc. This scenario is still observable today. Industrial experiences and training are far from equal among the ethnic groups.

With appropriate training, of late, Malays have been entering the professional and the technical fields. However, being recent recruits to these levels, Malays have found themselves in a subordinate position in the workplace. They have found their Chinese bosses to be competent in their tasks, and practised in administering a decision making process that is open to participation by subordinates. Inter-personal relations between Chinese bosses and Malay subordinates do not often extend beyond the workplace, yet a certain degree of friendship and obligation is felt. The Chinese boss might not have a sense of humour or talk freely with Malays, but feelings of consideration, trust and respect exist and they tolerate each other's idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, the Malays are aware that the managerial and professional groups, especially in the private sector, are dominated by Chinese. In 1970 as part of the restructuring policy, the private sector was opened to Malays. The statistics on Malay employment might indicate that their representation is proportionate to their population in the society, but close scrutiny would indicate that they are over represented in the lower rank of the labour force; as factory operators and manual labourers. Not only are more Chinese promoted up the managerial ladder; but a lesser number of Malays are recruited to management. Malays believe the Chinese to be too ambitious and many have resigned to join other companies when they found the corporate world too competitive. The failure of particular Malays to rise in the industrial structure has been symbolically important to Malay workers at large. Flames of ethnic consciousness could be fanned as Malay aspirations are thwarted. In such circumstances, one would expect Malays to predict that Husin Ali would experience conflict as he weighed the need to support his Chinese boss vis-a-vis the need to recognise his own ethnic group's interest.

The Chinese being, relative to the Malays, motivated more by economic norms, would predict that Husin Ali would support his boss and not succumb to pressure. As an Oxford graduate, it may be inferred that Mr. Tay has the technical and managerial competence to handle

the job. Furthermore, being his own immediate departmental boss, Husin Ali is expected to have developed good personal relations with Mr. Tay. The sex dimension should bring out any inability of female Malays to comprehend and appreciate the strength of personal obligation contracted at the workplace.

Table 3.10 : Question 13 : Supporting the Boss :

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	PO	EL	PO	PO
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	PO	EL

b) Indian Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party

Husin Ali has an Indian friend as his workmate. His Indian friend is throwing a wedding party for his daughter at his house.

- i) Will Husin Ali go?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) Would Husin Ali's mother wish him to go?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

The above question was designed to measure the respondents' expectations of the relative strength of personal obligations and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. These two influences come into conflict with one another as Husin Ali ponders on whether to go or not to go to his Indian workmate's daughter's wedding party.

Malays, Chinese and Indians have lived side by side in the peninsula for several generations. As Malaysia gained independence and developed economically, the social contacts in the market place widened to include other areas such as school, residential areas, and

workplace. At the workplace, the demand for cooperative relations between Indians and Malays has caused the conception of work relationships to extend beyond that which is necessary to earning a living. It generates expectations of socialisation and friendship, binding fellow-workers together. Their sense of personal worth derives not only from what they accomplish but also from the esteem accorded a man by his workmates irrespective of ethnicity. It should also be noted that the economic and political position of the Indians is less threatening to the Malays. The Indians are sandwiched between the Chinese and the Malays, though of late, some Indian professionals have been siding with the Chinese-based political parties, such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP). Indians usually prefer to shelter under the Malay political umbrella to defend their commercial and trading interests in the face of the economic encroachment of the Chinese. Compared to the Chinese, the Indians are socially closer; they converse more in Malay; some of them are Muslims; in case of inter-ethnic marriage with the Malays, the Indian partners more readily identify themselves as Malays, while politically they have always been supportive of the Malays. Thus, despite some socio-cultural differences, the Malays could be expected to predict that Husin Ali will attend his workmate's daughter's wedding party as the personal obligations developed between them as workmates is likely to override any concern for religious and ethnic differences. It would be embarrassing for him not to do so, as the Indian is his workmate, someone whom he sees every day of his working life and with whom he has probably developed mutual dependence and trust.

The Chinese, being influenced more by the economic norm of self-interest than by expectation of ethnic loyalty, would be more strongly inclined to expect Husin Ali to attend his Indian workmate's daughter's wedding party.

In respect to Husin Ali's mother, the females would predict that she would not want Husin Ali to go to the party as religious differences are likely to weigh more heavily in her judgement. The Indians may not eat pork, but the females are concerned about how the goats are slaughtered. The red and white markings on the foreheads of the female and male Indians, respectively, may be familiar sights, but the display of the statues of the Hindu gods and goddess

in the house often makes Malays feel theologically lost in a world of idol-worshippers. Malay females may have realised that the Malays have been adopting Indian cultural features as exemplified in the curry-based foods that they are taking, the ritual aspects of marriage ceremony that they practise, and the borrowing of words of Sanskrit origin, but this socio-cultural closeness may not be valued by the females. They may also underestimate the strength of a friendship generated at the workplace.

Table 3.11 : Question 12 : Attending a Wedding Party :
Expected Responses

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	PO	PO	PO	PO
Husin Ali's mother	PO	EL	PO	EL

c) Child's Playmate

Husin Ali has a next door Chinese neighbour who likes her child to play with Husin Ali's two-year old daughter. Will he allow the Chinese neighbour to take his daughter to their house for an afternoon?

- i) Would Husin Ali agree to the request?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

The question was designed to measure the respondents' expectations of the relative strength of personal obligations and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. The two influences sometimes are in conflict with one another as Malays confront the request of the Chinese next door neighbours to take Husin Ali's daughter home as playmate to their child for an afternoon.

One is rarely in a position to choose one's next door neighbours. Thus, when such requests are made to Malays by Chinese, the fear of food pollution as Chinese eat pork and use lard for cooking, are likely to come to mind. Yet as a consequence to their residential and physical proximity, the neighbours, including toddlers, would probably have become friendly. The wives while gardening and drying the clothes, would have exchanged gestures and greetings across the fence. The husbands, on coming home from work and while playing with the children in the compound, would talk to their neighbours, and even at times, borrow gardening tools and newspapers from one another. The toddlers could have been playing with one another through the fence exchanging sweets and biscuits, touching and being physically aggressive. Such relations may be viewed by Malays as friendly and limited to that social context. If this is the nature of a relationship between neighbours, a Malay would experience conflict as he or she had to decide whether or not to allow a daughter to go over the fence and be the next door Chinese neighbour's daughter's playmate.

The Chinese being more strongly motivated by economic norms would probably uphold personal obligations over ethnic loyalty relative to the Malays, and expect Husin Ali to allow his daughter to be brought home by the neighbour for an afternoon. The Chinese might not understand the Malay's fears about food pollution; at least not with one's neighbour. Furthermore, the Chinese place great interest on the toddler's development, for though child-parent relationship is considered the first relationship in which physical contact and affection are learned, it is in the peer-child relationship that toddlers' personality and social behaviour develop. Toddlers learn to adjust socially and imitate behaviours from one another. Pre-school nursery and kindergarten traditions are more popular among the Chinese than the Malays.

The female Malays may be expected to be more worried by the request, not only because of the food pollution problem, but also because they may fear that fellow Malay neighbours will frown upon them if they agree to it. Malays would, therefore, expect Husin Ali's mother to advise Husin Ali not to allow his daughter to go over to the neighbour's house for an afternoon.

Table 3.12 : Question 15 : Child's Playmate :

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	PO	EL	PO	PO
Husin Ali's mother	EL	EL	PO	PO

d) Bringing a Friend Home

Husin Ali’s twelve-year old son wants to bring his Chinese friends home to play.

- i) Will Husin Ali say yes?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- ii) What would Husin Ali’s mother wish him to do?
 - [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

The question was designed to measure the respondents’ expectations of the relative strength of personal obligations and ethnic loyalty as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. The two influences sometimes are in conflict with one another as Malays react to Husin Ali’s son’s intention of bringing a Chinese friend home to play.

The Malays would probably predict that approval for the Chinese boy to come and play in the house with Husin Ali’s son would be readily given. Fears of food pollution and the possibility of misbehaviour by the children should not arise as the family can supervise their playing time. To go against the wish of the son in bringing home a friend, even a Chinese, might hurt the son's feeling as indicating a sense of distrust on the part of the parents about his ability to choose a suitable friend. It is generally observed that during this pre-adolescence period, friendships may take priority over relations of kith and kin. In this period, emotional ties and cultural elements are formed, learned, explored, played with and discarded. Matters such as sex and aggression can

be discussed and explored among themselves better than in their relations with adults. Thus, friendships can grow, and later override concern about ethnic differences.

The Chinese were thought more likely to expect Husin Ali to approve such a request, but solely on the basis of personal obligations of friendship as this reflects the way they wanted to live or have lived during their childhood.

Once again, however, there was an exception that the females, both Malays and Chinese, would predict that Husin Ali's mother would put less emphasis on such personal obligations felt by her son.

Table 3.13 : Question 18 : Bringing a Friend Home:

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	PO	PO	PO	PO
Husin Ali's mother	PO	EL	PO	EL

e) Mother's Wishes Concerning Marriage

Husin Ali's wife has been persuading her daughter to marry Muhammad Lee - a son of her Chinese Muslim friend.

- i) Will the daughter say yes to her mother?

[1] Yes

[2] No

[3] Other
- ii) Would Husin Ali's mother wish her grand-daughter to agree?

[1] Yes

[2] No

[3] Other

The above question was designed to measure the respondents' predictions of the relative strength of personal obligations and ethnic loyalty for a representative Malay.

Among the Malays, mate selection and marriages require if not the choice, then at least the consent of the children, but they almost always require parental approval. Few Malays would insist on the mate chosen if their parents disapprove. In some cases, marriages are arranged by the parents even without the consent of the children, but many parents are aware that any such arrangement would arouse the resentment of their child.

Children have to rely on parental approval as the matrimonial processes of negotiation, the ceremonies, and ritual aspects are conducted by the parents themselves or by their representatives. Furthermore, Islamic law requires that the consent of parents or their representatives be obtained. Few Malays choose civil marriage as it is protected by no religious sanction. Young people who lack parental approval occasionally elope to neighbouring countries such as Thailand, but this is liable to bring shame on both families. Since parent-child relationships are supposed to be distinguished by the strongest feelings of duty and obligation, few would dare to elope. For the daughter, a mother continues to be an important source of support, both in practical ways and by giving advice and moral approval. Thus, most Malays would acknowledge that parents have a right to make demands upon their adult children, and that most children should do their best to meet those demands.

Parents choose mates for their children so as to consolidate kinship ties and property which results in marriages within sub-ethnic groupings; the Kelantanese Malays marry among themselves, so do the Javanese and others. As the country developed economically, Malays experienced geographical and social mobility, breaking down parental and community controls and developing individualistic attitudes which would very likely enhance the possibility of independent decisions in this and other spheres. Among the young Malays, love and courtship have become the basis of mate selection, and parents have found themselves adjusting to the changes as they try to maintain child-parent relations. Young people are bringing home partners from other sub-ethnic groupings; the Kedah Malays are marrying Bugis Malays from Selangor, the Perak Malays are marrying Penang Malays, and so on, despite the socio-cultural differences between them. There are also physical differences, as some groups, such as Kelantanese and

Johoreans, belong to the Malay-Polynesian group, while some other groups, such as Penang Malays, is Indian in origin. In other cases, as they study together in the local institution of higher learning or working in the same department, Malays are bringing home Chinese friends, seeking parental approval to marriage and may receive it if a non-Muslim agrees to convert to Islam. With Islamic revivalism, the liberal attitude to mate selection based on love and courtship is increasingly subject to this religious condition and the period of courtship is reduced to a minimum.

Under such circumstances, the Malay might be expected to predict that Husin Ali's daughter would defer to her mother's proposal to marry Muhammad Lee as the intensity of a mother-daughter obligation fostered would be sufficient for her not to say otherwise. As Islamic revivalism increases, young people have to rely increasingly on the choices made by friends and parents. Furthermore, with social changes occurring and reinforced by Islamic teachings, Malay preference for a Malay spouse weakens relative to the stress on religion.

Table 3.14 : Question 17 : Mother's Wishes :

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	PO	PO	PO	PO
Husin Ali's mother	PO	EL	PO	EL

The Chinese being more influenced by the economic norms relative to Malays would predict that the daughter would say yes to the mother's wishes as the conjugal relationships between a Malay and Chinese would be of advantage socio-economically, and also bring the two friends closer as in-laws. Furthermore, Muhammad Lee, though Chinese, has a Muslim name, implying that he comes from a Muslim family. Being co-religious, there should not be much opposition to the choice made. Just like the Malays, the Chinese hold that the children may have the right to choose their own partners, but the consent of the parent should be duly obtained.



Questions and Expected Resolutions of Ethnic Loyalty versus Religious Obligations**a) The Treasurer's Post**

Husin Ali will be attending his local branch political party's election next week. The treasurer's post is a keenly contested three-cornered fight. The previous treasurer was found to have embezzled the party's funds.

- i) For whom will Husin Ali vote?
 - [1] Ramli, a businessman linked to the Chinese elites
 - [2] Hamzah, a school teacher with grassroots support from the local Malays.
 - [3] Salleh, a candidate backed by an Islamic group
 - [4] Other
- ii) Who would Husin Ali's mother wish him to vote?
 - [1] Ramli
 - [2] Hamzah
 - [3] Salleh
 - [4] Other

The question was designed to measure the respondents' expectations of the relative strength of religious obligations (RO) relative to ethnic based relationships (EL), either with fellow Malays or with the Chinese as influences upon the behaviour of a representative Malay. As the previous treasurer of Husin Ali's local branch political party was found to have embezzled the party's fund, the patterns of voting expected to the post would be of significance to an understanding of the place of Islam in the mind of the Malays.

Since the racial riots of 1969, Malays have been asserting themselves Islamically, as manifested in their religious awareness and practices. The mosques are no longer places of solitude for the older Malays, but are increasingly venues for the younger Malays to meet and perform their five daily congregational prayers. Classes and discussions inspired by a thirst for knowledge of Islam are held nightly and almost everywhere: from the mosque to the Malay homes, at schools and in the lecture halls of the local universities, at the social clubs and even in their offices. There are changes in their behaviours; skull caps are worn, beards are kept,

mingling between the sexes is frowned upon, concern about food pollution increases, commercial transactions bearing interest are avoided, and Islamic-based universalistic values such as rights, justice and equality are being discussed. Increasingly, the Malays are mobilised no more along the traditional lines of politically-based associations such as PAS or UMNO, but by non-governmental-based religious organisations such as ABIM, Tabligh and Al Arqam. They stress Islam as a way of life, beginning with one's self, the family, the community of neighbours, the society, the nations and the universe. A commitment to a total way of life is demanded from the organisational members and this has affected how they perceive their society to be ordered, how social problems are to be solved, and how the country is to be run. The government is responding to demands for an Islamic University, Islamic Insurance, an Islamic Bank, Islamic Medical Centres and for linking developmental policy to Islamic tenets. Malay political leaders use religion to mobilise Malay votes.

This is manifested in their costume, their use of Arabic words and in pro-Islamic statements. Would Husin Ali be expected to vote for Salleh because of his religious stance? However, to be a treasurer, faith may be viewed by some Malays as secondary, and competency in accounting skills and experiences count first. Ramli with a business background would be well grounded in accounting skills and experiences and these would be an asset to the local branch. His relation to the Chinese elites would be an additional asset as no party could govern Malaysia without coming into a coalition with the other ethnic political parties. Yet Malays are constantly reminded that accounting skills and connection with the Chinese elites may not be an asset at all. The BMF scandal of 1983 is recalled, in which a subsidiary of the prestigious Bank Bumiputra, lost about M\$2.4 billion in ill-advised transactions in the Hong Kong property market, principally in the ventures with the Carrian group headed by George Tan, from whose executives some BMF top Bumiputra officials had accepted bribes. Fears of such financial perversion worry the Malays as the trappings of modernity and materialism have produced Malay businessmen lacking in honesty and responsibility. Thus, somebody with grassroots support may be seen as the best candidate. Hamzah shines over the other candidates, as being educated; it would be possible for him to learn the necessary technical skills needed to perform his tasks, and being close to the

grassroots, the ordinary members should be able to check him if they thought that he too might falter. The voices of the ordinary Malays would prevail and their own ethnic interests be secured. However, one would not know how the Malays would expect Husin Ali to behave, as the pressures of Islamic revivalism, the forces of modernity and Malay ethnic sentiments interact with one another in a conflictual manner on Husin Ali's voting pattern.

The Chinese being more strongly motivated by self-interest relative to ethnic loyalty or religious obligations than Malays, might expect Husin Ali to vote for a candidate with a strong grassroots Malay support. For Husin Ali to vote for a candidate connected with Chinese elites might seem more risky. Like wise, a religiously inclined Malay would be viewed by Chinese as anti-materialist and too other-worldly.

Just as the ethnicity of the respondents may affect their expectations of Husin Ali's behaviour, so may the respondents' sex be a factor. It was expected that, confronted with corruption and wishing to avoid any repetition, the Malay females would expect Husin Ali to vote for a religiously inclined individual, thinking such piety would deter such act from happening again. The Malay males, being less religious and more politically mobilised than the females, would not have the same expectation and would think it sufficient if Husin Ali were to vote for somebody with a Malay link rather than one who is pious or supported by the Chinese elites. However, the Malays and Chinese expected Husin Ali's mother to place piety as a factor in deciding as to whom Husin Ali should vote so as to ensure ethnic interests and to avoid any repetition of financial embezzlement of the local branch political party's funds again.

Table 3.15 : Question 6 : The Treasurer's Post :

	Expected Responses			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	EL	RO	EL	EL
Husin Ali's mother	RO	RO	RO	RO

b) The Students' Union Election

Husin Ali's daughter, attending one of the local universities, wonders whom should she vote for as president of the university's Students' Union.

- i) For whom would Husin Ali's daughter vote?
 - [1] Malik, who takes religion as a personal choice
 - [2] Akhbar, who prefers religion to be seen as a separate issue from politics
 - [3] Daud, who is a committee member of the students' Islamic Society
 - [4] Others
- ii) For whom would Husin Ali's mother wish her granddaughter to vote for?
 - [1] Malik
 - [2] Akhbar
 - [3] Daud
 - [4] Others

The above question was designed to measure the respondents' expectations of the strength of religious obligations relative to a person's level of religious commitment as reflected in the characteristics of the candidates to be chosen by Husin Ali's daughter.

Student activities and piety mirror broader social trends in the nation. Education and mobility are the keys to freedom and advancement. However, the government's intention to create an urban, Malay middle class with manufacturing as the cornerstone, and their vision of Malays as producers and consumers, secular and modern, are now increasingly being questioned. Greater religious awareness stimulates Malays to search for something more spiritually permanent than materialism.

The beginning of 1970's saw Islamic activists gaining control of the student unions at the various local universities. Over the years, different strands of Malay Islamic activist groups, such as ABIM, PAS, Islamic Representative Council, Al Arqam, Tabligh, etc., evolved. Some of these struggled to control the unions. Western ideologies as well as UMNO's secularism were rejected in favour of an Islamic system. Watching television was considered haram, i.e., religiously forbidden, as it lulled the mind into neglecting God. Males and females who were found

mixing and talking would be reprimanded. The wearing of ties and coats were considered the habits of infidels and to be in blind imitation of the West. Any form of musical and cultural concerts or other public entertainment held on the campuses, such as the Sheila Majid's concert at the University of Malaya on tenth of September 1989, would be the object of protests and demonstrations. On occasions, the police were called in. The standard fare of activities offered by Islamically controlled students' unions included Islamic conferences, forums, seminars, workshops, talks and religious retreats. Those initiated would attend regularly the five daily congregational prayers and the weekly Islamic study group. As dressing is an important symbolic measure of their commitment to the Islamic movement, the process of covering-up from just wearing a scarf to a veil and robe among the females, and skull cap to turban and robe among the males could be observed. Their ability to promote Islamic orthodoxy cannot be underestimated since as they left the universities, these graduates took their piety with them into the government bureaucracy, their community of residence and the society.

Yet there are Malay students who were not ready for such changes and religious commitment. They felt ambivalent and confused as the tug-of-war strained them to make a choice between modernity and secularism on the one hand, and Malay tradition and Islamic values on the other. Islamic values and controls as exercised by the Islamic study group leaders were experienced as suffocating their desire to make friends with others, to join university projects and to enjoy the social activities offered. Feeling disillusioned, they became sceptical and rebelled against such restrictions. These students saw the Malaysian government as committed to Islamising Malaysia. Though various Islamic discourses held at the universities sounded militant, they were criticised as mere rhetorics that would not change the world at all. No activities were organised that exploited the students' intellectual skills to restructure the larger society and combat the social ills observed. The programmes offered stifled creativity. They served the interest of the Islamic group supporters only and excluded both non-Malays and those Malays who felt sceptical of the activists. So the late 1980's saw greater moderation in the student activism on the campuses. The liberal, multi-racial, nationalist blocs emerged to challenge the dominance of the Islamic groups. They are now beginning to control the student unions not only

at the University of Malaya, but also the National University and the Science University. On coming to power, these liberal, multi-racial, nationalist leaders avoided the more puritanical and passive Islamic programmes. Islam is still a formidable force on the university campuses; indeed these liberal, multi-racial, nationalist leaders claim Islam as the basis of their struggle. They want to be true to the faith and practise Islam in its totality, but without being extremist. There is nothing un-Islamic about co-operating with the Chinese and the Indian students, because Islam preaches unity and tolerance. They see nothing un-Islamic about organising community services in which all the ethnic groups are involved. The fact that an activity does not carry the word 'Islam' in its title does not automatically make those activities un-Islamic. Thus, a liberal approach that takes Islam into account without excluding others, came to replace Islamic activism on the campuses.

In between these two responses to the pressures of a society undergoing rapid industrialisation and change, are the students, who feel ambivalent about Islam and find themselves absorbed more deeply into the changing make-up of western materialism. Today, they are under the influence of Madonna, tomorrow they adopt other models, as they reject Rambo as an image in ordering their life in this constantly changing and uncertain world. Under such pressures for change, and coming under the influences of many forces, be these be Islam, ethnicity, the liberal mind or just pure western culture, Malay students are pulled in several directions as they decide which candidate they should vote for in the election held by students' union.

Table 3.16 : Question 4 : The Students' Union Election :

	<u>Expected Responses</u>			
	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Husin Ali	RO	RO	EL	EL
Husin Ali's mother	RO	RO	RO	RO

The Chinese, being more strongly motivated by self-interest relative to religious obligations or ethnic loyalty than Malays, might expect Husin Ali's daughter to choose a candidate acceptable to the Malays, without being a religious zealot opposed to worldly interests.

As the surge of Islamic revivalism on the campuses is considered to be still formidable, Husin Ali's daughter might be expected to vote in terms of religious obligations by the Malays irrespective of sex differences. Both Malays and Chinese were likely to expect Husin Ali's mother to advise her granddaughter to vote for a candidate with Islamic credentials.

Conclusion of the Alignment Question

Looking back to the expectations of the responses to the alignment questions of material and status interests, and personal obligations, Malays were expected to sense the force of religious dogma and ethnic sentiment rather than the material and personal gains in themselves. Malays were expected to experience a dilemma while the Chinese were expected to put material gains above ethnic sentiment and interest.

Even a preliminary consideration of these questions and the difficulty of predicting how four different kinds of Malaysian will be expected to respond, is sufficient to bring out the difficulty in selecting questions which will neatly distinguish and compare the various influences bearing upon the ethnic alignment of a middle class male Malaysian of Malay origin. It should also show that the issues are ones which should be of great interest to social scientists. If more research is undertaken into such choice situations, it should be possible to identify the determinants better.

A general discussion of Petaling Jaya and Section 14, the study area, is briefly presented in the beginning of this chapter. The second part focuses on the research enterprise of collecting primary data, the strategy and the process of interviewing, and the problems faced in doing research work in an urban and polyethnic residential area. It ends with a general observation of ethnic relations in Petaling Jaya.


Petaling Jaya and the Study Area

Petaling Jaya has a polyethnic community. There are Malays, Chinese, Indians, other Malaysian ethnic communities, and foreigners. The residential community and township of Petaling Jaya are a post-independence development. In 1957 it ranked thirteenth, the smallest of the gazetted towns in Peninsular Malaysia. It has been steadily developed, so that by 1980 it ranked fifth. Unlike Sanusi Osman's study area, Malacca town, Petaling Jaya is a "new world" where local settlers are eclipsed by immigrants from other states and ethnic groups.

From the population census of 1980, the population of Petaling Jaya was recorded at 218,300, growing at a rate of 14 percent during the 1957-1970 and 9 percent on the 1970-1980 period. Out of this population size, the ethnic distribution being 57 percent Chinese, 27 percent Malays, 14 percent Indians and 2 percent others. The female gender is nearly the same as the male (51 percent) population. The age structure reflects a young productive population, 60 percent being between 15-44 age group and 28 percent in the 0-14 age group. The census also observed that 70 percent of the Petaling Jaya population were composed of urban immigrants, migrating from the bordering the Federal Territory, other districts in Selangor, and Perak.

In 1983, the Petaling Jaya Municipality Board commissioned the University of Malaya to carry out a socio-economic study (Chan 1984). From this study, it was found that the respondents generally came from the upper and the middle income groups. They were highly educated, 74 percent, having completed at least the School Certificate of Education. Though the medium of their educational instruction has been the Malay language, the language spoken at home was mainly English. The average household family size was five.

Petaling Jaya in Relation to Other Urban Areas in the Klang Valley



Map 4.1 : Petaling Jaya in Relation to Other Urban Areas in the Klang Valley

The occupational distribution reflected a non-agricultural economy. A large proportion of Malays and Indians, apart from the Chinese, were engaged in the commercial activities, ranging from petty trading to large scale businesses. The population of Malay respondents employed as professionals and executives was about the same as of Chinese and Indians. Sectional differentiation along ethnic line was observed; Malays tended to be employed in the government sector, with a few in the private and self-employed categories, while Chinese were the reverse.

Section 14 of Petaling Jaya was chosen as it has a one to two Chinese-Malay population ratio rather than a lop-sided ethnic composition of mainly Chinese or mainly Malays. In respect of housing, it is fairly diverse in that there are housing units forming single story terraces, semi-detached houses, and bungalows. In Petaling Jaya, the kind of housing in which a person lives is a good measure of his or her socio-economic status. The research worker has a firsthand knowledge of Section 14, having lived there from 1980 to 1982. Familiarity with the area enabled the research worker to assist the enumerators find the addresses selected and to advise on problems encountered with the respondents. Many of the respondents interviewed saw the research worker as a fellow member of the community which increased rapport.

Interview

Forty-three structured questions were devised and incorporated in an interview schedule. The questionnaire was divided into three parts; general observations of the respondent, counterweight to ethnic alignment and the alignment question. The questionnaire employed in collecting the data is enclosed as Appendix I.

The ethnic and gender variables were controlled during the sampling process. This was done because most studies on Malaysia regard ethnicity as a salient factor in the understanding of the society. The gender factor was given due attention because males and females often have different kinds of contact with members of other groups.

A pilot survey was carried out in order to check comprehension of the questions and the time taken for interviews. On average an hour was taken to interview a respondent. Two weeks were taken to finish the pilot stage in which a sample of twenty respondents was interviewed. Many respondents declined to be interviewed, saying they were too busy. Malays, especially females, more often agreed to be interviewed than did Chinese.

In the light of experience obtained from the pilot survey, the questioning format was rearranged. The biodata and contact questions were moved to the beginning as they helped established rapport with the respondents. The housewives' or students' socio-economic status was measured by the status of their spouse or parents, respectively. The overall findings of this pilot stage gave confidence that the questionnaire formulated was capable of capturing the information needed.

A sample size of six hundred was the target. It was to be distributed equally along ethnic and gender lines. Thus, three hundred Malays, half male and half female were to be selected. The same was planned for Chinese sample.

In Section 14, 2239 households were recorded - with 643 Malays, 1205 Chinese, 267 Indian, and 124 others. Armed with this information and in order to meet the targeted sampling distribution above, the sampling selection process became: to every two Malays on the residential list of the Petaling Jaya Municipality Board, a person was selected and to every four Chinese on the list a person was selected.

Due to the problems and constraints faced, only 339 respondents were obtained - 195 Malays [92 Male, 103 Female], 107 Chinese [65 Male, 42 Female] and Indian 37 [22 Male, 15 Female]. The Indian respondents were not obtained through the sample selection process. They were occupying the houses of Malay and Chinese selected and that is how they got to be interviewed. By right, the interviewers should really have moved to the next address on the list and such practice was later stopped (Table 4.2). Other problems were also encountered.

Based on their occupations, the respondents were categorised into three. The first category included the odd job workers, petty traders, manual workers and sale assistants. In the second category, covered the general service workers, general office administrators, technicians, teachers, nurses and businessmen. The last category represented owners of large scale business and industry, the executives, directors and professionals in the private and government sectors. Petaling Jaya being urban-based, does not have any agricultural and fishing activities, except that there are some gardeners. The question about occupation was inserted simply to permit an analysis by socio-economic status. Thus, the first occupational category represented the bottom socio-economic status, the second category the middle status and the third, the top one.

Note:

Insert at line 8

Table 4.1 : Enumerators and Respondents Interviewed (%)

Enumerators		Malay	Chinese	Indian	TOTAL
*	1. Amran	5	-	5	3
	2. Baharuddin	6	-	11	5
	3. Kamariah	5	-	5	3
*	4. Mazlan	9	2	17	8
	5. Razali	28	7	16	20
	6. Rohana	4	-	5	3
*	7. Rohani	11	5	11	9
	8. Samihah	12	7	8	10
	9. Mansor	8	5	11	8
*	11. Aw Yang Huey	2	28	5	10
	12. Ee Siew King	-	-	-	-
	13. Khoo	2	9	3	4
*	14. Lai Mee	-	0.5	-	0.3
	15. Lee	3	9	-	4
	16. Lim Pek Kee	-	2	-	0.7
*	17. Lim Siew Hua	-	0.5	-	0.3
	18. Soh Wai Kuen	-	2	-	0.7
	19. Tang	5	23	3	11
*	20. Teo Siew King	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL :	100	100	100	100

note: * additional enumerator

Table 4.2 : Interview Sample (%)

Ethnic	Gender	Target Sample Size	Gone Away	Failed Appointment	Refused	Inter-viewed
Malay	Male	21	17	14	9	27
	Female	21	17	10	5	30
Chinese	Male	29	30	36	38	19
	Female	29	36	40	48	12
Indian	Male	-	-	-	-	7
	Female	-	-	-	-	5
Number of Respondents		100	100	100	100	100

The average time taken for an interview remained one hour but the number of questionnaire completed per day was lower than expected. Enumerators were unable to finish four interviews per day; sometimes they needed a week to finish five. Enumerators found themselves faced with difficulties in meeting the respondents selected for interviewing as a large majority of them worked during the day time and were only available for interviewing for a few hours in the evenings. Some respondents refused to be interviewed. A high rate of refusal was observed among the Chinese samples, especially the female group. Those who refused to be interviewed were mainly housemaids and old people, though some came from the educated group and complained that the problem was over-surveyed.

The northeast monsoon brought rain not only to the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia but the west coast as well. Some enumerators and respondents missed appointments because the rainy spell caused traffic congestion. A five-mile ride might require a four-hour crawl. The end of year school holiday, which normally falls in December, was brought forward to November because a new semester based educational system was being implemented in 1989. This caused re-scheduling of appointments, ending inevitably in delays to the process of interviewing itself.

Section 14 is not a compact section. It is shaped like a bat's wings. The extensive spatial spread proved to be a logistic problem to the enumerators as only a few of them possessed motorbikes. The rest travelled by bus, sometimes changing buses to reach the area allocated to them. The enumerators themselves had a high rate of turnover. New training had to be given. Close supervision that was given to the other enumerators in their initial stage of interviewing, had to be given again. The main reason given to opt out by the enumerators was the difficulty in obtaining respondents selected; this reduced their material reward. Faced with the above problems and their impacts on the research enterprise what were not phantom earlier during the pilot survey, a number of remedies were taken.

Additional enumerators were added in mid-October 1989, on realising that the Chinese respondents quota was below target. The Malay enumerators were urged to interview Chinese

respondents as well. They seemed to be able to obtain access with the Chinese respondents. The interview process was reported by the Malay enumerators with their Chinese respondents as amicable, some Malay enumerators found it more stimulating to interview Chinese respondents than Malays. The Chinese enumerators were urged to interview Chinese respondents. However, the high rate of failed appointment and refusals, caused high turnover among the Chinese enumerators. Payment had to be raised, new enumerators sought, and some Malay respondent names were given to them so as to enable the new enumerators appointed to earn some material rewards from their research work. For the Chinese samples, 100 respondents were added and were distributed 50 each along the gender line (refer Table 4.2). Chinese enumerators were increased to ten. They managed to contact the houses, but faced a high degree of failure when trying to meet the appointed respondents. Enumerators were instructed to make appointment with those respondents contacted, but failure to meet them on the appointed time would cause such respondents to be dropped from further interviewed. This step was taken because lots of time were wasted earlier on making re-appointment and missing the respondents.

The main survey was started in the first week of September, being scheduled to last over a two-month period. Prior to this, fifteen undergraduates of the University of Malaya were given a day of training on the craftsmanship of social survey. They were students of sociology, Chinese studies and economics. Some of these enumerators came and went, but a minimum of five Malays and five Chinese enumerators was always maintained. Malay enumerators could speak the Malay and the English languages, while the Chinese enumerators could speak Chinese as well. Three hundred and thirty-nine respondents had been interviewed when the survey proper was ended in mid-December 1989. The sample size obtained is statistically representative of Section 14 as a community - it accounts for 15 percent of the total household units. By ethnic groupings, it represents 30 percent of the Malays, 9 percent of the Chinese, and 13 percent of the Indians. By gender line, it reflects the community distribution - 52 percent males and 48 percent females. Thus, the additional steps described above succeeded in rescuing the research enterprise above.

In reference to table 4.1, the possible influence of the ethnic origin of the enumerator on respondents' answers was of concern, especially with respect to the Chinese respondents because 25 percent of them were interviewed by Malay enumerators. The ethnic origins of the enumerators might have influenced the interviewees' responses to some of the questions; respondents might have wished to appease the enumerators rather than give their personal preference. Such an influence might have been strongest to the question on the national anthem. A study of differences in Chinese responses to Chinese and Malay enumerators would have enlightened us to the presence of any social desirability effect; no arrangements were made for this when the responses were coded. Yet, neither the research worker, nor those Malay and Chinese enumerators who interviewed respondents whose ethnic origins were different from their own, felt that they were receiving answers biased in this way. Thus, the research worker may not have been sufficiently alert to the possibility of this kind of bias. Any ethnic difference between interviewer and interviewee was not coded for computer analysis. As yet it has not been possible to locate the original questionnaires to check upon this. Future research workers may be able to learn from this mistake and codes such information for immediate computer analysis. Nevertheless, the research worker is confident that since the three-pronged analyses adopted, viz., the alignment question, the counter-balance question and the pluralistic ignorance, have showed similar patterns of response, any bias of this kind cannot have been substantial. Future research work that replicates the same questionnaire, but with a Chinese representative instead of a Malay, could verify the findings made.

Note:

Insert at line 4

Checking of the questionnaires was carried out immediately. Only a few cases needed re-interviewing. The checked questionnaires were sent back weekly to the Centre For Policy Research, University of Science in Penang, where data entry and computer analysis were made. As from mid-December to mid-January, concentration was given to the computer analysis and the relevant cross-tabulation tables were requested.

Ethnic Relations in Petaling Jaya

There were a number of government departments in Petaling Jaya; the major departments being the National Registration Department, the Road and Transport Department, the Employee Provident Fund, the Municipality office, the District office, the Post offices, the Police Stations, the Educational Institutions, etc. A number of training colleges for teachers, nurses, and dentists were to be found there, while two universities, the University of Malaya and the International Islamic University, lie on the Petaling Jaya-Kuala Lumpur boundary.

The leadership of the departments was in the hands of Malays, as the Malaysian Civil Service, representing the elites of the Malaysian bureaucracy, practises a recruitment quota at a ratio of 4:1 for Malays as against other ethnic groups. Despite this ratio, most professional and technical posts in the government sectors such as doctors, engineers, accountants, lawyers, architects, etc., including the army personnel, were filled by non-Malays, especially by Chinese. The non-executive occupations such as clerk, accounts clerk, technician, etc., were equally distributed among the ethnic groups.

In the private sector, the situation was reversed. Non-Malays, especially Chinese, controlled the commercial sector in Petaling Jaya. The book shops, textile shops, banks, insurance, restaurants, retailing activities, etc., were controlled by Chinese. Being family businesses, they employed only family members. Some Indians had opened up restaurants and newspaper stalls, but they were also family concerns. Some Chinese shop-owners hired Malays and Indians as sales persons.

Apart from the family businesses, Petaling Jaya also housed medium and large scale industries. Some were owned by local Chinese, others by Japanese, Singaporean and other foreign interests. Some of these companies set up joint venture companies with local Chinese and government's statutory bodies, such as PERNAS and Tabung Haji, representing Malays, producing items such as electronic chips, televisions, radios, air conditioning, car assembly plants and other products. The top management of these companies was dominated by European and Japanese, with some Chinese. Some Malay professionals such as engineers, accountants, managers, lawyers, etc., were also absorbed into the companies' middle and upper level managerial groups. The rank and file reflected the larger society's population distribution; more Malays could be found among the industrial work force. Some Malay leaders, such as the government political backbenchers or the retired top ranking government servants, were co-opted as company directors and chairmen as their connections proved helpful to obtain concessions from the government in bolstering the industries' interests. Joint ventures could bring business skills and capital together with political influence to the benefit of both parties.

The government restructuring programmes had some beneficial consequences. Some of these were indirect, in that they fostered relationships across ethnic lines both in the workplace and in the larger society. Cases were also highlighted of young Malay professionals in the banking sector, who had been promoted ahead of some of the long serving Chinese accountants because they had the ability and skills to manage the enterprise concerned. The daily interaction between individuals at work fostered relations of trust and mutual obligation. Sometimes Malays organised campaigns to replace non-Malays as heads of government or to prevent them obtaining such posts; these campaigns were often unsuccessful as competency and work experience usually prevail over such demands.

a) The Residential Area

Travelling around the residential areas of section 14 of Petaling Jaya, one could notice the increasing social differentiation cutting across the ethnic lines as economic opportunities and educational achievements opened up arrays of social mobility and new relationship among the

Malays, Chinese, etc. Lining the major roads within the section were the single-storey terrace houses of which each carried a market value of M\$40,000 per unit. These houses were laid-out in a row of 15 to 20 units per block, broken by access roads on both sides of the block with the next row of houses. A small back lane, large enough for the municipal workers to push a cart and collect the rubbish separated them from the row of houses behind. The front lawn and the back garden were small in sizes; often the front lawn had been cemented and pots of flowers arranged along the fence while the supposedly back garden had become part of the kitchen, illegally extended.

These houses were occupied by the labouring workforce and the low-level clerical staff, working either with the government or with one of the multinational corporations located in the industrial estates within and nearby to Petaling Jaya. Their family size exceeded five persons per family and an aged-parent stayed with them, sharing whatever space available in this three-bedroom house with their children, ranging in age from one to ten years old. Their lounge-cum-television room had a few collections of locally made chairs and a small table, and the cement floor was covered by vinyl mat. The kitchen was equipped with a gas cooker having a pair of stove and a small refrigerator, and they ate on the kitchen-floor. The younger children walked to the nearby school while the elder ones took the bus. The father used the motorbike for moving around. Those houses nearest to the shopping malls, the market, the University of Malaya and the International Islamic University were rented by students, the shop assistants and the low-level clerical staff, and being unmarried, they shared with six to ten others; the front lawn strewn with shoes and four to five motorbikes parked haphazardly over the lawn. Malays, Chinese, Indians, etc., lived in these single-storey terrace houses and as the Chinese were over-represented in numbers, others found that their next-door neighbours were unlikely to be from their own ethnic origin.

Entering the access roads, one located the double-storey terrace houses, costing around M\$90,000; a four-bedroom house with a spacious living room and kitchen but the front lawn and the back garden were of the same size to that of the single-storey terrace houses.

Individuals from the lower middle class such as teachers, clerks, nurses, the highly-paid labourers, etc., but of the older generation with five to seven grown-up children resided here.

The furniture items in the living room were made of rattan, a small piece of carpet placed on the floor and a ceiling fan hanging above. The kitchen was equipped with a gas cooker and oven, a medium size refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, a washing machine and a dinner table. One or two of their working children had their own motorbike and the parents drove a car. More Chinese families rather than Malays or Indians stayed in this type of house. The Malay families tended to be young in age and small in size than the others, with one or two young children whose ages varying from two to eight years old. They were the latest social group to experience social mobility as modern educational amenities and opportunities were opened to them.

As the road climbed up the slope, the semi-detached double-storey houses could be located; each costing M\$250,000, more spacious and with a larger front lawn and back garden where flowers and shady trees were planted. Under the shady trees, a swing and a see-saw for the children were provided. The wire fences were replaced by concrete walls, the gate was often locked and under the porch at least two expensive cars were parked. The living room was spacious and fully carpeted. The kitchen was well-equipped with modern imported appliances and a separate dining room. The five bedrooms were fully air-conditioned. Those who stayed here were the high ranking government servants, accountants, doctors, lawyers, etc., who formed the upper middle class of the section. Many of them had grown-up children studying at universities, locally and overseas. They often had a housemaid staying with them, brought from their villages or illegally from neighbouring countries such as Indonesia or Thailand. An equal number of Malays and Chinese could be found living in this type of house.

Up the slope and on the hill, behind the shady trees lining the road were the bungalow houses each costing M\$500,000. They had a large compound, an immaculate garden, a swimming pool located at the back of the house and sometimes a house for their live-in servants. The house was spacious with a separate lounge, guest room, television room and dining room,

with five bedrooms located upstairs. In each room, imported furniture was found, paintings hung on the walls and sculptures were displayed. The floors were wall-to-wall carpeted and the house was air-conditioned. Two to three cars were parked in front of the house. The family size was smaller with one or two children, most of them are working or living elsewhere. These were the individuals who held ministerial post in the various government ministry, managers and directors in multinational firms, managers of their own companies, consultants, etc. Their names carried an honorific title conferred by the King for their services to the nation; Datuk, Datuk Seri, Tan Sri, etc. Malays and Chinese formed the majority of the upper class in Petaling Jaya. A few of them were aristocrats while the others were individuals who had climbed the social ladder as mobility based on achievement prevailed over ascriptive criteria.

Social life in the single-storey terrace houses revolved around the home and family. After office, they would prefer to stay home rather than going out, they prepared their own meals and if they were to eat-out, they would go to the hawker's centre and buy fried noodles from their own ethnic members. Packed lunches were given to each of their school going-age children. The father would spend the weekend to relax and play with their younger children. Their ten to twelve years old children would be playing within the residential area, their friends were neighbours and schoolmates and at times they included members from other ethnic origins. The toddlers played by the fence and sometimes were taken home by neighbours as playmates with their own children. One or twice a week, the mothers walked with their young children to the park, exchanging news about their own life while waiting for their husbands to come home. Some of the university students and the working children of the working class would go to watch a movie at a cinema or dance the Saturday night away at a discotheque. Others retreated to the mosque and joined the Quranic circles discussing Islam as a way of life. Those young middle class Malays and Chinese who lived within this working class environment did mingle with their neighbours but their evenings were spent eating at the hawker's centre or at McDonald's and their weekends at the sport's centre, playing tennis or squash with their workmates.

The social activities in the double-storey terrace houses did not differ from those discussed above. They belonged to the same social station but they differed in age; they belonged to the older generation. Since their own children were grown-ups and some married, these parents found themselves taking care of their grand-children. Their grown-up working children stayed least at home, as they worked during the weekdays and over the weekends went off with their friends. Their parents would stay at home or take the opportunity to visit friends and relatives in nearby areas.

The upper middle class staying in the semi-detached houses and the upper class in the bungalows shared the same values and activities. These were the people who worked from morning until late evening. They were seldom home over the weekend as their jobs demanded them to attend meetings and conferences in other states and countries. If they were at home, one would see them strolling in their garden or entertaining guests for dinner. They seldom interacted with their neighbours. If there were to be any contact, it would be through their housemaids who would go and relax at the park bringing along with them the younger children of the family. These families preferred to eat corn flakes for breakfast and pizza for dinner. Their children, on coming back home from the universities during vacations, would throw birthday parties and invite varsity mates and previous school friends, irrespective of their ethnic origins. Driving their parent's BMW car around town, they would eat at the fast-food restaurants. During the weekend, they would go to the shopping complexes to replenish the food stocks of the house and buy shirts and gowns fancied for a night out at a pop concert attended by singers such as Tina Turner, etc.

b) Commuting to Work

Many residents in Petaling Jaya worked in Kuala Lumpur. From 6.00 a.m. before daylight appeared, the commuters gathered at the bus stops nearest to their respective houses. Leaving their houses singly or in pairs, they clustered in groups as others joined them on the way.

Individuals were grouped along sex lines, mixing ethnic and status differences between one another, with the females in one corner of the bus stop and the males in the other. Each

group combined individuals differently dressed, with the Malay females wearing head scarves and long dresses hanging down to their feet, while the Chinese and Indians wore their respective dresses of Cheongsam and Sari. Some Malay, Chinese and Indian females were dressed western-style in blouses and skirts. There was more uniformity in the male group, the majority wearing shirts and trousers; a few Malay males wore a skull cap and robe. Whatever their costume, most exchanged smiles and conversed with one another; others kept to themselves and were silent until the bus arrived.

Two main bus companies operated in Petaling Jaya. The major one, the blue bus, was owned by Malay shareholders while the red bus was owned by Chinese. Minibuses also operated in the area. They were either owned by Chinese or Malays, and a few of them were joint venture companies between Malay and Chinese interests. Whichever bus came first towards the stop, the groups moved to the expected bus entrance, each person apparently forgetful of being either Malay, or Chinese, or Indian, male or female; each person grabbed the bus door and pushed through the crowd on to the bus, standing in most cases close to one another, as the bus by the time it reached their stop was almost full. Despite the rush and the crowding, they managed to smile to one another; friends conversed on what they would do in their offices that day. As their destinations neared, each individual moved to the exit door while at the entrance door the scene described repeated itself for each of the bus stops passed. Others had to repeat the same process again as they boarded another bus to continue their journeys.

Those having their own cars and motorbikes departed from their houses slightly later. Two traffic peaks could be identified on the main roads in Petaling Jaya; the government traffic jam and the private sector one. The 7.30 a.m. rush saw government officers in mainly Japanese-made cars driving to work; they were mostly Malays. Then an hour later, the private sector jam, driving mainly Japanese-made cars too; they were mostly Chinese. The elites of both groups drove to work in Mercedes, BMW, and Volvo. The drivers of these cars seldom had other passengers with them, driving alone. However, the older and less fashionable cars were often full. To reduce expense, some drivers ferry their colleagues to and from work. Some drivers share

only with members from their own ethnic group, but in recent years more drivers include colleagues from other ethnic groups in their car-pooling systems. The motorbike riders represented the lower status workers, drawn from all the ethnic groups.

c) The Office Break

Three breaks are normally observed by office workers in Petaling Jaya. These were the morning snack at 10.30 a.m., the lunch hour at 1.00 p.m. and the tea-time break at 3.30 p.m. The morning snack and the tea-time breaks were short in duration; a fifteen-minute stop. Though some office workers went to the canteen and eating places provided for, others stayed in their offices eating and drinking titbits brought from home. The eating places were crowded in the first ten days of the month and deserted in the last ten days before pay day. In the canteen, several groups clustered and tended to be along gender lines rather than ethnically-based, as immediate departmental friends and floormates became the basis of friendship networks. Such patterns were a response to the time constraint. The things eaten tended to be limited to a cup of tea or coffee accompanied by one of two pieces of local cakes; others ate beef burger and some Chinese noodle.

The lunch break of one hour generated greater activity. People used it not only for eating but to go to the bank, to make a quick rush to the shop, supermarket, or post office to settle the water, telephone or electricity bills, to perform the midday Muslim Zuhur prayer, and so on. For the bosses, status becomes the basis of grouping in the executive and the managerial group. They would not normally patronise the canteen but would go to an exclusive country club instead, such as the Subang Golf Club, the Saujana Country Club or the Lake Garden Club, or go to a fancy restaurant in the centre, eating a 'continental' lunch or a set lunch of either the Chinese, Indian or the Malay styles. These were the professionals, elites of their own ethnic groups, who were linked to one another not only by the demands of their work but also by a western-based cosmopolitan culture. Ethnicity and religious differences were group markers of less significance to their existence than the American Express card that each one of them possessed.

The lunch time behaviour of the rank-and-file also reflected shared social status, but individuals within a stratum aligned to one another more on the basis of gender and ethnicity. The females grouped among themselves in a corner of the eating place and the men occupied the other side, leaving unoccupied tables between them as spatial boundary markers. Each of these gender groups is dominantly ethnic-based, with one or two individuals from the other ethnic groups joining as well if the eating stalls were selling halal or religiously non-polluting foods. The stalls in most cases were operated by private individuals from diverse ethnic groups. The stalls had one common identity as each display the halal food sign, but these stalls sold different kinds of food, from fried rice, to fried noodle or pasta, to curry rice and bread, drinks and cakes, etc., and their ethnic identities could be discerned from the languages of their signboards.

When Indian and Chinese-owned stalls did not serve halal foods, then the eating arrangements tended to define ethnic-cum-religious differences more markedly; most Malays, being Muslim, gathered along sex lines near to the Malay stalls while the non-Malays ate their own food near their stalls. In the latter case, sex lines became blurred as the females, especially the Chinese, tend to join the tables of their male counterparts as well. Some females, especially the Malays, preferred to wrap their foods and retire to the seclusion of their own offices. After finishing their meals, many Malays would go to the prayer room in the office block to perform their Zuhur or midday prayers.

d) The Covered Market, the Supermarket and the Shop

The scenes at the covered market and the supermarket centres in Petaling Jaya, in both the morning and the evening, were not to be missed. Buyers frequenting any of these centres parade in their best styles of dressing, reflecting status differences more than ethnicity. The covered markets in Petaling Jaya were opened from 7.00 a.m. to 7.00 p.m. and attracted buyers who emphasised cheapness. Housewives and housemaids form the majority of the buyers in the morning market. The housewives often came from the lower income grouping where their husbands would either belong to the clerical staff or the technical and manual labourers in the nearby industries. While the housemaids would at the very least be serving a middle class family

couple, both of whom were working in the professional or the executive groups. The majority of the sellers were Chinese, though there were to be found also some Malays and Indians as well, selling daily provision such as fish, chicken and meat, vegetables, grocery goods, pasta and eggs, other food items and cakes, etc. Each seller occupied a cement-structured table six feet long, four feet wide and four feet high to display the goods. Each seller was located within the section of the market categorised for such food items, so no signboard was needed.

Purchasing patterns between seller and buyer were not solely determined by ethnicity as a Malay housewife might be asking the Malay fishmonger the price per pound sold and instead buys from the Chinese fishmonger on the next table if she found the price cheaper or the fish fresher. However, in case of the need to ensure the religious purity of the food sold, Malays would instead rely on religious markers and downplay the price differences. This pattern of purchasing was mainly applicable to buying of meat, pasta, or liquid-based food items or cakes, and did not cover others such as vegetables, fish, dry grocery products in which the ingredients were free of animal fats and lard. The Indians abstained from eating beef and on certain days in a week preferred a vegetarian diet. Though, the Chinese seemed to be the only ethnic group unconstrained by ideas of pollution, some Malays and Indians did not adhere strictly to religious sanctions and would buy whatever they desired to eat.

Haggling for a good price between sellers and buyers was a normal practice in these markets. The haggling would be done with more vigour when the actors involved did not belong to the same ethnic group. A Chinese customer would be requesting his Malay fruit seller to sell the oranges at a much cheaper price. Such haggling was also observed when a Malay customer bought fish from the Chinese fishmonger. These customers question the prices given, the quality of the product sold, or appeal to the generosity of the seller, at times shouting to each other, and this makes the market buzz with the human voices.

The supermarket complexes represented a different social milieu in Petaling Jaya. There was an atmosphere of social sophistication; English not Malay was the language spoken,

driving fashionable cars rather than taking the bus became the norm of transporting oneself; the rattan bag was replaced with the shop's own trademark plastic bag, provisions were bought not in small quantities but to last for weeks, goods were sold at fixed price, and there was no haggling. Ethnicity and its symbols were irrelevant to those who frequented these centres, they came not because the goods were cheap, but because the prices were reasonable; they liked the convenience, as ample parking spaces for their cars allowed them the opportunity to parade and be noticed by others of their own social station.

In between the covered market and the supermarket complexes, there were various shops selling books and magazines, textile, shoe and clothes, electrical and electronic goods, hardware and stationery shop, etc. Most of these shops in Petaling Jaya were owned by Chinese individuals. The range of goods sold per activity was wide. There were books and magazines in Malay, Chinese, English and Indian. The textiles displayed catered to the various individual and ethnic tastes; some of the patterns were western-based, others carried more local and Asiatic influences. With such varieties of goods on sale, and with the Chinese dominating the commercial activities, all customers be they Malays, Chinese or Indians, pay little attention to ethnicity in deciding whom to patronise, but look to see which Chinese shops can offer them the best price for the goods they wish to purchase.

e) Night Life

Night life in Petaling Jaya stopped with the break of dawn. There were numerous hawkers' centres and each attracted a big crowd as twenty to thirty stalls operated by Malays, Chinese and Indians were found there and it gathered a mosaic of people irrespective of ethnic and social origins. The Chinese put up signs in Malay language and Chinese scripts to advertise the food sold while Malays hung out their signs in Arabic script and romanised Malay language. Individual Malays and Chinese paid less heed to such markers of ethnic differences. Tastes and preferences were no longer regarded as culturally given as they demonstrated an unconcern as to the ethnic stall from which to order their meals. The younger generation of individuals among them preferred eating hot-dogs than fried rice or noodle. The night flea markets began their

operations just before the end of the office hours. A stretch of road would be closed around a residential area to allow Malays, Chinese and Indian traders to bring in their goods which range from vegetables, eggs, chickens, hardware, cakes, etc. Those driving expensive cars stopped, still wearing their neck-ties, and joined the crowd to buy foods and other things desired. They bought apples rather than local fruits. The younger generation walked aimlessly there, not buying, but on the look-out for their friends who might happen to be there. They would adjourn to the A&W food chains to eat wafer and drink root beer, or stop at the Pizza Hut. Those Malays and Chinese, out on a date, would fancy going to a secluded restaurant, dining western-food such as T-bone steaks and then go to the cinema or the five-star hotel to sip a drink in their lounge and later dance the night away. Others would take a relaxed view to a night out in town; driving their family members to look at the neon lights and then rush home to watch a movie on the television set. Economic growth and technological changes have widened their horizons, increase their options and arranged new relationships with other individuals.

f) Recreational Activities

Petaling Jaya had some of the best recreational facilities in the country. The parks were the most used. The firsts to be there were the Chinese elders who performed the martial art of Tai Chi as a form of exercise in the morning dusk. At around 10.00 a.m. children aged ten to fifteen years old patronised the children's corner as they played on the swings, the see-saw, the iron-bars, etc., before going to school in the afternoon. Their groups comprised neighbours, school-mates and friends from the surrounding areas. Some played with their Malay or Chinese friends, and others with members from other ethnic groups. In the afternoon, housemaids and mothers brought toddlers under their care to the children's corner to play. Much later in the evening, even adult males frequent the open spaces of the park to kick around football with fellow friends to unwind after a day at the office. Individuals going to the parks had plenty of opportunities to play, relax and come to know others beyond their own family members and ethnic group. Those working with the multinational companies preferred to play with fellow office-mates at their office's social club. Malays played badminton with fellow Malays but some Malays joined the Chinese for a game of basketball. When their office had a football game with another club,

nearly the whole staff turned up at the sports centre to cheer their own team, among others, whose goalkeepers was an Indian, the defenders and striker were Malays and the midfielders were Chinese. They displayed seriousness in the game played: winning it would mean cheering aloud in unison over success while a moment of sadness is felt by the team members and their office-mates if the team lost.

Those holding executive and managerial posts, working either for the government or the private firms, would choose to be members of a private social club where they played tennis, squash, table-tennis, etc., after their office hours. Before going home, they would have a drink or tea at the restaurant in the club, discussing national politics and even signing up business contracts there. On the other hand, the masters of industry and nations could be found at the country club, playing golf until late evening, taking a shower and, before going home, dining in the restaurant of the club, eating beef-steak. Malays and Chinese found their lives revolving around others more than around their family members and fellow ethnic members.

g) Festivals

Festivals were celebrated all year round in Petaling Jaya. Once they had ethnic and religious significance only for one group, but of late they have carried social meanings for members of the other ethnic and religious groups since these festivities provide an opportunity for people to visit their friends. Malays celebrated Hari Raya Idul Fitri marking the end of fasting month in Ramadhan, Hari Raya Haji the day of pilgrimage in Mecca, the prophet's birthday, Islamic New Year, etc., the Chinese celebrated Chinese New Year, Mooncake festival, Christmas, etc., while the Indians celebrated Deepavali, Thaipusam, Wesak Day, etc., to name only a few. In preparation for these festivities, Malays and Chinese rushed to buy new clothing for themselves and their family as well as the ingredients needed to prepare cakes and the meals for the reception. Ten days before the end of fasting in Ramadhan, Malays lit kerosene lamps and hung twenty or thirty of them along the fence. The well-to-do hung instead flashing colour-bulbs on the trees and the front of their houses. The Chinese practised like-wise at their New Year. Days before the advent of the Chinese New Year, Chinese children were playing with fireworks and

crackers, making loud noises in the dark night and intermittently brightening the sky. Malays also followed this Chinese practice on their festivals. Some Malays were opposed as they considered it a part of a sectional culture and a waste of money. The government has actually banned the playing of fireworks and crackers as fire hazards and a cause of bodily harm, but Malays and Chinese looked forward to lighting them with their children on such festive occasions.

The days of the festive season belonged to the children. Malays and Chinese children paraded in new clothing, going from one house to the next to get the festive envelope containing money from the elders, dressed in cowboy suit complete with hat and guns, combat gears, jeans, a three-piece suit, etc. Western attire was the Malay and Chinese parent's choice for their children to wear, though such occasions they themselves wore their own ethnic dress to and from the mosque and temple, respectively. After fulfilling their religious obligations on their own respective auspicious days, Malays and Chinese entertained friends, workmates, neighbours and others of the same ethnic origin or otherwise, as they called upon them at their residence. The rich and famous of Petaling Jaya entertained their relatives and guests at top class hotels and their receptions had live entertainment, usually attended by a local singer. The younger generation had their own programmes on such an auspicious day. After collecting enough envelopes, especially from their Chinese neighbours, they would stroll in the city, watch a movie or take a bus to the beach and some dance the night away at a disco; they overlooked the religious and ethnic significance attached by the older generation to such festive occasions.

Wedding and death ceremonies had also gained a social meaning as not only co-religious and family members were involved but other friends, workmates, neighbours, etc., joined in their days of happiness and bereavement. The pious Malays would insist on a strict religious adherence to marriage and death ceremonies, but others had looked upon any such occasion as a day for others to join in as well. During a Malay wedding ceremony and celebration, Chinese friends came to witness the vow taken, watched the bride and bridegroom, 'the declared King and Queen of the day', seating on the wedding throne. They also joined others queuing to bless the newly married couples and to attend the wedding dinner reception given. The guests gave money

and other gifts such as bread-toasters, electric fans, shirts, etc., wrapped in beautifully designed wrappers to the couples as they shook hands on their way out. Malays increasingly attended their Chinese friends' wedding receptions held at the local hotels. They did not fear food pollution as their Chinese friends had taken the effort to hire a Muslim caterer to supply foods for the Malay guests.

The bereavement of a family member or a friend also evoked due respect. The death ceremony was closely linked to a person's religious and cultural practice but friends and office-mates often paid a visit to the bereaved family, giving their condolences to the family members, their parents and children and giving financial assistance to ease the cost of preparing the funeral. Kind words about the deceased friend were expressed as they sat in the compound of the house and later joined the procession to the graveyard. Malays and Chinese knew that some of their ethnic members were scornful of what they were doing, but the social bonds developed between them as they were brought to relate together in many situations, at work, at the social clubs, in the residential areas, etc., overrode such particularistic concerns.

h) Education

There were over 30 primary schools, 12 secondary schools and 14 colleges within Petaling Jaya. Two universities were located on its boundary with Kuala Lumpur. Schools were located within access to most of the residential areas. Parents accompanied their standard one children to and from school and, at time, neighbours took turn in relieving their tasks. Those slightly older, enjoyed the freedom of walking with their peers to school and those having younger brothers and sisters had to care for them as well. Malays and Chinese parents shared the same anxieties for the safety of their children, expressing them to one another as they walked home after sending their children to school. The lucky ones would go to and from school by car, their parents waiting for them near the fence toward the end of the schooling day. Those in the lower and upper secondary schools preferred to go to school by bicycle while those who had further to travel rode on the public buses. The "cream" of the Malays, selected on their standard five examination performances, studied at boarding schools within the state of Selangor or elsewhere

in Malaysia and this explained the increase in their numbers and proportion of attendance in the universities, both locally and overseas. At the gates of the University of Malaya and the International Islamic University, Malays walked in groups but were separated by gender. Other students discussed their university work with their Chinese course-mates, eating together at the canteen. Those who attended colleges specialised in business studies, finance, accounting, law, etc. At the private colleges, Chinese and Indians dominated the student population and at the government-sponsored colleges, it was the Malays. Those who were divided like this seldom had the opportunity to mingle with others, but remained with members of their own ethnic group.

Parents in Petaling Jaya placed a high premium on educating their children. Children were programmed to attend school in the morning, to two-hour tuition classes on Mathematics and Science in the afternoon, back to school again for their schools' co-curriculum and, for the Malay children, to the mosque to learn religious knowledge. The school and tuition classes provided the opportunity for the Malay and Chinese pupils to meet, discuss their school work and play together. Successive generations of elders have always looked to their young ones to overcome the knotty problem of racial harmony and in a place like Petaling Jaya the prospect often looks encouraging.

Conclusion

Observation of ethnic relations in Petaling Jaya suggests that Malays and Chinese are now less conscious of their ethnic markers. In some areas of life, individuals depended on ethnic supports. However, Malays and Chinese, irrespective of their social origins, found that an increasing number of areas of their life brought them to relate increasingly with members of other groups as they go to school, the shopping malls, the recreational centres and parks, on the buses and roads, on their festive seasons and even at marriage and death. With economic growth and technological changes, individual Malays and Chinese found that they were no longer isolated: their drive to accumulate material things, and economic search for individual gain, restricted the significance of ethnicity in their lives. The research methodology employed has

been chosen to increase our understanding of this changing social reality and to allow for the ways Malays and Chinese are increasingly entering into new relations that bring them as individuals, to accept universalist rather than particularist norms.

In this chapter, the predictions of the respondents about the strength of self-interest of the material and self-interest of the status kinds relative to ethnic loyalty are presented. Self-interest, (be it of a material kind or a desire for social recognition by associating with a person of higher status and gaining 'respectability'), and the call for ethnic loyalty, are two influences that sometimes come into conflict with one another. The manner in which an individual resolves such a conflict will depend both on his own sentiments and on his beliefs about how his peers will interpret his behaviour.

There were four hypothetical social situations bearing on self-interest of the material kind. The findings indicated that in the shopping choice situation, Malays perceived a conflict and their males were swayed by their belief that they should display ethnic loyalty. The Chinese thought that competitive prices would be more important than the owner's ethnic background. In the 'house key' situation, there was overwhelming support for the expectation that the convenience of leaving a house key with a neighbour would outweigh any consideration of ethnic loyalty. When it came to renting the house, strong support was shown for the expectation that Husin Ali would consider money more important than ethnic background, though Malays thought that Husin Ali's mother would feel differently. The situation in which Husin Ali's niece was asked to look after the child of a Chinese woman was thought to evoke rather less ethnic alignment. Overall, the findings showed that, on these measures, self-interest of the material kind exceeds ethnic loyalty.

Nevertheless, the answers do testify to the advance of a commercial ethos among Petaling Jaya Malays. However, it must always be remembered that had other test questions been employed a different balance might have resulted. The Chinese, perhaps, because they are more involved in commercial culture, give a higher priority to self-interest of the material kind and it looks as if they project their own values when predicting the responses of a representative Malay. Though a marked commercial ethos was observed among the Malays, they seem to

consider ethnic loyalty of more importance relative to self-interest than the Chinese expects them to.

There were four hypothetical social situations bearing on self-interest of the status kind. The findings indicated that in circumstances like the weekend trip to the zoo, ethnic alignment is more important to the Malays than any concern for the gains that could result from associating with a family of higher status. Malays expected Husin Ali to take along the Malay son of a housemaid on the zoo trip rather than the son of a Chinese doctor. Similar responses were obtained to the balancing of ethnic background and status in choosing which invitation to a wedding should receive priority. Other alignment questions showed a decided preference for a fair complexion in the choice of a bride, despite the liability of an age difference, but this was much less important than ethnic origin in choosing a child for adoption. The overall findings showed that self-interest of the status kind is less important relative to self-interest of the material kind. Concerns for ethnic loyalty over self-interest of the status kind by Malays are stronger than the research worker had expected. In this chapter, the predictions of the respondents' strength about self-interest of the material kind and self-interest of the status kind relative to ethnic loyalty could be employed to measure Malay's concern for ethnic loyalty. From the hypothetical social situations briefly presented above, we now turn to discussing the cases.

The Hypothetical Social Situations:

I. Self-Interest of the Material Kind

a) Shopping Choice

As can be seen from Tables 5.1 and 5.2, Malay respondents were divided in their predictions about which shop Husin Ali would patronise. Forty-seven percent predicted that Husin Ali would shop with Ahmad and an equal number predicted that he would continue shopping with Ah Kow. Contrary to the research worker's expectation, Malay females were less likely than Malay males to predict that Husin Ali's decision would be governed by ethnic loyalty.

The Chinese respondents overwhelmingly predicted, by 80 percent to 16 percent, that Husin Ali would patronise the shop where the prices of goods offered were lowest. They misjudged the strength of ethnic loyalty among Malays. Their responses were in line with the research worker's expectations. The gender analysis supported the research worker's expectation that no gender difference was to be expected among the Chinese.

Table 5.1 : Shopping Choice, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Ahmad	47	16	61	41
Ah Kow	47	80	33	51
Other	6	4	6	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.2 : Shopping Choice, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Ahmad	52	42	15	17	62	60	37	48
Ah Kow	41	53	79	83	29	36	55	45
Other	7	5	6	0	9	4	8	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In predicting Husin Ali's mother's responses, the Malays thought that she would give greater weight to ethnic loyalty than her son. Sixty-one percent of the Malays predicted the mother would wish her son to make an ethnic choice by patronising Ahmad's shop and only 33 percent thought that material gain would prevail over ethnic sentiment by shopping at Ah Kow's instead. Both Malay males and females predicted the mother to align ethnically by favouring Ahmad's; 62 percent and 60 percent, respectively.

Of the Chinese, 51 percent predicted that Husin Ali's mother would wish her son to place self-interest of the material kind over ethnic loyalty by shopping at Ah Kow's and 41 percent thought that ethnic interest would prevail by shopping at Ahmad's. Both males and females saw

Husin Ali's mother as more likely to display ethnic loyalty than her son. Assuming that Malays predict Husin Ali's mother's behaviour accurately. The Chinese underestimated the strength of ethnic sentiment among older Malay women. This is a question of pluralistic ignorance which will be discussed in a later chapter.

b) The House Key

The Tables 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that Malay respondents predicted that Husin Ali would put first his self-interest in the need to guard the security of the house and would, therefore, leave the house key with the next door Chinese neighbour. Males and females were alike in this. The Chinese, both males and females gave similar responses. The research worker had expected that Malays would see Husin Ali's mother as more influenced by ethnic loyalty, but this did not prove to be the case. The Chinese were predicted in like manner. Answers to this question did not reveal any significant differences between Malay and Chinese predictions of Husin Ali's response.

Table 5.3 : House key, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Unlocked	0	0	2	2
Neighbour	87	94	82	91
Other	13	6	16	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.4 : House key, by Ethnic group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Unlocked	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	3
Neighbour	88	85	92	98	85	80	90	90
Other	12	14	8	2	14	18	8	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

c) Renting-Out the House

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that the Malays predicted by 64 percent to 31 percent that Husin Ali would rent out the house to the Chinese accountant, self-interest of the material kind outweighing any consideration of ethnic loyalty. No gender difference was observed. These findings contradicted the research worker's expectation that concerns for the religious purity of the house would be the dominant consideration.

Table 5.5 : Renting-out the House, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	64	85	41	72
No	31	10	53	21
Other	5	5	6	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.6 : Renting-out the House, by Ethnic Group and Gender(%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Yes	62	64	88	81	45	37	73	69
No	29	32	6	17	47	58	19	26
Other	9	4	6	2	8	5	8	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Chinese respondents overwhelmingly (by 85 percent to 10 percent) predicted that Husin Ali's decision would not be based on ethnic loyalty. Males predicted this more confidently than females.

The Malays, however, predicted by 53 percent to 41 percent that Husin Ali's mother would see the situation differently from her son. Malay females were slightly more inclined to predict an ethnic influence upon Husin Ali's behaviour and they were even more inclined to

The Chinese predicted Husin Ali's mother to prioritise material gain rather than concern for ethnic sentiment as 72 percent registered renting out the house as against 21 percent for the opposite. No significant difference was observed among the Chinese along the gender line. They underestimated the strength of ethnic sentiment among Malays quite substantially.

In Tables 5.7 and 5.8, Malays predicted by 72 percent to 23 percent that Husin Ali's niece would accept the Chinese tiny tot; the material benefit would outweigh any concern for ethnic alignment. No significant difference could be observed along the gender line. This is contrary to the research worker's expectation that the Malay females would be influenced by ethnic loyalty.

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	72	81	54	82
No	23	10	41	11
Other	5	9	5	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

[illegible]

The Chinese also predicted more strongly, by 81 percent to 10 percent, that Husin Ali's niece would accept the minding of the one-year old Chinese child. No significant difference could be observed along the gender line.

Both Malays and Chinese predicted that Husin Ali's mother would not wish her relative to align herself ethnically in these circumstances. The Malays predicted this by 54 percent against 41 percent while the Chinese were predicting it by 82 percent against 11 percent.

Contrary to the researcher's expectation, Chinese and Malays, even Malay females, ascribed to self-interest of the material kind above ethnic sentiment when predicting Husin Ali's mother's response to child minding; 56 percent and 51 percent, respectively, for the Malay males and females, and 74 percent and 69 percent, respectively, for the Chinese males and females were in favour while 37 percent and 44 percent, respectively, for Malay males and females and 20 percent and 24 percent, respectively, of the Chinese males and females were against. The overall picture again indicated that the Chinese underestimate the strength of Malay ethnic alignment.

II. Hypothetical Social Situation: Self-Interest of the Status Kind

a) The Zoo Trip

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show that in the eyes of the Malay respondents, Husin Ali would take the son of a Malay housemaid on a family trip to the zoo rather than the son of a Chinese doctor. The findings indicated that ethnic consideration was likely in such circumstance to override the concern of individuals for status gain by associating with someone belonging to a higher status group. Seventy-four percent predicted that Husin Ali would suggest to his son that he should invite the housemaid's son as against only 13 percent for the doctor's son. The findings suggested that ethnic alignment was more important in this circumstance than the research worker expected. No gender difference was observed.

Table 5.9 : Zoo Trip, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Ah Seng	13	48	7	25
Ali	74	41	82	61
Other	13	11	11	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.10 : Zoo Trip, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Ah Seng	10	16	43	54	8	4	24	26
Ali	77	71	45	36	83	82	62	60
Other	13	13	12	10	9	14	14	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Chinese respondents were more inclined to predict that Husin Ali would find himself in a conflictual position as to whom he should suggest to his son to invite during the weekend trip to the zoo; 48 percent predicted it would be the doctor's son and another 41 percent for the housemaid's son. The self-interest of the status kind was predicted to have a slight edge over ethnic sentiment, but not strong enough to indicate certainty in its influence on Husin Ali's behaviour.

The Chinese females stressed self-interest of the status kind in their prediction of Husin Ali's behaviour in that only 36 percent thought the housemaid's son would be chosen as against the males who registered 45 percent. They also scored higher for bringing the doctor's son at 54 percent as against only 43 percent for the males. This was contrary to the research worker's expectation of no gender difference in response.

The Malays predicted Husin Ali's mother would be influenced most by ethnic consideration, by 82 percent to 7 percent. There was a slight gender difference. The Chinese recognised that Husin Ali's mother would be influenced by ethnic considerations, but underestimated their strength. Sixty-one percent predicted it would be the housemaid's son as against 25 percent for the doctor's son. No significant difference could be noted along the gender line.

b) Skin Complexion

In Malaysia, it is a social liability to have a daughter who marries late in life. Most parents prefer to marry-off their daughter early. A daughter with fair skin complexion would be much in demand by the match-makers as they go round selecting the most appropriate candidate.

Table 5.11 : Skin Complexion, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Fair	70	72	76	71
Dark	5	4	6	6
Other	25	24	18	23
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.12 : Skin Complexion, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Fair	69	71	71	71	71	80	72	69
Dark	7	4	7	0	7	4	8	2
Other	24	25	22	29	22	16	20	29
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Thus, in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, both the Malays and the Chinese irrespective of gender predicted that Husin Ali and the mother would choose, despite the liability of age, the elder sister who has a fair skin complexion. For all the four categories of Malay males and females, as well as

c) Child Adoption

Table 5.13 : Child Adoption, by Ethnic Group (%)

Table 5.14 : Child Adoption, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

[illegible]

The Chinese predicted otherwise, 55 percent as against 34 percent thought that Husin Ali would adopt the fair Chinese child rather than the dark skin Malay child. Chinese males overestimated the significance of a fair complexion more than Chinese females. This supported the research worker's expectation that some gender differences would be observed among the Chinese, but not as much as among the Malays.

The Malays predicted Husin Ali's mother would be more influenced than her son by ethnic sentiment, 77 percent to 17 percent. No gender difference was observed for the Malays. The Chinese respondents, contrary to the research worker's expectation, but in line with the Malay responses, predicted Husin Ali's mother's response would follow ethnic line. Fifty-three percent predicted that she would advise her son to adopt the dark skin Malay child compared to 37 percent for the fair Chinese child.

A comparison of this situation with the responses on the fair skin question earlier, indicated that the importance of ethnic factor, despite the general preference for a fair complexion, complicated the responses of the Malays and the Chinese as they tried to predict the behaviour of Husin Ali and his mother. The Chinese once again underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic sentiment.

d) Wedding Invitation

Tables 5.15 and 5.16 show that ethnic alignment overrides any concern for status gains to be associated with a person having a higher status. Sixty-two percent of the Malays predicted that Husin Ali would be influenced by ethnic considerations when deciding to whose wedding he should go first. Any fear of status loss from association with a person of lower status seemed unimportant by comparison. Only 27 percent thought otherwise and predicted Husin Ali would go first to the house of Leong, the company director. The emphasis on ethnic loyalty over self-interest of the status kind was stronger than the research worker had expected. No gender difference was observed.

Table 5.15 : Wedding Invitation, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Mr. Leong	27	65	12	25
Mr. Ismail	62	16	79	54
Other	11	19	9	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 5.16 : Wedding Invitation, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Mr. Leong	24	30	66	64	10	13	26	43
Mr. Ismail	60	63	19	12	78	80	57	50
Other	16	7	15	24	12	7	17	27
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Chinese respondents, underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic sentiment, predicting by 65 percent to 16 percent that Husin Ali would go first to the company director's house. Gender difference was insignificant. The research worker's expectation that the Chinese would be swayed by self-interest of the status kind was supported.

The Malays predicted that Husin Ali's mother would be more influenced than her son by ethnic loyalty when considering which wedding party he should go first. The predictions given were 79 percent to 12 percent in favour of Mr. Ismail. This confirmed the research worker's expectation. No discernible pattern of difference could be observed along gender line for Malays. Though the Chinese underestimated the influence of ethnic loyalty upon Husin Ali's behaviour, they were much less inaccurate in judging the position Husin Ali's mother would adopt.

Discussions of the Findings

The results of these alignment tests show that self-interest of the material kind has generally reduced the significance of ethnic loyalty and testifies to the advance of a commercial ethos among Petaling Jaya Malays.

Malays emphasised security of their home and financial gains relative to ethnic loyalty when they expected Husin Ali to give the house key to the Chinese neighbour, (Table 5.3, 87 percent against 0 percent), to accept the offer of minding a Chinese child, (Table 5.7, 72 percent against 23 percent), and to rent-out the house to the Chinese accountant, (Table 5.5, 64 percent against 31 percent). The Malays experienced conflict over shopping choice as material interest counterbalanced ethnic loyalty, (Table 5.1, 47 percent against 47 percent), but on the other three situations of self-interest of the material kind, the prospect of material gain outweighed any concern for ethnic obligation. This conclusion confirmed the research worker's expectation.

Ethnic loyalty was, however, more important to the Malays relative to self-interest of the status kind. Status consciousness was less developed among the Malays than the research worker expected. When fair skin complexion as a status symbol was placed against a dark skin complexion person, Malays showed status consciousness, (Table 5.11, 70 percent against 5 percent). However, when status gains were placed against ethnic loyalty, Malays downplayed status interest in favour of ethnic considerations. Thus, the wedding invitation showed Malays would attend a co-ethnic's wedding party first, (Table 5.15, 62 percent against 27 percent). A dark skin Malay child was preferred over a fair skin Chinese, though Malays had indicated fair skin complexion was a status indicator, (Table 5.13, 67 percent against 26 percent), and an association with a higher status person's son on a trip to the zoo was rejected in favour of a co-ethnic, (Table 5.9, 74 percent against 13 percent). The Malays rejected status for ethnic loyalty as they faced conflict and feared the growing economic and political dominance of the Chinese in the country that they considered theirs. It looks as if Malays, whenever they defined a situation as touching upon a shift in the political balance vis-a-vis the Chinese, was swayed by ethnic loyalty

rather than status gains. Under such stimuli, status remained undeveloped as a motivation to individual Malays. However, when individuals thought self-interest was not related to political considerations, then material and status interests were given precedence over ethnic loyalty.

Being a breadwinner or a career-minded person seem not to be associated with attaching more weight to self-interest. The alignment tests of the material self-interest indicated that the females were sensitive to economic norms relative to ethnic loyalty, viz., the shopping choice, (Table 5.2, 53 percent against 42 percent); the house key, (Table 5.4, 85 percent against 1 percent); renting the house, (Table 5.6, 64 percent against 32 percent); and child minding, (Table 5.7, 73 percent against 23 percent). The female Malays fared even better than their males; they shared the same views on the above circumstances with the males, but on the shopping choice the females ascribed to self-interest of the material kind rather than ethnic loyalty as their males' counterpart did (Table 5.2, 41 percent against 52 percent). This disproved the hypothesis that ethnic loyalty would be associated with the domestic sphere as opposed to the workplace.

No gender difference was observed for the Malays. Malays were exposed to modern values through education and they also increasingly encountered styles of life originating outside their traditional Malay world. The educational assets possessed, aided by the country's growing industrialisation, offered spatial mobility for them. Growing urbanisation, and the constant exposure to materialist culture through the mass media, led them to manifest greater independence in their attitudes towards life than their parents had shown. These observations of a growing recognition of more liberal and individualistic attitudes, even among the females, highlighted the importance of self-interest of the material kind over ethnic loyalty. The encroachment of the above attitudes among the female Malays meant that the earlier assumptions of only the males being influenced by the workplace and breadwinner-cum-career-minded attitudes was thus, falsified. Females, despite their being more accustomed to the domestic sphere, displayed an equally universalist tendency in their concern for self-interest of the material kind rather than ethnic loyalty per se. Just as other social situations of self-interest on the material kind versus ethnic loyalty, the shopping choice indicated that females put a lower

value on ethnic loyalty in order to save on the monthly kitchen allowance as whatever money saved would be theirs to keep and spend on things they themselves aspire to possess. The monthly bulk-buying was a family affair, but the female handled the daily shopping choice and shopping purse. Since the females controlled the kitchen purse and did the shopping, one could expect the spread of universalist norms through commercial relations, restricting and making ethnic loyalty less applicable.

Though an advance commercial ethos could be observed among the Malays as exemplified by the weight given to material returns relative to ethnic considerations, the hypothesis that Malays, as Muslims, would be hesitant about food pollution in contrast to the Chinese was also supported. This could be observed by comparing the house key and child minding with that of shopping choice and renting the house. In the house key and child minding situations, Malays placed material self-interest higher than ethnic loyalty (Table 5.3, 87 percent against 0 percent and Table 5.7, 72 percent against 23 percent, respectively). In contrast to the shopping choice and renting the house situations, Malays were caught in a conflictual position, not only in terms of ethnic loyalty, but of a religious kind as well (Table 5.1, 47 percent against 47 percent and Table 5.5, 31 percent against 64 percent, respectively). The Chinese shop sold food items such as pork, lard, etc., and renting a house to a Chinese meant having to cleanse the pollution. In response to such religious obligations, Malays reduced the significance given to material gains relative to ethnic loyalty. Chinese who did not share the Malay conception of pollution, consistently placed economic norms above ethnic considerations. This could be observed in shopping choice (Table 5.1, 80 percent against 16 percent), house key (Table 5.3, 94 percent against 0 percent), renting the house (Table 5.5, 85 percent against 10 percent) and child minding (Table 5.7, 81 percent against 10 percent). Thus, there were circumstances where religious obligation to Malays became a greater concern than financial return or ethnic loyalty per se. Sometimes to the Malays, religious obligations were intertwined with ethnic loyalty.

Scrutinising the data by gender line found no support for the research worker's expectation about the significance of gender. No, marked gender difference could be observed in

three of the four social situations of the self-interest of the material kind discussed above (Tables 5.4, 5.6 and 5.8). Findings from the fourth social situation ran contrary to the expectation, in that it was the females who showed greater concern for material considerations in the shopping choice (Table 5.2, 53 percent against 42 percent and 41 percent against 52 percent for females and males, respectively).

While on the status self-interest, Malays indicated status considerations relative to ethnic loyalty were not that developed. No gender difference could be observed among Malays, be it in relation to workplace and domestic sphere, work as a career versus housework, or with religious dimensions. Malay males and females were exposed to a materialist culture, consumerism, and economic individualism as the growth sector increasingly encroached onto their lives, displacing the significance of particularistic norms such as ethnic loyalty and religious obligations. When ethnic loyalty was significant, it was in minor spheres of life such as food and private rituals.

As expected in circumstances where interests and sentiments were ethnically based, especially those within the realm of ethnic bargaining and political mobilisation, ethnic loyalty become more salient in influencing their interest at the group level relative to both the material and status self-interest. Malays did not see any significance of ethnic loyalty relative to self-interest in the house key (Table 5.3, 0 percent against 87 percent) and fair skin complexion situations, (Table 5.11, 5 percent against 70 percent). These alignment tests did not put on a price on their concern for individual self-interest against that of ethnic loyalties.

However, as Malays increasingly felt that they had to trade their ethnic obligations relative to individual motivations of self-interest of the material and the status kinds vis-a-vis the Chinese, the tests showed that Malays became more sensitive to ethnic loyalty. In child minding 23 percent of the Malays demonstrated ethnic loyalty, but not strong enough to prevent other Malays, 72 percent, from accepting the Chinese request to mind the child (Table 5.7). Ethnic sentiment was displayed more strongly in the renting of the house question, 31 percent placed the

need to take account of their ethnic obligations against 64 percent for the income gained (Table 5.5). In these two situations, Malays fear the frowns of fellow ethnic members and pollution, respectively, but these ethnic considerations were not sufficient to displace their preference for the material gains.

Despite the financial gains to be obtained from competitive prices, Malays weighed ethnic loyalty as equal to self-interest of the material kind in the shopping choice question, (Table 5.1, 47 percent against 47 percent). In situations where ethnic obligations were pitted against status, Malays showed concern for ethnic loyalty, viz., the zoo trip (Table 5.9, 13 percent against 74 percent), child adoption (Table 5.13, 26 percent against 67 percent) and wedding invitation (Table 5.15, 27 percent against 62 percent).

These restrained responses to material and status advantages relative to ethnic loyalty could only be understood by referring to the underlying factors in the general society such as a shift in the political balance between Malays and Chinese. Malays found their economic and political positions unstable vis-a-vis the Chinese. Thus, ethnic sentiment retained political significance in influencing individual Malays, and any unwarranted supports given to a Chinese would be construed as creating disadvantages to one's own group.

The Chinese, perhaps, because they were more involved in a commercial culture, gave a higher priority to self-interest of the material and status kinds than the Malays. This was what the research worker expected. The alignment tests of the self-interest of the material kind showed that Chinese attributed greater significance to economic norms than ethnic loyalty when they predict Malay behaviour. They seem to have underestimated the Malays' concern for ethnic and religious considerations, perhaps, because they projected their own life experiences onto the Malays. This could be observed with all four self-interest of the material kind tests, viz., shopping choice (Table 5.1, 80 percent against 16 percent), house key (Table 5.3, 94 percent against 0 percent), renting the house (Table 5.5, 85 percent against 10 percent) and child minding (Table 5.7, 81 percent against 10 percent).

Unlike the Malays, Chinese placed status gains higher than ethnic loyalty. They underestimated Malay ethnic sentiment and cultural preferences. They placed status gains on the fair skin complexion (Table 5.11, 72 percent against 4 percent), on child adoption (Table 5.13, 55 percent against 34 percent) and wedding invitation (Table 5.15, 65 percent against 16 percent). They showed ambivalence on the zoo trip test, (Table 5.9, 48 percent against 41 percent), perhaps, reflecting their experience of the risks in being accepted socially in a Malay-biased society. Interestingly, the responses of Chinese females, displayed the prevailing commercial values more strongly than Chinese males (54 percent to 43 percent, Table 5.10).

No marked gender difference could be found among the Chinese regarding self-interest of the material kind. However, on the status tests, they differed on two social situations, viz., the zoo trip and the child adoption, but for different reasons. In the zoo trip, the females placed status gains over ethnic loyalty, but not their males who responded ambivalently (Table 5.10, 54 percent against 36 percent and 43 percent against 45 percent, respectively). The males' ambivalent response reflected their fear of risks prevailing in the larger society. Their females were ambivalent to the child adoption test as giving up a Chinese child for adoption to a Malay, contradicted their own ethnic sentiment (Table 5.14, 48 percent against 41 percent and 60 percent against 29 percent). These two social situations indicated that the Chinese males were sensitive to wider issues ethnically, and their females more sensitive to ethnic sentiment than their males. Overall, no significant gender difference could be observed in respect of self-interest of the material and status kinds relative to ethnic loyalty.

Husin Ali's mother featured in the questions as a female representative of an older generation with less experience of non-Malays and of workplace relations, and therefore, as someone likely to be suspicious about contacts with Chinese. The research worker's expectations on these counts were not supported. Malays predicted that the mother would face conflict as she confronted self-interest of the material kind relative to ethnic loyalty, and would place ethnic

loyalty above status gains. The mother was not seen as being more suspicious of contacts with Chinese of being less experienced with non-Malays, or less influenced by workplace relations.

Regarding self-interest of the material kinds, two of the four tests indicated Malays attributed more weight to commercial norms than ethnic loyalty when predicting the mother's behaviour, viz., house key (Table 5.3, 82 percent against 2 percent) and child minding (Table 5.7, 54 percent against 41 percent). On the other two social situations, they thought Husin Ali's mother would place ethnic considerations above material returns, viz., shopping choice (Table 5.1, 61 percent against 33 percent) and renting the house (Table 5.5, 53 percent against 41 percent). The mother was predicted to prioritise economic norms rather than ethnic loyalty when ensuring the security of the house and minding a child as there were material gains, despite having to leave the key to a Chinese neighbour and accepting a request from a Chinese mother to mind a child, respectively. Thus, the respondents thought that even Husin Ali's mother's behaviour would be influenced by the commercial ethos in these situations. However, their predictions were different for shopping choice and renting the house; in these situations, competitive prices and income gained from rent were not thought powerful enough to override the mother's ethnic sentiment. It would, therefore, appear that Chinese might have predicted Husin Ali's mother to be suspicious about contacts with Chinese, not because she represented an older generation, with less experience of non-Malays and of workplace relations, but more because of the political balance between Malays and Chinese in determining the control over societal resources.

It was expected that female respondents, irrespective of ethnic background, would be more likely than males to see Husin Ali's mother as swayed by ethnic considerations. The findings did not support the research worker's expectation. No distinct gender difference could be observed for the Malays and Chinese. Both males and females among the Malays placed material gains in the house key situation, above ethnic loyalty (Table 5.4, 85 percent against 1 percent males and 80 percent against 2 percent females) and child minding (Table 5.8, 56 percent against 37 percent males and 51 percent against 44 percent females). The males were ambivalent about renting the house, while the females showed a slight sensitivity to ethnic

sentiment rather than income gained (Table 5.6, 45 percent against 47 percent males and 35 percent against 58 percent females). Both were more concerned about ethnic loyalty in shopping choice (Table 5.2, 29 percent against 62 percent males and 36 percent against 60 percent females). With the Chinese, there was no marked difference along gender line as they gave priority to material returns rather than ethnic loyalty, with the exception for the females on shopping choice, where they predicted Husin Ali's mother would be caught in a conflicting position as she weighed material and ethnic obligations.

On self-interest of the material kind, material interest gained was acceptable to Malays, but not at the expense of their own ethnic group interests vis-a-vis the perceived Chinese threats where uncertainty in responses to such social situation would prevail. Chinese did not see the material self-interest tests in such a manner. In the status self-interest, no gender difference could be observed. All categories suggested that the mother would favour a fair skin complexion. However, on the other three status tests, both groups and by gender, displayed concern for ethnic rather than universalist norms.

The Chinese, at both Husin Ali's and his mother's levels of analysis, showed a consistent tendency to underestimate the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty. The research worker's expectation was confirmed. The tendency to underestimate was more distinct with self-interest of the material kind (Tables 5.1, 5.3, 5.5 and 5.7) than of the status kind (Tables 5.9, 5.11, 5.13 and 5.15). Higher priority was given to material gains relative to ethnic loyalty especially at Husin Ali's level.

To exemplify the observation, Chinese predicted 80 percent of the Malays against 16 percent to place competitive prices over ethnic loyalty in the shopping choice at Husin Ali's level, compared to only 51 percent against 41 percent for the mother's level (Table 5.1), the house key, 94 percent against 0 percent and 91 percent against 2 percent (Table 5.3), renting the house, 85 percent against 10 percent and 72 percent against 21 percent (Table 5.5), and child minding, 81 percent against 10 percent and 72 percent against 21 percent (Table 5.7). At both levels

Chinese valued fair skin complexion as a desired status object but downplayed the priority of status when pitted against ethnic loyalty.

Thus, on fair skin complexion, Chinese predicted Husin Ali and the mother to value status on fair skin complexion, (Table 5.11, 72 percent against 4 percent and 71 percent against 6 percent), but in the zoo trip, when status gains were pitted against ethnic loyalty, they predicted both levels would place ethnic sentiment higher at the mother's level (Table 5.9, 48 percent against 41 percent and 25 percent against 61 percent). While on child adoption, the Chinese predicted Husin Ali to place status gains by adopting the Chinese child, but not at the mother's level, where ethnic considerations were to prevail (Table 5.3, 55 percent against 34 percent and 37 percent against 53 percent), and the same pattern was predicted for the wedding invitation (Table 5.15, 65 percent against 16 percent and 25 percent against 54 percent). Chinese thus, predicted Husin Ali's generation to be influenced more by economic norms rather than ethnic loyalty, but saw the mother being swayed by ethnic consideration above status gains. Therefore, the Chinese were inclined at both levels to overestimate the importance of universalist norms among the Malays.

Conclusion

Malay and Chinese norms were becoming increasingly similar as the Malays were influenced by the commercial ethos. Malays were concerned for status gains, but, on the tests used, rated these gains as less important than ethnic loyalty. The Chinese gave a higher priority to self-interest in the questions put to them. There were also circumstances where Malays placed religious obligations above self-interest, especially on foods and in the area of personal rituals. Though no gender difference was predicted on religious obligations, the female Malays at times were swayed by ethnic considerations in their choice of actions. Overall, a large proportion of the tests indicated that no marked gender difference could be observed among the Malays. The exception to this pattern could be observed with regard to Husin Ali's mother where ethnic loyalty was predicted to influence inter-ethnic contacts, especially by the Malay females. Though a commercial ethos had spread among the Malays and Chinese reducing the significance of ethnic

sentiment in the calculation of their social exchanges, the tests distinctly indicated that self-interest of both kinds would prevail over ethnic loyalty when individuals related to one another as they pursued their own individual interests. However, when relations were interpreted as relations between group representatives, rather than on an inter-personal basis, ethnic loyalty gained significance over self-interest. This conflict has to be understood in the larger context of the shift in the political balance between Malays and Chinese. However, the results suggest that in their daily life Malays and Chinese increasingly come under the influence of a universalist norm rather than the particularistic ones. This reflects a widening of the universalist sphere where ethnic loyalty and sentiment would be restricted and be made less applicable to their social relationship. From the analysis above, it would appear that the situations could be imagined by subjects so as to measure the relative priority given to ethnic loyalty in contrast to individual goals affecting self-interest in terms of status or financial gain. Some of the interpretations of the findings discussed in this and subsequent chapters are speculative. They should be seen as provisional, inviting further research.

In this chapter, I will present the results from questions designed to measure the strength of personal obligation as an influence upon alignment by comparison with ethnic loyalty. Personal obligation generates social bonds, which reflect the type and intensity of relations between the individuals. There exists a self-interest element within personal obligation for those individuals who fear they might suffer if they were known to have neglected their obligations. Some kinds of behaviour bring individuals psychological rewards and satisfaction if they act in the manner expected of them. Sometimes though, actions are regarded as good in themselves. Furthermore, as people work or come into contact with one another in mutually rewarding relations, they come to feel a sense of debt or obligation to one another; such an obligation can at times be a higher priority than ethnic loyalty. Thus, when personal obligation is placed against ethnic loyalty, the relative strength of one against the other could be relied upon to weigh the strength of the two inclinations and to note the degree of conflict. The discussion below will present the findings and observations on the strength of personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty, based upon five hypothetical social situations. The findings showed personal obligation to be strong relative to ethnic loyalty, stronger than the research worker had expected.

The Hypothetical Social Situations :

a) Supporting the Boss

As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show, the findings on supporting the boss are of particular interest in showing the strength of the bonds of personal obligation that can be formed in the work place. These bonds are stronger than the research worker expected. Only one Malay respondent in five (20 percent) predicted that Husin Ali's response would be governed by ethnic loyalty where he would align himself with the Malays who were trying to have his Chinese boss replaced. Three in five (61 percent) believed he would support his boss. No gender difference was observed.

Special attention should be paid to the Chinese responses. In general, the Chinese regularly underestimate the strength of ethnic alignment among the Malays. Uniquely, in this situation they overestimated it, perhaps, because they thought its fraught with risks for

themselves and their fellow ethnic members. Though 50 percent of the Chinese predicted that Husin Ali would align himself on the basis of the bonds of personal obligation, 39 percent believed that he would succumb to calls for ethnic solidarity. No gender difference was found.

Table 6.1 : Supporting the Boss, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	61	50	50	31
No	20	39	32	54
Other	19	11	18	15
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 6.2 : Supporting the Boss, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Yes	58	63	49	52	48	51	26	38
No	20	20	39	41	30	33	54	55
Other	22	17	12	7	22	16	20	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Even Husin Ali's mother was seen by the Malays, contrary to expectation, as being less inclined to stress ethnic loyalty in such a situation. The 50 percent to 32 percent pattern of response was not very different from the 61 percent to 23 percent predicted for her son. Gender difference was minimal. The Chinese, contrary to the research worker's expectation and the general tendency of their prediction on other questions, predicted that Husin Ali's mother would place ethnic loyalty above the bonds of personal obligation established at the workplace. Fifty-four percent predicted that she would wish Husin Ali not to support his Chinese boss. Only 31 percent predicted that she would wish her son to observe an obligation to his boss. These predictions are the reverse of the Malays, perhaps, reflecting their view of the risks. The gender analysis did not indicate much variation.

b) Mother's Wishes Concerning Marriage

Turning to the question of marriage, it can be seen from Tables 6.3 and 6.4, that the Malay respondents saw the bonds of personal obligation developed out of a mother-daughter relationship as balancing any concern for ethnic loyalty. Fifty percent thought that Husin Ali's daughter would conform to the mother's wishes so as to be married to the Chinese-Muslim man. However, 28 percent predicted the daughter would give greater weight to the ethnic difference. The 'Other' category of responses at 22 percent, was higher than for most alignment questions; perhaps, respondents thought the daughter should marry whom she chose. These findings reflected a rather less enthusiastic support for the research worker's expectation. The gender analysis of the Malays showed that their males were less concerned of ethnic loyalty than their female, 51 percent against 49 percent and they were also observed to be more willing in letting other considerations be the basis of mate selection, 33 percent against 22 percent for females.

Table 6.3 : Mother's Wishes by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali's Daughter		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Agree	50	68	35	47
Disagree	28	14	40	30
Other	22	18	25	53
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 6.4 : Mother's Wishes by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali's Daughter				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Agree	51	49	66	67	44	28	52	38
Disagree	26	29	14	14	28	51	28	33
Other	33	22	20	19	28	21	20	29
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Chinese predicted Husin Ali's daughter would abide by the mother's wishes by 68 percent to 14 percent. This can be interpreted as either an overestimation of a daughter's duty to

obey her mother or an underestimation of resistance to marriage across an ethnic boundary. No gender difference could be observed. Malays were fairly evenly divided (by 40 percent to 35 percent) in predicting that Husin Ali's mother would not favour such a marriage. The evenness of their responses reflected a changing attitude towards mate selection as other consideration prevailed, 25 percent.

The gender analysis showed that Malay females seemed, more than males, to think Husin Ali's mother would be concerned about ethnicity. Fifty-one percent of the females thought she would disapprove as against only 28 percent of males. The affirmative answer recorded the females to be lower at only 28 percent against 41 percent for the males. This suggests that females are more doubtful than males about any such inter-ethnic union despite a common religion; thus, the norm of ethnic loyalty can prevail over personal obligation. When considering Husin Ali's mother's advice, the Chinese seemed again to have overestimated a daughter's obligation to obey her mother because significantly more Chinese than Malays thought she would agree to the marriage. This overestimation was once again the outcome of predictions by the males.

c) Child's Playmate

The next question was about allowing the two-year old daughter to be taken back to the Chinese house for an afternoon. As Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show, ethnic loyalty was not seen as an important factor in placing constraints on the playmate relationship, 84 percent of the Malays predicted that Husin Ali would agree and only 14 percent that he would say 'No'. No gender difference was observed.

Ninety-four percent of the Chinese predicted Husin Ali would accept the offer of his neighbour to take his two-year old daughter to their house. Only a mere 3 percent predicted a rejection. There was, therefore, a small underestimation of the strength of Malay ethnic sentiment. No pattern of difference could be observed along gender line for the Chinese.

Table 6.5 : Child's Playmate, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	84	94	68	79
No	14	3	29	18
Other	2	3	3	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 6.6 : Child's Playmate, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Yes	82	86	95	93	70	66	76	81
No	16	12	2	5	26	31	19	17
Other	2	2	3	2	4	3	5	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The Malays predicted that Husin Ali's mother's views would not be affected by ethnic alignment; only 29 percent thought that she would be against the suggestion. Sixty-eight percent predicted she would wish her son to allow the grand-daughter to be taken home by the Chinese neighbour as playmates for that afternoon. No gender difference was observed. Seventy-nine percent of the Chinese predicted Husin Ali's mother would respect the request of the Chinese neighbour. Eighteen percent thought that she would object on ethnic grounds. No marked difference of response could be observed for the gender.

d) Indian Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party

Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are to be analysed next. The tables show that the strength of the bonds of personal obligation developed at the workplace between workmates were valued overethnic sentiment. Seventy-six percent of the Malays predicted that Husin Ali would attend his

Indian's workmate's daughter wedding party. Only 18 percent thought that he would not go. No gender difference could be discerned.

The Chinese overwhelmingly predicted that Husin Ali would respect the workplace bonds above the concern for ethnicity. Ninety-five percent thought he would attend the wedding party as against a mere one percent who predicted that he would not attend it. The Chinese underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty. No gender difference was observed.

**Table 6.7 : Attending a Wedding Party,
by Ethnic Group (%)**

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	76	95	61	89
No	18	1	32	7
Other	6	4	7	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

**Table 6.8 : Attending a Wedding Party,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)**

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Yes	75	77	94	98	63	59	86	93
No	19	18	2	0	28	35	9	5
Other	6	5	4	2	9	6	5	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Again, contrary to the research worker's expectation, Husin Ali's mother was predicted, by 61 percent to 52 percent, to wish the son to attend the workmate's daughter's wedding party. The Chinese, who predicted the same result by 84 percent to 7 percent, slightly underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic sentiment. No significant gender difference was observed for Malays or Chinese.

e) Bringing a Friend Home

When deciding whether a Malay boy should bring his Chinese friend home to play or not, ethnic loyalty was not seen as an important factor. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show that 93 percent of the Malays predicted Husin Ali would not be concerned about ethnic background and would allow his son to bring home the friend. Chinese predicted in a similar way. No gender difference was observed for either groups. Both Malays and Chinese predicted that Husin Ali's mother would place the friendship bonds above ethnic difference.

Table 6.9 : Bringing a Friend Home,
by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Agree	93	97	82	88
Disagree	6	1	16	9
Other	1	2	2	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 6.10 : Bringing a Friend Home,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Agree	93	93	95	100	88	87	88	88
Disagree	5	6	2	0	10	21	9	10
Other	2	1	3	0	2	2	3	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Discussion of the Findings

The personal obligations developed between individuals prevailed over the norm of ethnic loyalty among the Malays to a greater extent than expected. Tables 6.1 to 6.10 show such a trend ranging from a low 50 percent in mother's wishes concerning marriage to a high 93

percent in bringing a friend home. Social bonds developed out of social relations were weighed above ethnic considerations. Malays duly respected and reciprocated the social exchanges despite their ethnic and religious differences with the Chinese. The social bonds developed between the boss and his subordinate, mother-daughter, the neighbours, the workmates, and friends had given them not only psychological rewards, but other gains as well. Such social exchanges thus, took into account the possibility of material and status gains, apart from the psychological costs to be incurred in the face of ethnic, cultural and religious considerations vis-a-vis personal obligation. As in the material gains, to prefer a lesser monetary advantage over a higher one would be a financial miscalculation. So, too, would the equivalent be with social exchanges between two individuals with regard to personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty.

Malays were observed to stress personal obligation rather than ethnic loyalty as they related themselves with the Chinese. Malays allowed their two-year old daughter to be brought home for an afternoon as playmate by their Chinese neighbour without concern for ethnic considerations and pollution; out of respect for a neighbour's request (Table 6.5, 84 percent in favour against 14 percent no). The same observations were noted with attending an Indian workmate's daughter's wedding party (Table 6.7, 76 percent yes against 19 percent no), and bringing a Chinese friend home to play (Table 6.9, 93 percent yes against 6 percent no). Such social cement and trust could also be discerned with supporting the boss where Malays supported the Chinese boss in the face of opposition from Malay lobbyists who were out to replace him with an ethnic Malay. Universalist norms of achievement orientation, based on skills and experiences, bound the subordinates to their boss, and the bonds developed were sufficient to displace ethnic concern (Table 6.1, 61 percent yes against 20 percent no). In mother's wishes concerning marriage, Malays predicted the daughter would respect the wishes of her mother, but other considerations seem to have entered the calculation such as love (Table 6.3, 50 percent yes, 28 percent no, and 22 percent other). The research worker expected Malays to place personal obligation above ethnic loyalty, but not so strongly. This suggests that social relations between Malays and Chinese were coming increasingly under the influence of the universalist norms. It looks as if the growth sector, which is not associated with ethnicity, had encroached on Malay

norms through consumerism, materialism, and economic individualism, developing a trans-ethnic commonality of sentiment and interest. This widening horizon of universalist norms that limit the social relevance of ethnicity among Malays and Chinese was not recognised by the research worker at the beginning of the study.

Generally, no marked gender difference could be observed. Slight differences in intensity without invalidating the general hypotheses discussed above could be noted. Females rather than their male counterparts placed slightly greater weight on personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty in all the tests asked, except mother's wishes concerning marriage. In the latter test, Malays were divided in their predictions. Table 6.4 shows their dilemma, with the males scoring 51 percent on yes, 33 percent on other considerations, and 26 percent no, against 49 percent, 22 percent, and 29 percent for the females, respectively. This suggested a break with tradition, as mate-selection increasingly became an individual preference based on love rather than one arranged by the parents. Such a change, like the other four tests, reflected the overall changes happening to the Malay females as they increasingly came under the influence of growth and modernity, and the widening of a universalist sphere at the expense of particularistic behaviours. The research worker was again not initially aware of such changes. Females were not as socially secluded as he had expected.

Malays as Muslims could be expected to be more likely than Chinese to be hesitant about food pollution. The tests on personal obligation did not support such expectation of the Malays. They were not concerned about food pollution when they fulfilled the request of a Chinese neighbour to take their two-year old daughter home for an afternoon as playmate with their toddler (Table 6.5, 84 percent yes against 14 percent no) and to attend the Indian workmate's daughter wedding party (Table 6.7, 76 percent yes against 18 percent no). Malays could be Muslim, but such willingness to fulfil a request suggested a weakening of the particularist concern for pollution. Chinese projected their own cultural values of not sharing such concern for pollution, as in both tests they placed personal obligation higher than ethnic loyalty, viz., 94 percent yes against 3 percent no for child playmate and 95 percent yes against 1 percent

no for attending the workmate's daughter wedding party. A change noted on the Malay perception of pollution was related to the displacement of particularistic by universalist norms as growth and modernity influenced their lives.

Malay females as Muslims were also observed not to give significance to religious obligation as had been expected. The findings indicated Malay females valued personal obligation slightly higher than their males relative to ethnic loyalty. Universalist norms had spread wider than expected and Malay females showed less concern for pollution than expected.

The Chinese, being more involved in commercial activities, were more likely to give priority to self-interest than Malays and they were likely to project their own cultural values when predicting Husin Ali's responses. The five tests confirmed the research worker's expectations, ranging from a low 50 percent in supporting the boss to 97 percent in bringing a friend home; giving higher weight to universalist norms than ethnic considerations. The social bonds developed between Chinese and Malays had reduced any concern for ethnic sentiment.

No gender difference among Chinese was expected comparable to that which among Malays was based on religious commitment. The findings supported the research worker's expectation, as the Chinese females did not share the expected Malay females concern for religious matters. They placed slightly higher than their males the concern for personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty; three to four percent higher in four of the five tests carried out. In supporting the boss, the Chinese females were consistent in not ascribing to ethnic loyalty as much as their male counterparts (Table 6.1, 52 percent of the females said yes against 41 percent no, and 49 percent yes for males against 39 percent no). Thus, Chinese females on personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty displayed greater concern for universalist rather particularist norms, and higher than their males. They were thus, least affected by religious commitment as expected of the Malay females. This suggested that economic growth and modernity had influenced the Chinese across the gender line where both males and females being motivated by universalist rather than particularistic norms.

The research worker's expectation that the Malays would predict Husin Ali's mother, as representative of an older generation with less experience of non-Malays and of workplace relations, to be suspicious of contact with Chinese, was not confirmed by the findings. Husin Ali's mother was seen to stress personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty, viz., in supporting the boss, it was 50 percent against 32 percent, attending a workmate's daughter wedding party, 61 percent against 32 percent, child playmate, 68 percent against 29 percent, and bringing a friend home, 82 percent against 16 percent. The exception being the question about mother's wishes concerning marriage, where Malays predicted the mother would value ethnic loyalty rather than personal obligation of a daughter to her mother (Table 6.3, 35 percent yes, 40 percent no, and 25 percent other considerations). The findings on this test did not reflect Malay concern for religious sentiment, as Muhammad Lee was already a Muslim, but more of their unwillingness to accept an ethnic Chinese as the bridegroom. Malay concern for ethnic loyalty in this test needs to be understood within the larger concern of political balance between Malays and Chinese. Thus, apart from the question about mother's wishes concerning marriage, Malays did not think that their maternal generation was tradition-bound and be suspicious of contact with Chinese. Growth and modernity had moulded them to be motivated by universalist norms on a par with their children's attitudes.

Chinese generally, at both Husin Ali's and his mother's levels of analysis, showed a constant pattern of underestimating the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty. Chinese, and especially their males, when predicting the mother's behaviour were more sensitive to Malay ethnic loyalty relative to personal obligation, especially on issues pertaining to Chinese shared interests as compared to those of Husin Ali. At Husin Ali's level, out of five tests, only one was ambivalently responded, but at the mother's level, ethnic loyalty prevailed in two tests. This concern for ethnic loyalty, as observed at Husin Ali's level, was directed to issues pertaining to their shared interests. At Husin Ali's level, they reacted ambivalently to supporting the boss test, 50 percent yes against 39 percent no (Table 6.1), but at the mother's level manifested greater consideration for ethnic sentiment relative to personal obligation, at 31 percent yes against 54 percent no, and also to

mother wishes concerning marriage from 68 percent yes against 14 percent no at Husin Ali's level, to 47 percent yes against 30 percent no at the mother's level (Table 6.3). Despite this tendency, Chinese generally valued universalist rather than particularist norms when predicting Husin Ali's and his mother's responses. This reflects underlying political factor in the society.

The findings suggest that when comparing personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty, an individual preference for universalist norms can be sacrificed to placate group pressure. Malays and Chinese had a tendency to overestimate Husin Ali's and his mother's ethnic loyalty when circumstances pointed to shared interests. This confirmed the research worker's expectation that Chinese and Malays would overestimate the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty in areas of political bargaining and mobilisation. They faced conflicts when individual motivations were weighed against ethnic loyalty that had political significance. In such circumstances, individual interests coincided with those of the group. Chinese reactions to this kind of situation could be observed in supporting the boss, at Husin Ali's level, and in supporting the boss plus mother's wishes concerning marriage at the mother's level. The Malays reacted to the same tests as the Chinese, but higher ethnic sentiment at the mother's level. Table 6.1 shows that it was 61 percent yes against 20 percent no for supporting the boss at Husin Ali's level, but ethnic consideration had increased at the mother's level, 50 percent yes to 32 percent no, and mother's wishes concerning marriage of Table 6.3, show that it was 50 percent yes against 50 percent no at Husin Ali's level to 35 percent yes against 40 percent no at the mother's level. Malays and Chinese felt threatened of each other's economic and political powers as they strove to accumulate societal resources and rewards. No gender differences could be observed, suggesting that the feelings of threat from the other ethnic groups were equally experienced across the gender line. This could point to their readiness for political mobilisation and ethnic bargaining. However, in mother's wishes concerning marriage, the Malay females when predicting Husin Ali's mother thought that she would be swayed by ethnic considerations; a slight concern for signs of group identification. Thus, growth and modernity have reduced the political significance of ethnic sentiment on a large area of social relations between Malays and Chinese, but any analysis of personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty, just as in chapter 5, had to take

account of a lingering concern for ethnic considerations in circumstances where individual interests also pointed to shared interests.

Conclusion

It was generally observed that individuals in their interaction with other individuals generated social bonds and shared interests. Such relations could be mutually beneficial, at times rewarding to them materially, and at times entailing costs. Relations were reciprocal so long as the parties gained some rewards or moral obligations to respect and honour the wishes of others. In this chapter, the findings discussed indicate that personal obligation prevailed over ethnic loyalty. The Chinese and the Malays had gauged each other well. The tests carried out also showed that Malays and Chinese were uneasy when economic and political dominance was an issue. The strength attributed to personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty is consistent with the thesis of a widening universalist sphere.

In this chapter, the other questions from the research work that did not relate directly to ethnic alignment will be discussed. These questions pertain to age, residential composition, languages employed, inter-ethnic contact, national questions, and social perceptions of ethnic relations. The expectations held by the research worker will be presented first and then followed by the findings. Initial analyses of the associations between both age and socio-economic status, and the responses discussed in Chapters Five and Six, do not modify the validity of the conclusions presented there. The tables pertaining to the discussions on the relative strength of age and socio-economic status vis-a-vis ethnic loyalty are presented in Appendix III. In view of the quantity of data, it is necessary to keep some of the findings for subsequent analysis in future publications. The significance of these other questions about counter-weights to ethnic loyalty lies in their indications of a growing similarity between Malay and Chinese views on certain national issues. Their differences and similarities, as well as the comparison with the research worker's expectations, should help us to understand the direction and speed of change occurring among Malays and Chinese.

Questions and Expected Resolutions of the Counterbalance Questions to Ethnic Loyalty

Prior to the survey, the research worker wrote out his expectations of how Malay and Chinese respondents would respond to these counterweight questions. This was to draw out underlying assumptions and thereby formulate hypotheses about counterbalances to ethnic loyalty.

a) Language Usage

- a) How many languages can you speak?
 - [1] Own ethnic language
 - [2] Bilingual
 - [3] Multi-lingual

- b) Which language-based newspaper do you read?
 - [a multiple choice answer]
 - [1] Malay
 - [2] Chinese
 - [3] Tamil/Urdu

- [4] English

[5] Mixture

[6] Other
- c) Which language-based TV programmes do you watch?
[a multiple choice answer]

[1] Malay

[2] Chinese

[3] Tamil/Urdu

[4] English

[5] Mixture

[6] Other

Since the questions asked demanded a multiple choice answer, in working out the expected resolutions, the research worker provided them in a ranking format.

Table 7.1: The Expectations of Language Usage (Ranking)
(a): Language Spoken

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Bilingual	Mother-tongue	Bilingual	Mother-tongue
Mother-tongue	Bilingual	Mother-tongue	Bilingual

(b): Newspaper: Languages Read

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
English	Malay	English	Chinese
Malay	English	Chinese	English
		Malay	

(c): Television Programmes: Languages Watched

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
English	Malay	English	Chinese
Malay	English	Chinese	English
	Tamil / Urdu	Malay	Malay
	Chinese		

Irrespective of ethnic grouping, males were expected to be more often bilingual than their female counterparts, in terms not only of languages spoken, but of the newspapers read and the television programmes watched (Tables 7.1(a)-(c)). They were perceived to be more cosmopolitan and universalist than their females who were thought to be domestic-bound and particularistic in their norms.

b) Ethnic Contacts and Plots

- a) Do you come into contact with members of other ethnic groups?
- [1] Frequently
 - [2] Sometimes
 - [3] Seldom
 - [4] Never
- b) With which ethnic group do you come into contact?
- [1] Malay
 - [2] Chinese
 - [3] Indian
 - [4] Other
- c) Where do you come into contact with them?
- [1] Residential area
 - [2] Workplace
 - [3] Shopping centre
 - [4] At the children's school
 - [5] Public gatherings and festivals
 - [6] Organisation meetings
 - [7] Other
- d) In which occupational categories are most of them?
- [a maximum of two choice answers]
- [1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, petty trader
 - [2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant
 - [3] General services, general office administrator, technician, teacher, nurse
 - [4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler
 - [5] Executive in the private and government sectors and professional

- e) Do you consider yourself religious?
- [1] Religious
 - [2] Normal
 - [3] Not very
 - [4] Not at all

Malays and Chinese were expected to be in constant contact with one another; the males more frequently than their female counterpart (Table 7.2(a)). Males were expected to come into contact with members of other ethnic groups at their workplaces and the residential areas and the females in their residential areas and at the shopping centres (Table 7.2(b) and (c)). The Chinese and Malay males were expected to come into contact with members of other ethnic groups who belonged to the middle and upper socio-economic status (Table 7.2(d)). The influences of materialism, respectability and economic individualism were expected to determine the behaviours of the males, and to some extent the Chinese females, but not the Malay females who would come more under ethnic and religious norms (Table 7.2(e)). Malays, especially their females were expected to express a higher degree of piety than the Chinese.

Table 7.2: The Expectations of Contact Questions:

(a): Frequency of Contact

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Frequently	Sometimes	Frequently	Sometimes

(b): Frequency of Contacts between Ethnic Group

Malays with Malays		Malays with Chinese	
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Frequently	Frequently	Frequently	Sometimes
Chinese with Malays		Chinese with Chinese	
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Frequently	Sometimes	Frequently	Frequently

(c): Venues of Contact (Ranking)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Residential areas	2	1	3	1
Workplace	1	4	1	4
Shopping Centre	3	2	2	2
Children's School	6	3	5	3
Public Gatherings	4	5	4	5
Society Meetings	5	6	6	6

(d): Occupational Categories of Persons in Contact (Ranking)

Malays with Malays		Malays with Chinese	
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Middle	Middle	Middle	Middle
Upper	Lower	Upper	Upper
	Upper		
Chinese with Malays		Chinese with Chinese	
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Middle	Middle	Middle	Middle
Upper	Upper	Upper	Upper
			Lower

(e): Degree of Piety Professed

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Religious	Religious	Not Really	Normal

c) Rukunegara, the Six Statements and the National Problems

- a) Do you remember the Rukunegara?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] Slightly
 - [3] Not really

I am going to read six statements. Please tell me if you agree with them very strongly or strongly, or whether you disagree with them very strongly or strongly, or if you have no particular feelings on the subject.

- [1] Very strongly agree
- [2] Strongly agree
- [3] Very strongly disagree
- [4] Strongly disagree
- [5] No particular feelings

b) It is disgraceful if people fail to stand while the country's National Anthem is being played.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

c) Compared to other countries, there is much racial discrimination in Malaysia.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

d) People should not be dependent on government programmes, these destroy people's ability to look after themselves.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

e) The Indonesian migrants are socially undesirable, they take our jobs away.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

f) Those who are dissatisfied with Malaysia should emigrate to another country of their choice.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

g) This country does not belong to Malays alone, it belongs to all Malaysians.

- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

h) What are the main problems faced in this country.

- [1] Drug addiction
- [2] Corruption
- [3] Religious deviation
- [4] Factionalism
- [5] Unequal access to education
- [6] Ethnic differences
- [7] Other

On general public opinion questions as counterbalanced to ethnic loyalty, ethnic loyalty was expected to prevail, though in limited areas, but convergence of values could be expected to occur among the males. On Rukunegara, only the Malay males were expected to slightly remember the five pillars, but not the others (Table 7.3(a)). Remembering Rukunegara as an ideological mechanism to promote national unity was not expected to be well received, especially among the Chinese.

On the national anthem statement, Malays were expected to agree strongly with the assertion that it would be disgraceful if people failed to stand while it was being played (Table 7.3(b)). The Chinese were expected to disagree strongly with such a statement. No gender difference was expected. An absence of a common national sentiment with regard to respecting the national anthem among the Chinese was expected. Possession of such a national sentiment would be regarded by Malays as an indication of loyalty to the country.

Table 7.3: The Expectations of Public Opinion Questions:

(a): Remembering the Rukunegara			
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Slightly	Not Really	Not Really	Not Really
(b): Disgrace for failure to stand while the National Anthem is being played			
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree
(c): More Racial Discrimination in Malaysia than in other Countries			
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree
(d): Dependency on Government programmes disables people to look after themselves			
Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree

(e): the Social Undesirability of the Indonesian Migrants

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Strongly agree	Strongly agree

(f): The Dissatisfied should Emigrate

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree

(g): Malaysia does not belong to Malays alone

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly disagree	Strongly disagree	Agree	Agree

(h): The Main National Problems (Ranking)

1. Drug Addiction
2. Corruption
3. Religious Deviation
4. Political Factionalism
5. Unequal Access to Education
6. Ethnic Difference
7. Poverty
8. Others

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
1,4,2	1,4,3	2,5,1	4,1,2

Malays were expected to disagree strongly with any statement that there is much racial discrimination in Malaysia compared to other countries (Table 7.3(c)). Chinese were expected to support it strongly. No gender difference was expected. Malays were not expected to view policies and programmes based on ethnic differences as unjust and discriminatory. The country is theirs, and if any discrimination was to prevail, it was to correct a wrong; positive discrimination was to be regarded as justified. Chinese, however, might see themselves as experiencing discrimination in many parts of their life; at the hands of the police on the roads, difficulty in getting business licenses and permits, restricted by quotas in favour of Malays on scholarship

allocations, admission to the universities, government jobs and promotion, etc. Malaysia might be the Malays' country, but ethnic discrimination was likely to be seen as an abuse of their rights as citizens.

Malays were expected to disagree strongly that dependence on government programmes would destroy people's ability to look after themselves (Table 7.3(d)). The Chinese were expected to perceive otherwise. No gender difference was expected. Malays were expected to disagree strongly with this statement as government programmes for Malays are supposed to uplift their economic backwardness in the face of Chinese economic success. Without such governmental assistance, they would lose to the Chinese. The Chinese' personal experiences might indicate that over-reliance on government programmes would destroy a person's initiative and creativity. Such ethnic-based programmes would then be counter-productive.

Indonesian migrants were expected to be strongly supported by Malays as not socially undesirable; their presence would not take the Malaysian jobs away (Table 7.3(e)). Chinese were expected to take the reverse view. No gender difference was expected. Indonesian migrants were thought not to compete directly with the Malays, politically or economically. If these Indonesian migrants were absorbed into the Malaysian society, it would boost Malay numerical strength against the Chinese and the non-Malays; an advantage at the polling booths. Being migrants, the Indonesians would not have the required official status to compete for government jobs reserved for Malays. By contrast, the Chinese were expected to fear that the influx of Indonesian migrants would reduce their percentage in the population. They realised the cultural affinity between the Indonesians and the Malays. The Chinese, especially the poor, were feeling the disadvantage of an uncontrolled cheap labour supply, and with a large reserve. The Indonesian migrants were easily absorbed in the unorganised construction works, the plantation sectors, commercial activities, etc., at their expense, taking their own jobs away. Chinese also feared the increasing social ills of drug addiction, theft, house-breaking, etc., being committed by these Indonesian migrants. Recently, the newspapers were reporting on such developments and the government's actions in opening more ports of entry were opened to facilitate the movement of this cheap labour bewildered the Chinese.

Malays were expected to agree strongly with the assertion that those who felt dissatisfied with Malaysia should emigrate to another country (Table 7.3(f)). The Chinese were expected to react otherwise. No gender difference was expected. As Malays always think that Malaysia is the only country their group is identified with, so they could not understand why Chinese would voice dissatisfaction with their own adopted homeland. Chinese were expected to express dissatisfactions with the political system of the country and believe the ethnic-based governmental programmes to be counter-productive, encouraging corruption and destroying people's creativity, etc. Chinese would think such criticism constructive rather than a mark of disloyalty.

Malays were expected to disagree with the statement that the country does not belong to Malays alone (Table 7.3(g)). The Chinese were expected to agree strongly with such an assertion. No gender difference was expected. Malays might have accepted the Chinese as citizens of the country, but a sense of distrust was to be expected. The Chinese were migrants. They came from China and they could go back there again, or go somewhere else where the pastures were greener. Not the Malays, they were expected to live and die in Malaysia, come what might. The Chinese were expected to acknowledge that the country belonged to all Malaysians. They might be the descendants of immigrants, but so too were the Malays whose roots lay in Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, India, the Middle East, etc. The younger generation Chinese would be perplexed that, although born and bred in Malaysia, they should be categorised as non-indigenous.

Table 7.3(h) shows that Malays and Chinese were expected to differ least, except in terms of their intensity, when perceiving national problems. Drug addiction, corruption, and political factionalism were expected to be the dominant issues. Malays might see these issues as the by-product of materialism and greed, breaking down religious obligations. Chinese might see these issues as consequences of social frustrations stemming from the use of ethnicity as the basis of access to opportunities and mobility.

d) Relations between Ethnic Groups

- a) How would you describe the relationship between ethnic groups in Malaysia today?
 - [1] Good
 - [2] Moderate
 - [3] Bad
 - [4] Other

- b) How would you describe the relationship between ethnic groups in your locality today?
 - [1] Good
 - [2] Moderate
 - [3] Bad
 - [4] Other

- c) How do you expect the relations between ethnic groups in Malaysia to change over the next five years?
 - [1] Better
 - [2] The same
 - [3] Worse
 - [4] Other

- d) How do you expect the relations between ethnic groups in your locality to change over the next five years?
 - [1] Better
 - [2] The same
 - [3] Worse
 - [4] Other
 - [5] Do not know

In Table 7.4(a), Malays are depicted as seeing the current ethnic relations in Malaysia to be good. The Chinese were expected to feel ambivalence, with the males thinking relations good and the females just moderate. Malays felt confidence that the Malay-based government would come up with programmes that would ensure their economic and political supremacy. Daily, the newspapers, the television and the radio highlighted programmes to eliminate poverty among the Malays, to increase their assets in the corporate sector, and to ensure their upward social mobility. Malays expected Chinese not to be offended by such discrimination, as Malays had always been accommodating to the Chinese culturally and politically. Chinese political

leaders, some holding ministerial posts had accepted the political settlements. Even economic projects meant for Malays were often implemented on a joint-venture basis; Chinese males were expected to acknowledge such pragmatism, but their females might feel otherwise.

At the local level (Table 7.4(b)), ethnic relations were expected to be perceived as moderately good by all groups. Malays sometimes felt frustrated as they saw Chinese owning bungalows, driving expensive cars, belonging to professional circles, etc. Being Malay signified to them poverty, backwardness and worthlessness. They saw Chinese as not assimilating to their culture and yet the government as accommodating culturally, economically and politically. Often Malays became mere sleeping partners in joint-ventures while some businesses were sold outright to Chinese. The Chinese were expected to regard local ethnic relations as moderate because ethnic hurdles were placed in their path when they wanted to possess a house, obtain a university education, a job, etc. They would see the rules as manipulated unjustly to help Malays.

Table 7.4: The Expectations of Ethnic Relations:
(a): Current Ethnic Relations in Malaysia

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Good	Good	Good	Moderate

(b): Current Ethnic Relations at the Local Level

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

(c): Ethnic Relations in Malaysia in the Next 5 Years

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Worse

(d): Ethnic Relations at the Local Level in the Next 5 Years

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Worse	Unchanged	Worse	Worse

When asked to predict ethnic relations in Malaysia over the next five years, Malays and Chinese males were expected to view the situation in the light of the generalisations set out above (Table 7.4(c)). The Chinese females were likely to feel worst. Malays depended on their political supremacy to ensure their own economic position vis-a-vis the Chinese. Chinese males being pragmatic realised the need of the Malays for support. With respect to ethnic relations in the locality in five years' time, the males were expected to be less optimistic (Table 7.4(d)). Malays and Chinese might see themselves as involved in a zero-sum game; Malays fearing Chinese economic power and Chinese fearing Malay political strength. Ethnic relations might no longer link individuals, but place them on a group basis, ready to be mobilised.

e) The Preferred Political Party

- a) Given a choice, which political party would you prefer to govern a multi-ethnic Malaysia?
- [1] The National Front - the pragmatic approach

[2] DAP - Malaysian Malaysia

[3] PAS - an Islamic based

[4] A socialist party

[5] Do not know

[6] Other

Table 7.5: The Preferred Political Party to Govern a Multi-Ethnic Malaysia (Ranking)

Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
BN	BN	BN	DAP
	PAS	DAP	BN

Table 7.5 above shows that when asked to choose a political party suitable for a multi-ethnic society, males were expected to show pragmatism, but not females where ethnic considerations were to prevail. Thus, Malay and Chinese males were expected to choose the National Front, or Barisan Nasional (BN), rather than their own ethnic-based opposition parties. The males might place pragmatism above particularistic norms. Their female counterparts were

expected not to realise the realities of multi-ethnic politics as their own particularistic interests were to be placed above other considerations.

General Hypotheses underlying the Expectations

1. Males, irrespective of ethnic group, were expected to come under the influence of universalist rather than ethnic norms as they took up careers in the public sector and often came into social relations with others, not necessarily of their own ethnic origin.
2. Females, irrespective of ethnic group, were expected to be domestic-bound and less exposed to inter-ethnic relations.
3. Malay females were expected to be more influenced by ethnic and religious obligations than their Chinese counterparts.
4. Malays were expected to display greater concern for ethnic sentiments and loyalty, being the 'sons of the soil' they were thought to claim inalienable rights to political, cultural and economic supremacy over others.
5. In areas where interest and sentiments were ethnically based, especially those within the realm of ethnic bargaining and political mobilisation, ethnic considerations were expected to prevail over other considerations.

Overview of the Findings

The responses to questions about factors counter-balancing ethnic loyalty show that Malays and Chinese in Petaling Jaya have developed common interests and sentiments on many topics. They had similar childhood experiences with regard to mixed residential living. Their outlooks were cosmopolitan in the languages spoken, the newspapers read, and the television programmes watched. They frequently came into contact with members of the other ethnic groups, especially at work and in residential areas, and inter-ethnic contacts displayed a social network based more on status than ethnic loyalty.

A number of questions soliciting Malays and Chinese attitudes to a common national interest and sentiment suggested more a commonality of values than differences. On most of the issues raised, ethnic loyalty was counterbalanced by some other factor, though ethnic loyalty and gender differences seemed to prevail when issues of inter-ethnic relations and choosing a political party suitable to a multi-ethnic society were raised. Such reactions in favour of ethnic loyalty were manifestations of the underlying political significance of ethnicity in the larger society. However, the findings indicated that Malays and Chinese were linked markedly by commonalities of interest and sentiment.

The Findings of Ethnic Difference and Similarity

a) Age, Residence and Language Usage

The findings in Table 7.6 show that the age structure of the Malay respondents was evenly distributed with similar numbers below and those above thirty years of age. When differentiated by gender, as in Table 7.7, female Malays were younger, since 60 percent belonged to the below 30 years old category while 57 percent of males were above 30 years old. The Chinese respondents were evenly divided in terms of age categories and gender line. The division at 30 years divided subjects into those who might and might not remember the ethnic bargaining that followed independence and the May thirteenth, 1969 racial riots.

Table 7.6: Age Composition, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Under 30 years	52	51
30 years and over	48	49
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.7: Age Composition, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Under 30 years old	43	60	51	52
30 years old and over	57	40	49	48
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show that 43 percent of Malay respondents reported residence in mixed Malay-Chinese areas. However, as the Chinese first settled the towns, it is not surprising that 39 percent of Malays said they lived in Chinese areas while only 17 percent managed to reside in an area where Malays were the majority. No gender difference was observed.

Sixty-one percent of the Chinese respondents lived among fellow ethnic members; another 26 percent lived in Malay-Chinese areas and only 11 percent of the Chinese lived in Malay majority areas. Little gender difference except more Chinese males than females lived in mixed areas. Malay and Chinese females were inclined to live with co-ethnic. Though the urban areas are basically populated by Chinese, of late, more Malays have settled there. The older housing schemes were intended for particular ethnic groups, but with economic progress and rural-urban migration, new housing schemes have tended to be mixed.

Table 7.8: Residential Composition, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
More Malays in the area	17	11
More Chinese in the area	39	61
As many Malays as there are Chinese	43	26
Others	1	2
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.9: Residential Composition, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
More Malays in the area	14	21	11	12
More Chinese in the area	40	38	55	67
As many Malays as there are Chinese	45	40	32	19
Others	1	1	2	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 7.10: Residence During Childhood, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Malay-only residential area	45	24
Mixed residential area	55	76
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.11: Residence During Childhood, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Malay-only residential area	41	49	17	31
Mixed residential area	59	51	83	69
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

The findings in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 also indicated that 55 percent of the Malay respondents, but 76 percent of the Chinese, had spent their childhood in a mixed inter-ethnic community. No gender difference was observed.

Table 7.12: Piety, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malay	Chinese
Religious	63	32
Normal	37	63
Not religious at all	0	5
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.13: Piety, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Religious	67	59	34	31
Normal	33	41	62	64
Not religious at all	0	0	4	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

On the question of piety, Tables 7.12 and 7.13 show that Malays scored higher, at 63 percent, in regarding themselves as religious. No difference was observed along the gender line. Some Malays regarded Islam as a sign of a Malay identity, but increasingly others submitted to Islam as a way of life. Of the Chinese, 63 percent regarded themselves as being normally religious. Whereas 31 percent said they were not religious at all. No gender difference could be observed.

Table 7.14: Language Spoken, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Mother-tongue	34	6
Multi-lingual	66	94
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.15: Language Spoken, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Mother-tongue	30	39	2	10
Multi-lingual	70	61	98	90
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Tables 7.14 and 7.15 show that 66 percent of the Malay respondents were bilingual in Malay and English languages, and 34 percent spoke only their mother-tongue. No gender difference was observed. The Chinese claimed overwhelmingly to be bilingual; just 6 percent spoke only their own mother-tongue. No gender difference was observed.

Tables 7.16 and 7.17 show that nearly all Malays, at 96 percent, said they read Malay newspapers. More than half, at 54 percent, read English newspapers. Malay respondents did not normally read Chinese and Tamil newspapers. No gender difference was observed. The Chinese said they read more English newspapers than Chinese, 76 percent to 64 percent; 27 percent also read Malay newspapers, while 2 percent read Tamil newspapers. No gender difference was observed.

Table 7.16: Newspaper Reading, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Malay-based Newspaper	96	27
Chinese-based Newspaper	2	64
Tamil/Urdu-based Newspaper	0	3
English-based Newspaper	54	76

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.17: Newspaper Reading, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Malay-based Newspaper	96	99	29	26
Chinese-based Newspaper	2	1	63	64
Tamil/Urdu Newspaper	0	0	3	2
English-based Newspaper	55	52	80	71

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

Malay respondents, as shown in Tables 7.18 and 7.19, switched their television to Malay and English programmes most, at 94 percent and 79 percent, respectively. Forty-three percent of the Malays watched Chinese programmes and 22 percent Indian programmes. The gender analysis indicated that no difference was observed for the Malays on Malay-based programmes, but their female counterparts watched more Chinese, Indian and English

programmes than their males (53 percent to 32 percent Chinese programmes; 41 percent to 12 percent Indian programmes and 81 percent to 77 percent English programmes).

The Chinese respondents divided their time evenly between watching Chinese and English television programmes; at 88 percent and 87 percent, respectively. A high 53 percent watched Malay programmes as well while 15 percent watched Indian programmes. No gender difference was observed.

Table 7.18: Television Viewing, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Malay Programmes	94	53
Chinese Programmes	43	88
Tamil/Urdu Programmes	27	15
English Programmes	79	87

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.19: Television Viewing, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Malay Programmes	93	95	54	52
Chinese Programmes	32	53	82	93
Tamil/Urdu Programmes	12	41	17	12
English Programmes	77	81	86	88

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

b) Ethnic Contacts:

This section presents responses to questions about inter-ethnic contacts, their frequency, places of meeting, and the status background of those contacted.

Table 7.20: Malays: Frequency of Contacts,
by Ethnic Group (%)

	In Contact with	
	Malays	Chinese
Frequent	95	54
Sometimes	5	34
Seldom	0	12
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.21: Malays: Frequency of Contacts,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	In Contact with Malays		In Contact with Chinese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Frequent	97	92	60	48
Sometimes	3	6	24	43
Seldom	0	2	16	9
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Tables 7.20 and 7.21 show that Malay respondents came into contact more frequently with the members of their own ethnic group; 95 percent as against 54 percent with the Chinese. Malay males mingled more frequently with Chinese than did their female counterparts; 60 percent and 48 percent, respectively.

Table 7.22: Chinese: Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group (%)

	In Contact with	
	Malays	Chinese
Frequent	89	63
Sometimes	6	30
Seldom	5	7
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.23: Chinese: Frequency of Contacts, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	In Contact with Chinese		In Contact with Malays	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Frequent	88	90	68	57
Sometimes	6	5	29	31
Seldom	6	5	3	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

While in Tables 7.22 and 7.23, a majority (at 89 percent) of the Chinese respondents interacted frequently with their own ethnic members; a higher proportion of Chinese than Malays said they interacted with the members of the other group at 63 percent against 54 percent. No gender difference could be observed.

Tables 7.24 and 7.25 show that Malays came into contact with other Malays mostly in their residential areas and workplaces; 62 percent and 55 percent, respectively. Gender analysis indicated that female Malays met their fellow ethnic more in their residential areas, while their males did so more at their workplaces, 71 percent and 72 percent, respectively. This reflects the gender-based divisions of labour between males and females in respect to workplace situation and domestic sphere, respectively.

Table 7.24: Malays: Places of Contact, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Residential Areas	62	44
Workplace	55	62
Shopping Centre	10	18
Children's School	6	7
Public Functions	7	6
Organisation Meetings	4	5

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.25: Malays: Places of Contact, by Ethnic and Gender (%)

	Malays		Chinese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Residential Areas	52	71	38	50
Workplace	72	38	74	50
Shopping Centre	8	12	18	18
Children's School	7	4	8	6
Public Function	7	7	8	3
Organisation Meetings	4	3	9	0

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

Malays met Chinese at the workplace (62 percent), in the residential areas (44 percent); other areas, such as school, public functions and organisation meetings were of lesser importance. Malays interacted with Chinese in office-based situations; other possible contact areas were not so developed. No gender difference was observed for the other areas mentioned. Female Malays mingled with Chinese in their residential areas and Malay males interacted with Chinese in their workplaces, 50 percent to 38 percent, and 74 percent to 80 percent, respectively.

Table 7.26: Chinese: Places of Contact, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Residential Areas	56	38
Workplace	61	66
Shopping Centre	12	12
Children's School	6	6
Public Functions	10	7
Organisation Meetings	2	0

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.27: Chinese: Places of Contact, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Chinese		Malays	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Residential Areas	48	64	38	38
Workplace	62	60	72	60
Shopping Centre	9	14	14	10
Children's School	5	7	6	5
Public Function	8	12	8	7
Organisation Meetings	2	2	0	0

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

Tables 7.26 and 7.27 show that Chinese mixed with their fellow ethnic members in their workplaces, at 61 percent and the residential areas at 56 percent. Just as the female Malays above, the female Chinese interacted with their own kind more in the residential areas. However, no gender difference could be observed with respect to the workplace situation as found with the Malays by gender line. This observation is similar to the other areas of inter-ethnic meeting places as well. Chinese encountered Malays mainly in the workplaces (at 66 percent), residential areas (at 38 percent) whereas other areas were of lesser importance. No gender difference could be observed.

Table 7.28: Malays: Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Lower Social Status	41	38
Middle Social Status	62	65
Upper Social Status	26	29

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

**Table 7.29: Malays: Status of Persons in Contact,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)**

	Malays		Chinese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Lower Social Status	39	43	38	37
Middle Social Status	73	50	70	60
Upper Social Status	30	21	37	21

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

As shown in Tables 7.28 and 7.29, Malay respondents mingled with members of their own ethnic group who had a middle class background (62 percent). By gender, Malay males tended to associate with Malays of higher social status than did their females. Female Malays had relations with Malays of the lower status than their males; 43 percent to 39 percent in the lower status category, 50 percent to 73 percent in the middle class and 21 percent to 30 percent in the upper class. Malay respondents mingled with Chinese having a middle status background, at 65 percent, another 38 percent with the lower status and 29 percent the upper status. Malay males interacted more with Chinese from the middle and upper strata; 70 percent and 37 percent as against only 60 percent and 21 percent for female Malays.

Chinese respondents said they mingled among their own ethnic members with those who had a middle stratum background, at 59 percent and the upper status at 44 percent. Chinese respondents tended to mingle more with Malays from middle to upper strata; 64 percent and 46 percent, respectively. The inter-ethnic contacts by status background indicated that Malays mingle with other Malays and Chinese of middle to lower status, while the Chinese interacted with other Chinese and Malays having a middle to upper status background. This suggests that Chinese may be more status conscious than Malays.

Table 7.30: Chinese: Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Lower Social Status	32	33
Middle Social Status	59	64
Upper Social Status	44	46

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.31: Chinese: Status of Persons in Contact, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Chinese		Malays	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Lower Social Status	32	31	32	33
Middle Social Status	48	69	48	79
Upper Social Status	42	45	52	40

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

c) Rukunegara, the Six Statements and the National Problems

After the May thirteenth racial riots, the Rukunegara or the National Ideology was adopted. Its principles cover the belief in God, loyalty to the King and country, rule of law, upholding the constitution and good behaviour and morality. The Rukunegara is read at official functions, recited on every Monday by pupils at school, invoked by youth at their gatherings and athletic games, etc. Nevertheless, as shown by Tables 7.32 and 7.33, after 20 years of such practice, only 57 percent of Malay respondents said they remembered the principles of Rukunegara. No difference could be observed along the gender line.

Table 7.32: Rukunegara, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Remember fully	57	35
Remember partly	36	44
Do not remember	7	21
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.33: Rukunegara. by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Remember fully	55	59	42	29
Remember partly	39	32	37	50
Do not remember	6	9	21	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

The Chinese respondents had given a lower priority to remembering the Rukunegara; only 35 percent could do so. The Chinese males manage better than their females, 42 percent to 29 percent, saying they remembered the Rukunegara. Nearly half the female Chinese remembered only some of the principles in the Rukunegara. A fifth of the Chinese respondents seemed not to remember the Rukunegara at all.

Six statements were read to the respondents to which they responded as 'very strongly agree', 'strongly agree', 'strongly disagree', 'very strongly disagree', or if they had no particular feelings on the subjects. Tables 7.34 and 7.35 show that the findings of the first statement on national anthem which showed that 92 percent of Malays would be displeased with any person who did not respect the country's national anthem by standing when it was being played (50 percent as very strongly agreed and another 42 percent as strongly agreed). Compared to their female counterparts, Malay males showed greater displeasure; 56 percent to 44 percent as strongly agree, respectively.

Table 7.34: National Anthem. by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	50	50
Agree	42	39
Indifferent	3	5
Disagree	1	2
Strongly disagree	4	4
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.35: National Anthem, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	56	44	55	45
Agree	40	43	37	41
Indifferent	1	6	3	7
Disagree	0	2	2	2
Strongly disagree	3	5	3	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Chinese respondents responded to the statement read in a similar manner to the Malays; 89 percent agreed that it would be a disgrace if people failed to stand while the country's national anthem was being played (50 percent agreed very strongly and 39 percent agreed). Again following the Malay pattern, Chinese males responded more strongly than Chinese females (55 percent to 45 percent strongly agree). Thus, Chinese attitudes resemble Malay attitudes in feeling displeased towards those who did not respect the national anthem by standing when it is being played.

The second statement asked respondents if there was much racial discrimination in Malaysia compared to other countries. Tables 7.36 and 7.37 show that 33 percent of Malays agreed that there was racial discrimination in Malaysia (and of this, 7 percent expressed a very strong agreement to the statement) and 61 percent disagreed with it (the bulk of them strongly disagree at 44 percent). No gender difference could be observed.

Tables 7.36 and 7.37 show that 46 percent of the Chinese respondents agreed that there was racial discrimination in the country (16 percent very strongly and 30 percent strongly). Another 45 percent disagreed with the assertion (with only 4 percent as very strongly and 41 percent strongly disagree). No gender difference could be observed. Generally, Malays and Chinese responses did not differ much; only at the 'very strongly agree' level did Chinese relative to Malays express a significant difference, 16 percent to 7 percent respectively, indicating differences in the perception of discrimination.

Table 7.36: Racial Discrimination, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	7	16
Agree	26	30
Indifferent	6	9
Disagree	44	41
Strongly disagree	17	4
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.37: Racial Discrimination, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	7	8	15	17
Agree	30	22	23	36
Indifferent	6	7	5	14
Disagree	40	47	49	33
Strongly disagree	17	16	8	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

On the statement that people should not be dependent on the government as they could destroy people's ability to look after themselves. Tables 7.38 and 7.39 show that Malays indicated agreement; 74 percent for, to 19 percent against. Of those Malays who agreed, 34 percent thought so very strongly while 40 percent were strongly in agreement. No gender difference could be observed. The Chinese responded just as the Malays did above; 74 percent agreed and 22 percent disagreed with the assertion. No gender difference could be observed.

Table 7.38: Government Programmes, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	34	38
Agree	40	36
Indifferent	7	4
Disagree	14	17
Strongly disagree	5	5
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.39: Government Programmes, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	36	32	43	33
Agree	36	45	32	41
Indifferent	9	6	6	2
Disagree	14	13	14	19
Strongly disagree	5	4	5	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

When asked about the Indonesian migrants as socially undesirable, taking both the Malay and Chinese jobs away, Tables 7.40 and 7.41 show that Malays were less inclined to assent; 12 percent agreed very strongly. No gender difference could be observed. Chinese respondents were more inclined to feel that Indonesian migrants were socially undesirable, taking both Malay and Chinese jobs away; 59 percent felt so as against 26 percent. No gender difference could be observed.

Table 7.40: Indonesian Migrants, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	12	21
Agree	33	38
Indifferent	19	15
Disagree	26	24
Strongly disagree	10	2
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.41: Indonesian Migrants, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	11	12	19	22
Agree	29	37	38	38
Indifferent	19	11	17	14
Disagree	27	25	23	24
Strongly disagree	14	5	3	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 7.42: The Dissatisfied should Emigrate, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	28	18
Agree	27	26
Indifferent	18	17
Disagree	17	28
Strongly disagree	10	11
TOTAL	100	100

**Table 7.43: The Dissatisfied Should Emigrate,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)**

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	30	26	20	17
Agree	21	33	23	29
Indifferent	20	16	22	12
Disagree	17	17	26	30
Strongly disagree	12	8	9	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

In the fifth statement, when asked whether those who are dissatisfied with Malaysia should emigrate to another country, Tables 7.42 and 7.43 show that Malays reacted positively, at

55 percent (28 percent very strongly and 27 percent strongly agreeing). It is interesting that Chinese respondents did not seem to support this statement as strongly as the Malays; only 44 percent agreeing to it (18 percent very strongly and 26 percent strongly agreeing).

With regard to the last statement, Tables 7.44 and 7.45 show that Malays, at 76 percent agreed (35 percent very strongly and 41 percent strongly) that Malaysia does not belong to the Malays alone. The Chinese overwhelmingly maintained that Malaysia did not belong to the Malays alone; 98 percent felt so (79 percent very strongly and 19 percent strongly agreeing). No gender difference was observed.

Table 7.44: Malaysia is not Just for Malays, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Strongly agree	35	79
Agree	41	19
Indifferent	2	1
Disagree	11	1
Strongly disagree	11	0
TOTAL	100	100

**Table 7.45: Malaysia is not Just for Malays,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)**

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Strongly agree	35	35	74	84
Agree	38	43	25	12
Indifferent	2	3	0	2
Disagree	10	12	1	2
Strongly disagree	15	7	0	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 7.46: Major National Problems Faced, by Ethnic Group (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Corruption	52	46
Religious Deviation	12	7
Political Disunity	46	21
Education Place/ Scholarship)	8	14
Poverty	23	21
Drug Addiction	40	24
Others	13	15

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item and ethnic group

Table 7.47: Major National Problems faced, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Corruption	52	51	49	43
Religious Deviation	9	14	6	7
Political Disunity	48	44	23	19
Education Places/ Scholarship)	4	11	14	14
Poverty	26	20	18	24
Drug Addiction	34	46	22	26
Others	16	10	11	19

N.B.: Figures do not add up to 100 percent as they were individually analysed by item, ethnic group and gender

On the 'National Problems' question, a list was prepared and presented to the respondents. The Tables 7.46 and 7.47 show that Malays placed corruption, at 52 percent, as the country's main problem, with political factionalism at 46 percent second, drug addiction at 40 percent third, and poverty at 23 percent fourth. The Chinese respondents placed corruption at 46 percent as the main national problem, followed by drug addiction (24 percent), political factionalism (21 percent) and poverty (21 percent). No gender difference was observed.

d) Ethnic Relations

When asked to describe ethnic relations in Malaysia today, Tables 7.48 and 7.49 show that Malays seemed to be unsure; 47 percent thought the ethnic relations to be good and another 45 percent as moderate. Malay males took a more favourable view than their females (50 percent to 43 percent).

Table 7.48: Current Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by Ethnic Groups (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Good	47	50
Moderate	45	46
Bad	8	3
Other	0	1
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.49: Current Ethnic Relations in Malaysia, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Good	50	43	60	40
Moderate	39	51	36	55
Bad	10	6	2	5
Other	1	0	2	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

The Chinese saw the ethnic relations between ethnic groups in slightly positive terms; 50 percent considering them good. Gender analysis indicated the same pattern as above, more Chinese males at 60 percent, than females (at 40 percent) thought that inter-ethnic relations were good.

At the level of their locality, Tables 7.50 and 7.51 show Malays to have the same ambivalent feeling about the nature of inter-ethnic relations; 49 percent saying they were good to 46 percent moderate. No gender difference could be observed.

The Chinese, on the other hand, showed optimism, 55 percent viewed the relations as good and another 42 percent moderate. Unlike the Malay responses, both male and female Chinese were confident about ethnic relations situation; 52 percent and 57 percent respectively. Chinese relative to Malays were positive about inter-ethnic relations at the local level.

Table 7.50: Current Ethnic Relations in Locality, by Ethnic Groups (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Good	49	55
Moderate	46	42
Bad	4	2
Other	1	1
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.51: Current Ethnic Relations in Locality, by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Good	49	49	52	57
Moderate	43	48	44	41
Bad	6	3	2	2
Other	2	0	2	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

When asked for their view of how inter-ethnic relations of Malaysia would be in the next five years, Tables 7.52 and 7.53 show that Malay respondents portrayed the same view of uncertainty; with 49 percent as better, 40 percent the same, and only 9 percent worse. Female Malays seemed to be more positive than their male counterparts, as 50 percent rather than 48 percent to males said it would get better and 43 percent to 37 percent as the same.

Again the Chinese respondents reacted to this projection question positively, 59 percent predicted that inter-ethnic relations at the national level in the next five years would be good. The males, and especially the female Chinese, gave responses that indicated such confidence, at 51 percent and 57 percent for getting better, respectively. The Chinese relative to Malays projected an optimistic perception of inter-ethnic relations at the national level in the next five years.

**Table 7.52: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia in the Next Five Years,
by Ethnic Groups (%)**

	Malays	Chinese
Better	49	59
No change	40	35
Worse	9	6
Other	2	0
TOTAL	100	100

**Table 7.53: Ethnic Relations in Malaysia in the Next Five Years,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)**

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Better	48	50	51	67
No change	37	43	45	26
Worse	11	7	4	7
Other	4	0	0	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

In Tables 7.54 and 7.55, inter-ethnic relations at the local level in the next five years were described by Malays as less optimistic; with 49 percent perceiving the same and 43 percent saying they would get better. Malay females compared to their males indicated greater

uncertainty as they were unsure of the trend (56 percent to 41 percent as the same and 38 percent to 49 percent for the relations between ethnic groups would get better).

Table 7.54: Ethnic Relations in Locality in the Next Five Years,
by Ethnic Groups (%)

	Malays	Chinese
Better	43	53
No Change	49	44
Worse	6	2
Other	2	1
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.55: Ethnic Relations in Locality in the Next Five Years,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
Better	49	38	45	60
No Change	41	56	49	38
Worse	7	5	3	2
Other	3	1	3	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

The Chinese thought that inter-ethnic relations at the local level in five years' time would be better; 53 percent saying so and 44 percent felt it would be the same. By gender, female Chinese were more likely to expect improvement at the local level (at 60 percent). The Chinese males showed signs of uncertainty as only 45 percent said it would be better and 49 percent saying it would be the same. At the local level, Chinese relative to Malays still had a positive perception of better inter-ethnic relations, and their males, just as the Malay males, showed feelings of uncertainty about ethnic relations in the coming years. Malays, both males and females, saw current Malay-Chinese relations at the national and local levels ambivalently, so too in the coming five years at the national level, but held pessimistic expectations at the local level.

The Chinese often viewed ethnic relations in positive terms, giving optimistic evaluations to local scene over national level in the current year, and the reverse for the coming five years. Gender analysis supported the findings, with males feeling less secure at the local level in the next five years and their females feeling so at the national level of today. Chinese seem to have confidence over control of their daily life in the current situation, which would explain their more positive perception of the local than the national level; it may be an evaluation based on their personal experience. The future was expected to hold a different situation, as Malay political rhetorics about their unresolved economic problems in the face of Chinese competitors were often reported in the mass media, generating feelings that more constraints would be placed in their paths to ensure Malay economic and political supremacy. Malays, despite such political clout, realised their inability to compete with the Chinese with their business skills and networks that ensure success, so they are pessimistic about ethnic relations in the current situation and in the future, especially at the local level. Malays felt they were losing control over their daily life at the local level and were despondent about their ability to use political supremacy at the national level to bring economic success in their own communities. Lacking skills, experience and resources, they often felt beaten by Chinese commercial acumen.

e) The Preferred Political Party

Tables 7.56 and 7.57 show that the Malays picked the National Front as the political party best suited to govern a multi-ethnic Malaysia (at 60 percent). In the midst of Islamic revivalism and despite allegations that government policies had been influenced by Islamic activists, the Pan-Islamic Party (PAS) at 15 percent fared worse than the Democratic Action Party (DAP) at 19 percent. No gender difference could be observed.

The Chinese had more faith in the DAP than the National Front for governing a multi-ethnic Malaysia; 56 percent to 44 percent, respectively. However, the Chinese male differed markedly from their females. The former trusted the National Front more at 57 percent to 31 percent and their females for the DAP at 69 percent to 43 percent.

Table 7.56: Political Party Best Suited For A Multi-Ethnic Malaysia,
by Ethnic Groups (%)

	Malays	Chinese
National Front	66	44
Democratic Action Party/ Socialist	19	56
Pan-Islamic Party	15	0
TOTAL	100	100

Table 7.57: Political Party Best Suited For A Multi-Ethnic Malaysia,
by Ethnic Group and Gender (%)

	Malay Males	Malay Females	Chinese Males	Chinese Females
National Front	72	62	57	31
Democratic Action Party/ Socialist	16	22	43	69
Pan-Islamic Party	13	16	0	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Tables 7.56 and 7.57, together with Osman's leadership question in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 did not contradict one another, but the level of analysis and the interpretation differed. Osman's Table 2.5 suggests that Malays, Chinese, Portuguese and Indians would choose a Malay with leadership skill rather than a non-Malay candidate to be their prime minister. When the same question was replicated in Petaling Jaya, the findings indicated pragmatism for self and national interests were ascribed to; just as was noted in their choice of the National Front to govern the country.

The females were influenced by ethnic considerations in choosing a political party and a leader which pursued their group interests. Thus, Osman's work reflected a political culture prevailing among the Malaysians in choosing a prime minister, but the females' reactions reflected their desire for their own group's survival. This may help to explain the political reality of Malaysia, where the governing party is Malay-based, but a conglomeration of other ethnic parties within it becomes partners in the exercise of power. The coalition of political parties approach

would satisfy the political culture of the country, as the Malay political party is still the dominant partner.

Discussion of the Findings

In line with previous hypothesis, Malays and especially the Chinese were under the influence of an advanced commercial ethos. They were bilingual in the languages spoken, newspapers read, and the television programmes watched, with English as the second language; it has economic value. (Tables 7.14 to 7.19).

Comparing Table 7.1 to Tables 7.14 to 7.19 shows that the findings did not support the research worker's expectations about the significance of gender. The separation of gender into the domestic sphere of the housewife and the public sphere of the work as a career, of tradition and modernity, etc., was not as important as expected. Females were found to be just as cosmopolitan and universalist as their male counterparts.

Tables 7.20 to 7.31 on ethnic contacts, as indicated by places of meeting and social categories contacted, supported another of the previous hypotheses about ethnic differences, in that Chinese appeared to be more motivated by self-interest of the material and status kinds than Malays, and the Malays more concerned with ethnic solidarity. The research worker's expectations regarding the influence of gender were again not supported.

Perceptions of ethnic relations further supported the hypothesis discussed, in that Malays are more sensitive to ethnic loyalty than Chinese. When asked to predict ethnic relations at national and local levels, both currently and projecting ahead for the next five years, Malays viewed ethnic relations ambivalently, where the Chinese had positive expectations (Tables 7.48 to 7.55). Malay portrayed their own sense of material disadvantage as the Chinese forged ahead economically. Malay political supremacy might influence policy and programmes, but could not

satisfy them completely. However, the Chinese males felt less secure at the local level in the next five years.

The research worker's expectations on ethnic relations were not supported (Table 7.4). Malays did not expect ethnic relations at the national level, both currently and in five years' time to be good. The Chinese responded to the questions in reverse to what had been expected by the research worker, being optimistic rather than pessimistic. Maybe their skills and commercial acumen gave them self-confidence.

Tables 7.40 and 7.41 show much smaller differences than expected between Malays and Chinese in their views about Indonesian migrants. May be both groups were influenced by the many reports in the daily papers, about the social ills committed by the Indonesian migrants, such as house-breaking, muggings, etc., apart from taking jobs away from Malaysians. The same pattern of response was observed with the statement of discrimination in Malaysia. Malays and Chinese males tended to refute any indication of discrimination, but not the Chinese females who sensed otherwise (Tables 7.36 and 7.37).

Though Chinese responses to the suggestion that those dissatisfied should emigrate resembled the Malay responses, they were less inclined to agree to it (Tables 7.42 and 7.43). The findings of these three statements, viz., the Indonesian migrants, racial discrimination, and emigration because of dissatisfaction, did not fully support the research worker's expectations of a diverging view between Malay and Chinese (Table 7.3). Malays and Chinese did value ethnic loyalty, but not sufficiently to displace self-interest. The similarities are more striking than the differences.

The other statements about counter-balances to ethnic loyalty also suggest an extension of the universalist norms discussed earlier; bilingualism and the frequency of inter-ethnic contact point to growth of a common interests and sentiments. Malays and Chinese would both feel displeased if they saw somebody fail to stand when the national anthem was being

played. The males felt more so than their females. (Tables 7.34 and 7.35). On the government programmes, Malays and Chinese concurred that being dependent on government programmes destroyed people's initiative and creativity. (Tables 7.38 and 7.39). Malays and Chinese had accepted that Malaysia is not just for Malays; it did not belong to Malays alone (Tables 7.44 and 7.45). The responses to these statements suggested a convergence of views on public issues among Malays and Chinese. Ethnic loyalty is slowly losing its significance in the face of a recognition of common national interests and sentiments. The research worker's expectations about these statements, viz., the national anthem, the dependency on government syndrome, and Malaysia is not just for Malays, were proven wrong (Table 7.3).

The development of common national interests and sentiment could also be noted with respect to two other questions. On the national problems question, Malays and Chinese listed the same issues as the country's national problems, viz., corruption, drug addiction, political factionalism, and poverty (Tables 7.46 and 7.47). The research worker had listed those issues, but had underestimated the growth of common national interests (Table 7.3). Responses to the question probing the choice of a political party best suited to a multi-ethnic society also revealed such a trend, as Malays and Chinese males both chose the National Front over the ethnic-based political parties. (Tables 7.56 and 7.57). The National Front is a coalition of a number of the major ethnic political parties, viz., Malays, Chinese, Indians, and other indigenous groups, with Malays as the dominant partner. Thus, not only is its ideology of governing pragmatic, but it ensures Malay political supremacy. Its political culture is accepted by Malaysians to ensure the country's stability while satisfying each ethnic group by seeing that it is represented in the government. Malay females' responses showed more particularism as they placed their own ethnic-based political party as the one best suited to govern a multi-ethnic country, but the difference was very slight, much smaller than expected. Since the males are the ones most mobilised for political bargaining and action, such recognition of common interests and sentiments among them would help to make ethnic norm to its lose political significance. The findings supported the research worker's expectations (Table 7.5). On Rukunegara, difference between Malays and Chinese in their claims to remember the five pillars of the national ideology were smaller than expected

(Table 7.32 and 7.33). The research worker had expected the worse, as many should have remembered the five pillars; its utility had thus, fallen short of its objectives. (Table 7.3).

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the strength of factors such as residence, language usage, Rukunegara, the six statements, views of national problems, inter-ethnic contact, assessments of ethnic relations, and choice of political party to explore counter-weights to ethnic loyalty. In the two previous chapters, ethnic loyalty was counter-posed to individual motivations of self-interest and personal obligations, but in the counter-weight questions the influences of general public issues were evaluated. Similar patterns of responses were observed. The findings indicated that the research worker had underestimated the development of a commonality of interests and sentiments between Malays and Chinese. This may be because they are increasingly coming under the influence of a growth sector that is not associated with ethnicity. Malaysians of Malay and Chinese extraction have come to accept the signs and symbols of the country that they call theirs. The similarity of responses indicates that in Petaling Jaya cross-cutting ties are starting to transcend ethnic boundaries.

The ability of individuals to predict the reaction of other individuals with whom they interact is crucial to the avoidance of conflict. For example, a Malaysian employer contemplating the appointment of a new supervisor with an ethnic background different from his predecessors must make some assumptions about the influence of the supervisor's ethnicity upon the behaviour of those supervised. A retailer considering the purchase or opening of a shop must make some assumptions about the relative importance in the minds of potential shoppers of competitive prices compared to the owner's ethnicity. Any failure of Malays and Chinese to predict each other's behaviour results in ethnic misunderstanding; failure causes those involved to feel disappointed with one another.

Many of the ideas, feelings and actions of individuals are determined and sustained by their conceptions of what others think, feel or do. These images and assumptions which people have of one another may be widespread, firmly held, and provide common understandings, but their accuracy is not to be assumed. A number of studies have indicated that the thoughts and deeds attributed by individuals to others are particularly apt to be distorted if the perceivers define the others as different from them in some important cultural or structural respect. Scholars have indicated that people often hold unwarranted assumptions regarding others with whom they share significant social attributes. Just as the errors made in judging those who are different, the misperceptions of those who are similar usually occur because individuals either overestimate or underestimate the proportions of those who think, feel, or act as they themselves do. Floyd H. Allport (1924) referred to this misperception as pluralistic ignorance, an erroneous cognitive belief shared by two or more people regarding the ideas, sentiments, and actions of others. It is pluralistic ignorance because the erroneous beliefs are shared. Pluralistic ignorance deserves careful attention because it is a prime example of how the social environment can be misperceived by its inhabitants, and is linked to more general patterns of cultural distortion. Pluralistic ignorance concerning ethnic characteristics is a special instance of the broader process by which individuals mistakenly attribute certain ideas and behaviour to others.

Most studies of pluralistic ignorance with respect to racial attitudes examine people's beliefs about how members of their own group will judge their own behaviour in their interaction with non-members. Fields and Schuman (1976), O'Gorman and Garry (1976), Banton (1986), and Bergmann (1988) discussed pluralistic ignorance by analysing all-white data in understanding white and black racial attitudes and behaviours. O'Gorman (1979), and Hewstone and Ward (1985) made improvements to the research technique by comparing data from two ethnic groups (black and white for the former, and Malays and Chinese for the latter) as they responded to certain sets of ethnically related issues and situations. The first studies assumed that white respondents were able to predict the perceptions and behaviour of other whites and blacks. While the later studies, despite improvement in technique, assumed that the ethnic group concerned could predict their own ethnic group's perceptions and behaviours. Banton and Mansor (1992) have presented a summary account of the improved technique used for this study. It still has weaknesses and gaps remain. In this technique, respondents were asked to say how they thought Husin Ali would act, not how they themselves would act. Since Husin Ali was presented as a representative Malay male, the predictions of his behaviour given by Malay males would coincide with how a real Husin Ali would behave more closely than would the predictions of Malay females or Chinese, both males and females. It is also possible to take the responses given by older Malay women as indicators of how a real Husin Ali's mother would feel, and to use this as a standard by which to assess others' predictions of her feelings. This new technique, thus, enabled the research worker to analyse instances of pluralistic ignorance, viz., at Husin Ali's level, using the responses of Malay males as the comparator, to measure pluralistic ignorance among Malay females and Chinese, both males and females, and at Husin Ali's mother level, using the responses of older Malay women as the comparator to assess others' predictions of her feelings, viz., Malay males, younger Malay females, Chinese males, and Chinese females. This chapter shows that Chinese underestimated the strength of ethnic sentiment among Husin Ali's and the maternal generation probably because they projected their own commercial values. Malay females overestimated Husin Ali's concern for ethnic loyalty; Malay males and females under 30 underestimated his mother concern for ethnic loyalty: possibly because the influence of ethnic sentiment was declining faster than they realised.

Pluralistic Ignorance Concerning Husin Ali

Malay males are closer in sentiment to Husin Ali than are Malay females and Chinese. Their predictions of his behaviour are most likely to be borne out and can, therefore, be taken as a standard by which to evaluate Malay females and Chinese predictions and see whether in general, they over or underestimate the influence of ethnic loyalty upon his behaviour relative to other factors; they can also highlight whether or not over or underestimation is greater with reference to some areas of behaviour. For example, Chinese are thought to be more money-minded than Malay males. It would, therefore, not be surprising if, in predicting Husin Ali's behaviour, Chinese project their own attitudes and overestimate the likely influence of financial gains relative to ethnic considerations. In the present state of research on these matters, many of these interpretations can be only speculative.

In Chapter Five, Malay females were shown to be motivated by universalist rather than ethnic or religious norms relative to material self-interest. In Table 8.1, Malay females overestimated the strength of Husin Ali's ethnic loyalty on renting the house (10 percent) and child minding (5 percent), they concurred on house key (0 percent), and underestimated on the shopping choice (19 percent). Two of these four tests showed that Malay females misjudged male attitudes regarding the strength of ethnic loyalty relative to material self-interest, viz., renting the house and child minding. Fears that ethnic members would frown on them for minding a Chinese child and of pollution as a result of renting the house to a Chinese, outweighed their concern for material gains. However, Malay females valued the protection of the housing property and competitive prices, the former on par, but the latter higher than their males, and suggested that ethnic loyalty would not outweigh material gains.

Table 8.1 recalls that 52 percent of Malay males thought that Husin Ali's shopping choice would be governed by ethnic loyalty and assumes that this would reflect the choice of a real Husin Ali. The table similarly recalls that Husin Ali was less sensitive to ethnic and religious norms on the other questions. Malay females underestimated the influence of ethnic loyalty upon Husin Ali's shopping choice by 19 percent, suggesting that they saw this as more a business

choice than a matter of ethnic loyalty. Since the females were the ones to control domestic shopping, this would ensure the widening of a universalist pattern of shopping rather than otherwise, but not on social relations where ethnic loyalty and religious obligation had to be traded, as in child minding and renting the house.

Table 8.1: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Malay Female	Malay Females' Under- (Over) Estimation
Shopping Choice	52	42	19
House Key	0	1	0
Renting-Out the House	29	32	(10)
Child Minding	22	23	(5)

It was observed in Chapter Five that, compared to the Chinese, Malays were more sensitive to ethnic sentiment than self-interest of the material kind. Table 8.2 shows that the Chinese underestimated the relative strength of Husin Ali's ethnic loyalty in three of the four social situations, viz., child-minding (55 percent), renting the house (66 percent), shopping choice (69 percent), and they concurred with Malay behaviours on the house key situation (0 percent). Perhaps, because economic norms had developed faster among the Chinese, they were less concerned with ethnic loyalty when predicting Husin Ali's behaviour.

Table 8.2: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Chinese	Chinese Under- (Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under- (Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under- (Over) Est.
Shopping Choice	52	16	69	15	71	17	67
House Key	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renting-Out the House	29	10	66	6	79	17	41
Child Minding	22	10	55	11	50	10	55

Some gender difference could be observed. The Chinese correctly predicted that Malay males were not concerned with ethnic loyalty relative to material gains on the house key situation (0 percent). The males underestimated most on shopping choice, 71 percent against 67 percent for females, and renting the house, 79 percent against 41 percent, and their females on child minding, 55 percent against 50 percent for males as they projected their own commercial ethos onto the Malays.

In Chapter Five, it was noted that Malays, both males and females, were less concerned about social status relative to ethnic loyalty. In Table 8.3, Malay females showed a slight tendency to overestimate the strength of Husin Ali's ethnic loyalty. On skin complexion they underestimated by 43 percent and 8 percent on the zoo trip. Thus, female Malays preferred fair skin complexion more than their males when choosing a bride, and they would have had a greater preference for taking the Chinese doctor's son. Yet female Malays overestimated on child adoption and wedding invitation (both 5 percent), apparently because they had a slightly greater fear that fellow ethnic members would disapprove of their action in adopting a Chinese child and would avoid food pollution by not attending the director's wedding invitation. Malay males valued status gains in child adoption more than their females possibly because they saw numerical and status advantages in adopting a fair skin Chinese child. Compared to their females they were less concerned about religious obligations such as food pollution and thus, the choice to attend the Chinese director's wedding invitation. However, not on the zoo trip; in this situation, Malay males valued the significance of ethnic loyalty rather than any status gain.

Table 8.3: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Malay Female	Malay Females' Under-(Over) Estimation
Zoo Trip	77	71	8
Skin Complexion	7	4	43
Child Adoption	65	68	(5)
Wedding Invitation	60	63	(5)

The findings in Chapter Five showed that status consciousness to be more developed as an influence upon Chinese, than upon Malays, relative to ethnic considerations. Table 8.4 shows that Chinese underestimation of the strength of ethnic loyalty relative to status upon Husin Ali, was decisively large on the wedding invitation at 73 percent, and less conclusive on the skin complexion 43 percent, zoo trip 47 percent, and child adoption 48 percent. Chinese underestimated the wedding invitation as they did not share the Malay fears of food pollution relative to status. Chinese males were concerned to avoid dark skin bride, and slight more than the Malay males. On the zoo trip and child adoption tests, Chinese were sensitive to ethnic norms relative to status concern; both situations were fraught with risks as they involved choosing a Chinese child over a Malay.

Table 8.4: Pluralistic Ignorance Among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Chinese	Chinese Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under-(Over) Est.
Zoo Trip	77	41	47	45	42	36	53
Skin Complexion	7	4	43	7	0	0	100
Child Adoption	65	34	48	29	55	41	37
Wedding Invitation	60	16	73	19	68	12	80

Gender analysis indicated that the Chinese females underestimated the strength of ethnic loyalty among the Malay males more than did their male counterparts, especially on fair skin complexion, wedding invitation, and the zoo trip, and their males on child adoption (Table 8.4). The Chinese had predicted Malay males to be influenced by economic norms rather than ethnic considerations. Chinese female were less willing to accept a dark skin bride than their males. Scrutinising closer, Chinese of both genders were less conclusive in their underestimation on the zoo trip and the females on child adoption. It looks as if Chinese vis-a-vis Malay males detected the attraction of ethnic loyalty relative to status considerations in the zoo trip, and that the Chinese females would be unwilling to let a Malay adopt a Chinese child. Overall Chinese underestimation of the Malay males on self-interest of the status kind did indicate that Chinese

were more concerned about status gains, but both Chinese and Malay males were not willing to place individual status gains above ethnic considerations in circumstances where relations were interpreted as relations between group representatives.

In Chapter Six, Malays were seen to have been motivated by personal obligation rather than ethnic loyalty and no significant gender difference could be observed. However, Table 8.5 shows Malay females to have predicted Husin Ali's behaviour accurately on supporting the boss where ethnic sentiment relative to personal obligation was equally shared (0 percent). They underestimated on child playmate and attending an Indian workmate's daughter wedding party, 25 percent and 5 percent respectively, but overestimated on mother's wishes concerning marriage and bringing a friend home, 12 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Table 8.5: Pluralistic Ignorance Among Malay Females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Personal Obligation. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Malay Female	Malay Females' Under-(Over) Estimation
Supporting the Boss	20	20	0
Mother's Wishes	26	29	(12)
Child Playmate	16	11	25
Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party	19	18	5
Bringing a Friend Home	5	6	(20)

This suggested that Malay females valued the social bonds developed between individuals more than their males. They supported the Chinese boss inspite of a Malay campaign to replace him, fulfilled a Chinese neighbour's request to bring home the two-year old daughter to their home as playmate for an afternoon, and to attend an Indian workmate's daughter wedding party rather than be concerned by ethnic considerations. The bonds developed out of such social relations as boss-subordinate, neighbours and workmates were to be duly respected and reciprocated. There were not only psychological rewards to be gained when personal obligation prevailed over ethnic loyalty, but also material gains. Malay females acknowledged the skills and experiences to be gained by associating with the Chinese, the material inter-dependence

between neighbours such as borrowing of tools, exchanging information, etc., and the interdependence between workmates as they interacted daily within the workplace.

Malay females were influenced by ethnic loyalty when predicting Husin Ali's reaction to his mother's wishes concerning marriage and a son bringing a friend home. This suggested that Malay females, despite their general tendency to place personal obligation above ethnic loyalty, were influenced by ethnic loyalty even in a situation in which it was not associated with religious obligation. Muhammad Lee, the bridegroom, came from a Muslim family, and the boys being twelve years old and playing at home were thus, old enough and in better position to handle food pollution. This observation contradicted others in which Malay females appeared more sensitive to ethnic-cum-religious considerations as compared with their males. It looks as if Malay males were more able to accept ethnic and religious differences as manifested in mother's wishes concerning marriage and in bringing a friend home. Just as in the child adoption of Table 8.2, Malay males saw the numerical and status advantages of a Malay marrying a Chinese Muslim. The same advantage could be observed with bringing a friend home, as apart from playing together, the meeting could be a basis where the Malay son could learn and exchange ideas about school matters with their Chinese friends. However, on child playmate and attending an Indian workmate's daughter wedding party, Malay males had not realised that their females would have valued the social bonds developed between neighbour and workmate more than ethnic loyalty.

Chapter Six indicated that Malay respondents predicted Husin Ali to place personal obligation above ethnic considerations. Table 8.6 shows that Chinese consistently underestimated Husin Ali's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to personal obligation, ranging from 46 percent in mother's wishes concerning marriage, 80 percent bringing a friend home, 81 percent neighbour's child-playmate, and 95 percent attending a workmate's daughter wedding party, and an exception was observed to supporting the boss where an overestimation of 95 percent was recorded. The underestimations were decisive except for mother's views about marriage. As already mentioned, Chinese overestimation of Malay concern for ethnic loyalty when

faced with a campaign to replace their boss could reflect their general fear of risk in such circumstance.

The gender analysis in Table 8.6 indicated some differences in emphasis. The Chinese of both gender equally shared their underestimation of Husin Ali at 46 percent on mother's wishes concerning marriage, but they differed on the other four tests; the females underestimated slightly more than their males on bringing a friend home, 100 percent against 60 percent, and attending an Indian workmate's daughter wedding party, 100 percent against 89 percent, while their males underestimated slightly more than the females on child playmate, 88 percent against 69 percent, and scored a lower overestimation on supporting the boss, 95 percent against 105 percent.

Table 8.6: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Personal Obligation. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Husin Ali	Chinese	Chinese Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under-(Over) Est.
Supporting the Boss	20	39	(95)	39	(95)	41	(105)
Mother's Wishes	26	14	46	14	46	14	46
Child Playmate	16	3	81	2	88	5	69
Workmate's Daughter Wedding Party	19	1	95	2	89	0	100
Bringing a Friend Home	5	1	80	2	60	0	100

This indicated that in predicting Husin Ali's behaviours, the females gave slightly less weight to ethnic obligation than their males on bringing a friend home and attending a workmate's daughter wedding party, as friendship bonds were to be respected relative to ethnic considerations, but not on child playmate and supporting the boss where they sensed the importance of ethnic considerations.

Pluralistic Ignorance Concerning Malay Mother's Generation

Available data also enabled the research worker to analyse pluralistic ignorance in respect of the Malay mother's generation. The responses of the female Malays of the above 30

year old age group were used as a standard from which to measure the degree of pluralistic ignorance of the other Malays and the Chinese. Unlike the above analyses of pluralistic ignorance of Malay females and Chinese toward the relative strength of ethnic sentiment among the Malays, data indicated that erroneous cognitive beliefs shared by the other respondents towards the Malay mother's generation were multi-dimensional in direction; some social situations envisaged in the alignment questions registered underestimation and others, overestimation on the part of both Malays and Chinese. It is generally observed that Malays and the maternal generation did not seem to differ on the direction of response to individual motivations of material interests, status and personal obligation relative to ethnic loyalty when compared to the Chinese. However, the Malay younger generation underestimated the extent to which the maternal generation was influenced by universalist norms relative to ethnic loyalty. Social change seems to have been more rapid than they realised.

Table 8.7: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to the Material Self-Interest, Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Malay	Malay Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Males	MM Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Females	MF Under-(Over) Est.
Shopping Choice	56	62	(11)	62	(11)	63	(13)
House Key	0	2	0	1	0	3	0
Renting-Out the House	54	53	2	47	13	61	(13)
Child Minding	39	41	(5)	56	(44)	47	(21)

With respect to self-interest of the material kind, Malays could be influenced by an advanced commercial ethos, but they slightly overestimated the mother's generation's concern for ethnic sentiment on two of the alignment questions, viz., shopping choice (11 percent), and child-minding (5 percent). While in the house key situation the prediction concurred with the maternal generation's views (0 percent), and there was a slight underestimation of 2 percent for renting the house (Table 8.7). Since the pluralistic ignorance of the Malays toward the maternal generation was minimal on the underestimation, but higher on overestimation, these findings suggest that the

maternal generation was more influenced by the commercial ethos than the younger people appreciated.

The Malay females overestimated the maternal generation’s concern for ethnic loyalty over shopping choice (13 percent), renting the house (13 percent), and child minding (21 percent), and concurred on the house key 0 percent. While their males overestimated on shopping choice (11 percent) and child minding (44 percent), concurred on the house key 0 percent, and underestimated on renting the house at 13 percent. These findings suggest that Malay males were less sensitive to ethnic norms than their females. As Malay females overestimated three situations to two of the males in their prediction of the maternal generation, this supported the previous hypothesis that Malay females were more influenced by particularistic norms.

The Chinese underestimated the Malay maternal generation’s concern for ethnic loyalty relative to material self-interest. They concurred on the house key with the mother as to the absence of ethnic sentiment relative to material gains (0 percent), underestimated on shopping choice (27 percent), child minding (46 percent), and renting the house (61 percent) (Table 8.8).

Table 8.8: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Material Self-Interest. Husin Ali’s mother’s generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Chinese	Chinese Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under-(Over) Est.
Shopping Choice	56	41	27	37	34	48	14
House Key	0	2	0	2	0	3	0
Renting-Out the House	54	21	61	19	65	26	52
Child Minding	39	21	46	24	39	20	49

Gender analysis suggested some variations of underestimation. The females had a lower underestimation than their males on shopping choice (14 percent against 34 percent) and renting the house (52 percent against 65 percent), but on child minding, it was the reverse (49

percent against 39 percent). The males were influenced less by ethnic loyalty than their females in predicting the maternal generation's behaviours, but the males interpreted child minding as a relation of group representatives rather than one of simply an economic gain.

Table 8.9 shows that Malays underestimated the mother's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to status gains slightly; child adoption by 1 percent, the zoo trip 11 percent, and wedding invitation 13 percent. On fair skin complexion as a status item, Malays overestimated the mother's concern by 350 percent, but the actual numbers were so small that this can be disregarded. The males were more willing to accept the bride with dark skin complexion than their females, and the mother was most concerned to avoid. For the other social situations, differences were insignificant and marginal, indicating that Malays quite accurately predicted the mother's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to status. Neither generation valued status consciousness highly relative to ethnic loyalty.

Table 8.9: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Malay	Malay Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Males	MM Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Females	MF Under-(Over) Est.
Zoo Trip	90	80	11	83	8	63	30
Skin Complexion	2	9	(350)	7	(250)	3	(50)
Child Adoption	78	77	1	74	5	61	22
Wedding Invitation	88	77	13	78	11	47	47

The Chinese underestimated the strength of ethnic loyalty relative to status gain among the Malay maternal generation, but only marginally (Table 8.10). They overestimated the mother generation concern for dark skin complexion, but underestimated the zoo trip 32 percent, child adoption 32 percent and wedding invitation 39 percent. Since it was observed in Chapter Five that Malays had developed less status consciousness relative to ethnic loyalty than the Chinese, the marginal differences of underestimation indicated that Chinese were sensitive to ethnic consideration too, a reflection that status relationship when confronted with ethnic loyalty can lose its individual significance to group interests.

Gender analysis indicated no significant difference, and supported the hypothesis above. The only difference being on the fair skin complexion as the males overestimated the Malay mother's concern about a dark skin complexion more than the female counterparts who accurately predicted the mother's reactions (0 percent). Thus, Chinese males in comparison with their females and the Malay maternal generation seemed to show less inclination for fair skin vis-a-vis dark skin complexion as a cultural preference.

Table 8.10: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Status Self-Interest. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Chinese	Chinese Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under-(Over) Est.
Zoo Trip	90	61	32	62	31	60	33
Skin Complexion	2	6	(200)	8	(300)	2	0
Child Adoption	78	53	32	55	29	57	27
Wedding Invitation	88	54	39	57	35	50	43

Table 8.11: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Personal Obligation. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Malay	Malay Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Males	MM Under-(Over) Est.	Malay Females	MF Under-(Over) Est.
Supporting the Boss	24	34	(42)	30	(25)	39	(63)
Mother's Wishes	54	36	33	28	48	48	11
Child Playmate	22	31	(41)	26	(18)	37	(68)
Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party	31	32	(3)	28	10	37	(19)
Bringing a Friend Home	20	15	25	10	50	23	(15)

As Table 8.11 shows, Malays overestimated the maternal generation's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to personal obligation, viz., attending a workmate daughter's wedding party (3 percent), neighbour's child playmate (41 percent), and supporting the boss (42 percent), and they underestimated bringing a friend home (25 percent) and mother's wishes concerning

marriage(33 percent). This suggested that the maternal generation did not place ethnic considerations first when weighing the personal obligations between workmates and neighbours. Yet on bringing a friend home (25 percent) and mother's wishes concerning marriage (33 percent), Malays underestimated the strength of the mother's concern for ethnic considerations. In mother's wishes about marriage and bringing a friend home to play, the maternal generation were observed to be more sensitive to ethnic loyalty relative to mother-daughter bonds or friendship. Could it be because such relations signalled a possibility of ethnic boundary dissolution, or did it reflect a difference in concern for other considerations such as the importance of love in mate selection?

As Table 8.11 reveals, female Malays overestimated the importance of ethnic loyalty for the maternal generation more than did the males. The one exception relative to the question about the mother's wishes concerning marriage and, as has been explained already, the interpretation of answers to this question is somewhat uncertain as other considerations come into play.

Table 8.12: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Personal Obligation, Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Husin Ali's Mother	Chinese	Chinese Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Males	CM Under-(Over) Est.	Chinese Females	CF Under-(Over) Est.
Supporting the Boss	24	54	(125)	54	(125)	55	(129)
Mother's Wishes	54	30	44	28	48	33	39
Child Playmate	22	18	18	19	14	17	23
Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party	31	7	77	9	71	5	84
Bringing a Friend Home	20	9	55	9	55	10	50

Table 8.12 shows that the Chinese underestimated the Malay maternal generation's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to personal obligation on four out of five questions. The difference between the under- or overestimation of the Chinese males and females were slight.

Chinese did not see the mother's wishes on marriage to be based on ethnicity as the Chinese bridegroom came from a Muslim family. While on supporting the boss, Chinese overestimated the maternal's concern for ethnic loyalty perhaps, because they feared risks involved when Chinese held such position at work in the face of Malay ethnic pressure. The gender analysis did not show any significant difference from the discussions above.

An overall analysis of Malay pluralistic ignorance regarding the mother's generation's concern for ethnic sentiments relative to other individual motivations raised some queries. Malays underestimated the mother's concern for ethnic loyalty on two measures of the self-interest of the status kind, the zoo trip 11 percent, and wedding invitation 13 percent, (Table 8.9) and two of the personal obligations, mother's wishes concerning marriage 33 percent, and bringing a friend home 25 percent (Table 8.11). The mother's generation's concern for ethnic loyalty relative to self-interest of the status kind indicated that status consciousness was not developed in her generation. If there was any desire for an association with a person of a higher status, the ethnic factor outweighed it. To explain the Malays' underestimation of the two measures of personal obligation, viz., mother's wishes concerning marriage and bringing a friend home, is not an easy matter as Muhammad Lee, though a Chinese, was already a Muslim, and bringing a Chinese friend home was expected to be safer in terms of concern for food pollution than the other test of letting the two-year old daughter be taken home for an afternoon by the Chinese neighbour.

However, analysing those alignment questions in which the Malays overestimated the mother's concern for ethnic loyalty plus those situations that registered slight differences between the two generations, suggests that the mother's generation was less concerned about ethnic loyalty than both Husin Ali's generation and the research worker had realised. The Malays, by a small margin overestimated the maternal generation's concern for ethnic loyalty in one situation of the self-interest of the material kind, shopping choice (11 percent)(Table 8.7) and by big margins on two of the tests of personal obligation, supporting the boss (42 percent), and child playmate (41 percent). Slight differences were observed between the two generations on three situations of the self-interest of the material kind: house key 0 percent, renting the house 2 percent, and child-

minding 5 percent, (Table 8.7), and on one of the personal obligation, workmate's daughter wedding party (3 percent), (Table 8.11). These results suggest that the whole Malay group in Petaling Jaya is more sympathetic towards universalist norms than individual members of the group realise.

Discussion of the Findings

The errors in predicting Husin Ali's and his mother's attitudes support the findings of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and invalidate a number of hypotheses formulated by the research worker prior to the study. The tests in Table 8.1 suggested that Malay females were increasingly influenced by an advance commercial ethos, as exemplified by their underestimation of their males on shopping choice, 19 percent concurring with them, on house key, 0 percent. Their overestimation on other questions were marginal; viz., renting the house (10 percent), and child minding (5 percent). Malay females were thus, increasingly exposed to modernity and material accumulation as economic growth experienced, reinforced through education and the media, restricted the applicability of particularist norms. Malay females were not isolated from the universalist sphere, even though some were not career-minded and their roles pertained to the domestic sphere. Tradition is losing its grip in motivating their behaviour. The research worker's expectation was thus, not confirmed.

The findings did not support the expectation that Malay females compared to their males were more sensitive to ethnic difference and food pollution and thus, validating the findings of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Malay females slightly overestimated their males concern for ethnic sentiment on child minding (5 percent), child adoption (5 percent), mother's wishes concerning marriage (12 percent), bringing a friend home (20 percent), renting the house (10 percent), and wedding invitation (5 percent), but the percentages were too marginal to be of any significance.

In certain circumstances, where ethnic loyalty was interpreted as a group demand, the males displayed greater sensitivity to ethnic considerations than the females. Malay females in predicting Husin Ali, emphasised ethnic considerations rather than material and status gains

regarding shopping choice (19 percent), and the zoo trip (8 percent), respectively. Yet on other circumstances, Husin Ali was observed to display lesser concern for ethnic loyalty on these individual motivations than their females.

As expected, Chinese emphasised self-interest of the material and status kinds, and personal obligation when predicting Husin Ali. They misjudged the strength of ethnic loyalty among the Malay males (Tables 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6). No significant gender difference was observed, except in intensity of emphasis. When predicting the behaviours of Husin Ali, Chinese males emphasised financial gains more than did their females on self-interest of the material kind (Table 8.4), while on personal obligation it was the reverse (Table 8.6). This suggests the Chinese males were more money-minded than their females. The females would value social bonds developed out of social relationship as things to be duly respected and honour. However, both misjudged the strength of ethnic loyalty found among the Malay males. On supporting the boss, Chinese overestimated Husin Ali's concern for ethnic loyalty rather than personal obligation (Table 8.6).

The expectation made of Husin Ali's mother by Chinese that she would be suspicious of contact with the Chinese was not confirmed. The Malay maternal generation might not be career-minded and might function more within the domestic sphere, but their reactions to the alignment questions were not those of persons bound by tradition and isolated from the encroachment of economic individualism.

Conclusion

The concluding section presents the findings regarding pluralistic ignorance in a different framework. It brings together the findings about over/underestimation in respect of all the three kinds of choice in single tables.

Thus, Table 8.13 makes it easier to see quickly that the number of observations in which Malay females overestimated the strength of ethnic loyalty as an influence upon Malay

males was roughly equal to the number in which they underestimated it, and that there were no striking difference between the results when ethnic loyalty was opposed to self-interest of the material kind, self-interest of the status kind and personal obligation. This, of course, is a reflection of the question used in the survey, but such a table offers a useful way of checking the findings.

Table 8.13: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Shopping choice (19)	House key (0)	Renting-out the house (10) Child minding (5)
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (8) Skin complexion (43)		Child adoption (5) Wedding invitation (5)
Personal Obligation	Child playmate (25) Workmate's daughter's wedding party (5)	Supporting the boss (0)	Mother's wishes (12) Bringing a friend home (20)

Table 8.14: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malays concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Renting-out the house (2)	House key (0)	Shopping choice (11) Child minding (5)
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (11) Child adoption (1) Wedding invitation (13)		Skin complexion (350)
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (33) Bringing a friend home (25)		Supporting the boss (42) Child playmate (41) Workmate's daughter's wedding party (3)

Broadly similar conclusion can be drawn concerning Malay under and overestimation of the influence of ethnic loyalty upon Husin Ali's mother (Table 8.14). Dividing this table so as to compare the under and overestimation of Malay males and females (Table 8.15 and 8.16)

suggest that Malay females were concerned with the signs of group identify such as phenotype, food pollution, etc., and their males with group signs that indicate relations of group representatives such as a shift the political balance.

Table 8.15: Pluralistic Ignorance among Malay males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Renting-out the house (13)	House key (0)	Shopping choice (11) Child minding (44)
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (8) Child adoption (5) Wedding invitation (11)		Skin complexion (250)
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (8) Bringing a friend home (50) Workmate's daughter's wedding party (10)		Supporting the boss (25) Child playmate (18)

Table 8.16: Pluralistic Ignorance among the Malay females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind		House key (0)	Shopping choice (13) Child minding (21) Renting-out the house (13)
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (30) Child adoption (22) Wedding invitation (46)		Skin complexion (50)
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (11)		Supporting the boss (63) Bringing a friend home (15) Child playmate (68) Workmate's daughter's wedding party (19)

However, table 8.17 differs from that of Table 8.13, Chinese, and by both gender, consistently underestimated the strength of Husin Ali's ethnic loyalty (Table 8.18 and 8.19). The only exception being on supporting the boss where Chinese overestimated the Malays concerns for ethnic loyalty; the situation fraught of risks. The pluralistic ignorance of the Chinese concerning Malays ethnic loyalty, misreading their strength in most situations, surprised even the research worker as it was generally accepted that it was the Chinese who were the most chauvinist and ethnocentric compared to the other ethnic groups in Malaysia. The same observation could be noted with the Chinese prediction of Husin Ali's mother(Tables 8.20, 8.21 and 8.22)

Table 8.17: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Shopping choice (69)	House key (0)	
	Renting-out the house (66)		
	Child minding (55)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (47)		
	Child adoption (48)		
	Wedding invitation (73)		
	Skin complexion (43)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (46)		Supporting the boss (95)
	Bringing a friend home (80)		
	Child playmate (81)		
	Workmate's daughter's		
	wedding party (95)		

Table 8.18: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Renting-out the house (79)	House key (0)	
	Shopping choice (71)		
	Child minding (50)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (42)	Skin complexion (0)	
	Child adoption (55)		
	Wedding invitation (68)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (46)		Supporting the boss (95)
	Bringing a friend home (60)		
	Child playmate (88)		
	Workmate's daughter's wedding party (89)		

Table 8.19: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms, Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Shopping choice (67)	House key (0)	
	Child minding (55)		
	Renting-out the house (41)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (53)		
	Skin complexion (100)		
	Child adoption (37)		
	Wedding invitation (80)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (46)		Supporting the boss (105)
	Bringing a friend home(100)		
	Child playmate (69)		
	Workmate's daughter's wedding party (100)		

Table 8.20: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Shopping choice (27)	House key (0)	
	Renting-out the house (61)		
	Child minding (46)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (32)		Skin complexion (200)
	Child adoption (32)		
	Wedding invitation (39)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (44)		Supporting the boss (125)
	Bringing a friend home (55)		
	Child playmate (18)		
	Workmate's daughter's wedding party (77)		

Table 8.21: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese males concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Renting-out the house (65)	House key (0)	
	Shopping choice (34)		
	Child minding (39)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (31)		Skin complexion (300)
	Child adoption (29)		
	Wedding invitation (35)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (48)		Supporting the boss (125)
	Bringing a friend home (55)		
	Child playmate (14)		
	Workmate's daughter's wedding party (71)		

Table 8.22: Pluralistic Ignorance among Chinese females concerning Ethnic Loyalty relative to Universalist Norms. Husin Ali's mother's generation (%)

	Underestimation	Correctly Predicted	Overestimation
Self-Interest of the Material Kind	Shopping choice (14)	House key (0)	
	Child minding (49)		
	Renting-out the house (52)		
Self-Interest of the Status Kind	Zoo trip (33)	Skin complexion (0)	
	Child adoption (27)		
	Wedding invitation (43)		
Personal Obligation	Mother's wishes (39)		Supporting the boss (129)
	Bringing a friend home (50)		
	Child playmate (23)		
	Workmate's daughter's wedding party (84)		

If members of one group hold unrealistic expectations of the members of another group, they are likely to feel let down when their expectations are not met. Malays may be disappointed when Chinese do not realise how important ethnic solidarity is to them. Chinese may be disappointed when Malays do not acknowledge universalist norms. Yet on some matters, a greater commonality of sentiment and interests has developed than either group appreciates. This was only a small study, but it opens up issues which are important to Malaysia's programme for promoting national unity.

The descriptive sections of this dissertation have shown that new relationships governed by universalistic rather than ethnic norms are being introduced into Malaysian society. Malays and Chinese are relating to one another in social relations that attribute little significance to ethnic sentiment and loyalty. Their relationships as buyers and sellers, employers and employees, rich and poor, performers and audience, teachers and pupils, the governing and the ruled, etc., link them in new ways. Concerns for material interests, respectability and personal obligations often override and weaken these individuals' concern with ethnic sentiment. The new relationships provide opportunities for Malays and Chinese to relate to one another as individual men and women, and in this way restrict the applicability of ethnic norms.

When Malays and Chinese drive their cars on the roads and highways, their commonality of experience of driving causes them to react as drivers. They are governed by the same traffic codes and laws, at times faced with the same adverse circumstances such as traffic jams, accidents, electrical faults with the traffic lights, landslides, etc. When their cars are in need of repair, a mechanic's shop is chosen on the basis of a prompt service and a competitive price. A Malay car owner may prefer to send his car for repairs by a Malay mechanic, but he will think twice if he finds that a Chinese mechanic will provide a similar service for a lower price. The car pools observed in Petaling Jaya are recruited from passengers who work in the same office or in nearby offices and who live in the same neighbourhood. They bring Malays and Chinese together. The same can be observed with the Malay and Chinese bus commuters; the ethnic origins of the bus company and the driver and of the other passengers are all irrelevant as the commuters queue and board the bus.

Malays and Chinese encounter new relationships too, as they increasingly experience social mobility, moving out of their traditional vocations and residential areas. They relate to one another in new work situations and places alien to their parents' experiences. The Chinese used to be regarded as the economic and commercial force with the Malays as the political figures, but these and other divisions such as urban-rural, private-public sector employees, professional-administrators, etc., are gradually breaking down. Material interests and the desire for

respectability set these city-dwellers in pursuit of new goals. A Malay farmer's son becomes a commercial bank manager, while a rich Chinese miner's daughter ends up working as a clerk in a government department. Some would expect the boss of a local agricultural department with a basically Malay staff, and serving a Malay-based community, to be a Malay, but such a post may now be held by a Chinese. The local Chinese shop, formerly family run, now often employs a Malay salesgirl. Urban areas may still be identified with the Chinese, but Malays are taking up residence, changing the demographic composition of the urban areas.

Even within the bounds of their own homes, ways of life and values are converging among the Malays and Chinese. People often read their own ethnic-based newspapers, watch ethnic-based television programmes and tune to an ethnic-based radio channel, but there are Malays and Chinese who read English newspapers, prefer American-produced television series and hum the latest popular songs from the West. This commonality of cultural tastes between them, of what is considered modern rather than particularistic, is manifested in the way people communicate to one another about local and international affairs. Even their own cultures, their newspapers, the locally produced television and radio programmes cannot escape the influence of the "Dallas" soap opera or the "Ninja Turtle" craze. The record and video shops sell Madonna's album and Kevin Costner's "Robin Hood: The Prince of Thieves". An evening out with the family may end up at Pizza Hut or McDonald's, the American-style restaurants of take-away and dining, rather than at the Chinese chicken rice stall or the barbecue beef Malay satay. Ethnic tastes are no longer regarded as given. Just as during the lunch break at work, Malays and Chinese, on their night out seemed to exchange their ethnic tastes for foods with new flavours by going from one eating stall to the next.

In their leisure time, over the weekdays and especially over the weekends, Malays and Chinese, acting on personal ties developed at work, go together to the same leisure clubs, play games together, chat and gossip. Games which once were ethnically based, have changed. Soccer is no longer exclusively Malay, but includes Chinese. Badminton has lost its Chinese image as Malay players have taken it up with success.

The same can be observed regarding festivities such as weddings, which used to be for family members and co-religionists. Malays and Chinese are accepting the other's festive seasons such as the Chinese New Year, Christmas, or the Muslim celebration of the end of fasting as social events for everybody, even though they may have special religious and ethnic meanings for some of the participants. Malays welcome their Chinese friends to their festivities just as they in turn are welcomed to the Chinese. Hosts are careful to respect their guests' feelings, taking care that no inappropriate foods are served. Because of personal bonds, some visit their friends from the other group in times of bereavement, either calling at their homes to express condolence, or joining them at the cemetery. Thus, a Chinese can be seen coming to pay homage to his Malay friend's death by giving some financial contribution and saying nice words to his sons. Such relationships are on the increase as Malays and Chinese encounter one another on universalistic terms of personal interest and need, without much ethnic colouration.

Their children are changing too, as they go to the same school system. In the afternoons the children go to the same tutorial classes or playing fields. Some Malays and Chinese encourage their children to bring friends home to play, and they may not be of the same ethnic origin. Such acceptance reflects the widening of social relations based on materialism, respectability and personal obligation as Malaysians are drawn into the growth sector.

Ethnic sentiment and loyalty continue, and can be acute in times of political competition, but the new economic growth of the 1970's has restricted their applicability. Malaysians seem not to have recognised how great these social changes have been. They take the continuing economic growth and technological change for granted and do not notice its social consequences.

Some relations are affected by both universalistic and ethnic norms, while in others, individuals vary in the importance they ascribe to one relative to the other; some variations are patterned by ethnicity, gender and other variables. The analytical sections of the dissertation

show that Malays and Chinese encounter some social situations in which individual motivations of self-interest of the material and status kinds, and personal obligation, counter-balance considerations of ethnic loyalty; this puts them in a conflictual position. The two kinds of norm were sometimes seen as having equal weight as influences on Husin Ali's actions.

Another author, Salim(1986:27), has painted a different picture. Doubting the effectiveness of Rukunegara in promoting sentiment conducive to national unity, he claimed that racial polarisation was on the increase and that relations were deteriorating. He remarked that on the university campuses, "the children who were too young to know or understand the racial clashes of 1969 are now the young men and women in the colleges and universities. These same people were brought up with heavy doses of Rukunegara. They were imbued with a sense of justice and fair play; they were taught about the need of racial tolerance and understanding; they were exhorted to work together for the good of the nation. Yet these are the very people among whom there is great suspicion and cleavage. There is very little inter-racial mixing among the students in these institutions and the situation seems to get worse rather than better."

Such an inference of ethnic polarisation among students on the campuses differs from the descriptive analysis of ethnic relations in Petaling Jaya presented here. The differences between the conclusions of Salim and this research worker are not a consequence of describing different regions of Malaysia, but of the kinds of social relations examined. The university campuses and their social milieu are comparatively similar to cosmopolitan Petaling Jaya. The educated class is often the section most modern in a society. Universalist norms as exemplified by materialism, consumerism and economic individualism could be expected to prevail among the university students too. Salim painted a portrait of polarisation on the campuses by noting that Malay, Chinese, Indian and other students rushed to the lecture halls together, but when inside arranged themselves into distinguishable phenotype groupings. They greeted one another and asked whether the other had taken their lunch and dinner, but when the meal times came they patronised canteens operated by their ethnic members. Playing fields were crowded by Malays

Chinese relations characterised more the defence of ethnicity and privileges at the political level. In some settings individual interest may be eroding shared interest, while in other settings individual interest may reinforce shared interests. Groups grow or diminish by actions at the periphery, as individuals cross the boundary to align in new social relations, becoming new members of one social grouping and leaving another. Salim overlooked such changes because of his view of racial relations as reflecting political desires.

The contrast with Salim's interpretation reinforces the view that Malaysians in the course of their lives are engaged in many games; in their families, workplace and communities. Each of these games is played according to rules that the players take for granted. In Malaysia, one of the most fiercely contested games dividing Malaysians into ethnic teams, are their struggles over the distribution of the benefits produced by an expanding economy. However, because they are so busy playing their roles, Malays and Chinese do not see what is happening in the other parts of the playing field or how, over time, the nature of the game itself is changing. This study has shown that universalistic norms prevail in the lives of many Malaysians as they increasingly come under economic expansion and technological change.

The data collected on pluralistic ignorance demonstrated that sociologist who collects such data has a source of information superior to that of the people going about their daily lives. Malaysians' images of their society and its ethnic relations, even if widely shared, failed to correspond with the facts collected. The findings on the problems of pluralistic ignorance indicated that the whole Malay group in Petaling Jaya, be it in terms of gender or age, is more sympathetic towards universalist norms than individuals of the group realise. Malays were generally observed to be increasingly influenced by the advance of a commercial ethos. Malay females did not lag behind their males in being influenced by universalist norms of materialism, respectability and personal obligation. The younger Malay generation misperceived the extent to which the maternal generation was increasingly coming under the influence of the universalist norms relative to ethnic loyalty. Chinese consistently underestimated the strength of Malay ethnic loyalty at both Husin Ali and the mother's levels. Perhaps, because economic norms had

developed faster among the Chinese than the Malays, and thus, they were less concerned with ethnic loyalty when predicting the behaviours of Husin Ali and the mother. In some circumstances, however, Malay females underestimated the strength of ethnic loyalty felt by Husin Ali, these may have been circumstances in which relations were interpreted as the relations of group representatives. By contrast, all groups overestimated the strength of ethnic loyalty felt by Husin Ali's mother. This may be because attitudes have been changing faster than respondents appreciated.

The findings on pluralistic ignorance demonstrated that the images of society and its ethnic relations held by Malaysians cannot all be correct and some of the discrepancies may be due to the Furnivall tradition. Scholars studying race and ethnic relations have followed the tradition of Furnivall (1948) who described Malaysia as a plural society where different sections of the community lived side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Each segment in the society had its own values, belief, language, and way of life. The segments were divided vertically cutting across the strata. The society as a whole was more characterised by conflict and coercion than value consensus. Indeed, value consensus was conspicuously lacking (Freedman 1960). Ting (1982:120) noted the political and economic changes taking place in the country since independence, but "... hasten to add that basically, the main plural features which developed during the colonial period persist until the present day." Lee (1990:499) argued in the same vein that "... the idea of ethnic nationalism was not only an organised reaction to colonialism but also the driving force behind the conceptualisation of ethnic policies in the post-colonial state". Jesudason (1989:1) argued that "... ethnic considerations decisively influenced the political elite's choices over critical development issues, such as the degree of state intervention in the economy, the choice of entrepreneurial groups to promote, the level of tolerance for economic inefficiency, and the degree of strain to impose on the state's fiscal position. In short, the essential motor of the development process, extending to macro-economic policies, was driven by powerful ethnic sentiments and patterns of ethnic political mobilisation". The primacy of the ethnic-cultural variable over economic variables led Snider (1977:4-7) to observe that Malaysian politicians were correct in their assumptions that only overtly communal parties could gain and hold voter support;

those parties mainly supported by the middle and upper classes (originally founded on a specific basis of multi- or noncommunalism) drifted toward majority membership of and the identification

with the interests of a particular communal group. Having such view of ethnic sentiment, von Vorys (1975:14) set out to present a democratic system not based on national community, but by necessity and choice on the co-operation of discrete communal groups. Mutalib (1990:1) indicated that Malay ethnic nationalists tended frequently to dispense with Islamic values and universal principles like the emphasis on equity, tolerance, fair play and justice irrespective of race or creed, in the defence of their ethnic, particularistic interests, and unique cultural heritage. Ethnic attachment is thus, regarded as unalterable, and "a fact of life" to be ignored at one's peril. (Milne 1981:4-6). However, these writers could be exaggerating as to the continuity between the colonial and post-colonial period. This is possible as in many post-colonial societies the one point on which everyone has been able to agree is on blaming the colonial era for any misfortunes. This is a way of evading responsibility as one does not have to come up with a remedial policy that questions the status quo and jeopardises their own class interests. Furthermore, it is unwise to regard plural societies as a permanently distinct class of societies; the features which characterise them appear at a certain stage in a sequence of conquest and rule by an invading group. No group of any size, be it a nation, a "race", a class, a congregation or a family, maintains itself automatically. Groups dissolve and change as they interact with one another.

Blumer (1965:245) argued that the rational and impersonal forces of industrialisation did not cause the dissolution of racial alignment. How industry conformed to the prevailing pattern of racial alignment and its accompanying racial codes. Referring to the British colonies in Asia, such as India and the Malay Peninsula, with their own special racial ordering that allowed for much industrialisation to be in the hands of native groups, Blumer found evidence in support of his argument. However, this study shows the contrary. The inner forces of industrialisation can erode a scheme of racial ordering when there is political change. In Malaysia, political power, societal privileges, kinds of job, etc., are no longer the exclusive properties of ethnic groups. Osman had indicated that Malaysians were articulating among one another along class lines, especially their elites, sharing similar life styles, economic and political interests. The changes in the political structure had changed the relations between individual Malays and Chinese. Thus, one should

not expect the conclusion of Blumer, and those who share his idea of the continuity of the colonial structure to the post-colonial period, to be valid in Malaysia in the 1990s.

For Malaysia, one of the consequences of the changes in the pre-independence racial order and codes were the riots in 1969. These led many Malaysians to believe that their country had a problem of national unity. The riots had a traumatic influence upon their image of their own society and shaped their conception of ethnic relations. Other countries have had worse riots without being so shocked by them. The riots of 1969 warned the Chinese that they had to make concessions if their security and businesses were not to be in peril; a warning that ethnic conflict could prevent economic growth. However, some Malay leaders have elevated the significance of those riots for their own political purposes. Those leaders persuade their followers to put less time and energy into non-ethnic memberships and activities, and transfer it to their ethnic membership; the leader exhorts them to invest in that membership in the expectation of a future return in material or emotional satisfaction greater than can be expected from other activities. The desire to preserve ethnic distinctiveness is therefore associated with an interest in defending group monopoly. Malays considered themselves the owners of the territory, to have prior rights to its produce, but found the Chinese to be gaining the upper hand. An image of ethnicity was created that proved self-perpetuating. Thus, it was in some peoples' interest to present ethnic relations in a pessimistic way. Pessimism in this area can create a downward spiral in which people behave in a more hostile way towards members of other groups because they believe that it is expected of them. To persuade their audience of the seriousness of the matter they highlight instances of conflicts, prejudice, and discrimination: if unchecked this would bring increasing conflicts and economic costs in the future. Under such situation, even if a person's own sentiments have become more positive it would not be surprising for him to conclude that the decline must be the fault of others; others' prejudice must be greater than his. This line of argument observed in this study supports Banton's (1988) work that showed British people to be less pessimistic about racial trends in the localities they knew best than at the national level where (as in their views about the future) they were influenced more by mass media presentation. The concern by individuals to obtain the approval of their peers, or their fears of disapproval,

often inhibit their interactions with individuals from other ethnic groups in circumstances when they would otherwise be accepting. When people believe that they are expected to be on their best behaviour they often rise to the occasion. If ethnic relations are defined in such a way as to exclude the very possibility of good ethnic relations, then this blinds people to important grounds for optimism,

Another possible reason for the prevalence of a false image is that it has taken time for the effects of the changes in policy started in 1970 to become apparent. In the aftermath of the 1969 racial riots and as new policy and laws were implemented, numerous writings in the newspapers, the magazines, and scholarly works were reacting to the perceived discriminations. Writings in the early seventies created an image of racial relations as deteriorating. Basham (1983) assembled views of Malay, Chinese and Indian students at a university in Malaysia in 1974 to present an educational environment that was crumbling, where incompetent students were admitted and the university staffed with similarly incompetent lecturers because university admissions and job allocations were racially motivated. Sivalingam (1989) noted that Malays, Chinese and Indians were affected positively by the structural change in the economy which coincided with the implementation of the New Economic Policy: the modern sector expanded and within the modern sector, the tertiary sector expanded more than the secondary sector; income differentials between ethnic groups were reduced; and yet even he concluded that Malaysian economy and society were set for stormy times ahead. The act of portraying ethnic relations to look worse than do the statistical data on the subject is one of the reasons that make people believe that ethnic relations have become worse.

Hirschman (1989:81) may have the advantage of hindsight when he argued that "... It is premature to assign cause and effect, but active government intervention in the economy did not seem to slow down the economy". The resulting cauldron of development and industrial activity, helped by national resources and favourable terms of trade, has fuelled the economy to an impressive real gross domestic product growth rate of 9.8 percent in 1990 and 8.6 percent last year. This, in turn, has fed powerful rises in private consumption which surged 14.7 percent

in 1991 as the country's middle class stepped up purchases of big-ticket items such as automobiles, housing, and major appliances. This spending revolution has spawned far reaching changes in Malaysian life styles. Huge shopping malls and 24-hours convenience outlets are making inroads against a traditional infrastructure of family-owned shops and open-air markets. Luxury condominiums are rising in areas formerly dominated by squatter shacks and abandoned tin mines. With economic expansion, and technological change, new non-ethnic relationships were created between Malays and Chinese. Malays and Chinese obeyed the same universalistic rules as they climbed the social ladders.

Malays and Chinese were observed to give responses that reflected common sentiments and recognition of national interests. Malaysians of both Malay and Chinese extraction thought it disgraceful if people did not stand as a mark of respect to the country's national anthem. Malays may find giving due respect to the national anthem a patriotic act on their part, but the sentiment expressed by the Chinese to accept such a Malay-based national symbol represents a major change on their part. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most Chinese in Malaysia were politically oriented towards China and Chinese nationalism. Now both groups recognise the country is not just for Malays. Malaysian Chinese appreciate the value of their citizenship. Malays have undergone a major change to recognise that the country is not just for them. In 1965 Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore were ousted from the Malaysian political scene in the struggle for a Malaysian Malaysia. These responses indicate that Malays and Chinese concur in their sentiment of being Malaysians, and that the loyalty of neither group can be doubted. As the bonds of a common citizenship were observed to be more important than ethnic sentiment, they were willing to scrutinise themselves and the country's development policy as both agreed that people should not be dependent on government programmes. A large proportion of Malays and Chinese have increasingly shown dissatisfaction to such communal discourses in solving their problems. Their purposive social actions have opened up new areas of behaviours not linked to ethnic norms.

Post-1970's policy might have encourage economic growth and economic individualism, but some of the policy failed to produce the desired effect. Attempts have been made to reconsider and change some of these policies, while others are left untouched. A lot of discussions have concentrated on the allegedly counter-productive nature of an ethnic-based New Economic Policy in bringing about national integration and economic growth. This study also showed that Malays and Chinese argued that dependency on government sponsorship would destroy an individual initiative and creativity to perform; a corresponding shift has been noted with the new National Development Plan of 1990-2000 which replaced the post-1969 New Economic Policy. The new development plan recognised that "...too much emphasis on the redistribution of wealth along racial lines at the expense of rapid economic growth, not only hinders the overall development of the country, but has also created areas of economic privilege and inefficiency". (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 April 1992:54). A shift was thus, observed from the previous plan which emphasised growth with ethnic redistribution to one of the growth with social redistribution, irrespective of ethnic origin.

The government has also shown commitment to the notion of making qualitative changes to Malaysia's faltering programme of English-language education which has suffered since 1969 due to the emphasis on promoting Bahasa Malaysia as the national tongue. This will combat the gradual loss of English proficiency in the workforce, an escalating complaint among multinational corporations doing business inside the country (Far Eastern Economic Review 16 April 1992:53). Malays and especially Chinese in Petaling Jaya were found to be bilingual, with English as the main language relied on rather than national tongue as they responded to the commercial interest. Nor did the political decision to develop a national culture prove effective, being Malay-based it tended to be emotionally empty to Chinese and other non-Malays. Furthermore, Malays and Chinese came under the influence of other events more than those elements defined in the national culture; viz., Malay culture, Islam and the acceptance of other cultures restricted to the two previous elements mentioned. Non-official cultures such as international and national contests on badminton, football, athletics, pop culture, Miss World, disco, styles of life of the rich and famous of Hollywood, etc., influenced their ways of life more

than the national culture politically designed. Under such influences it is not surprising that Malays and Chinese in Petaling Jaya were observed to be cosmopolitan, characterised by a western-based cultural orientation in their choices of television programmes watched and newspapers read. The banishment of sensitive issues such as Malay language, the special position of Malays, the king, etc., through an act of Parliament, and the bringing together of other political parties into an expanding alliance called National Front might depoliticise communalism but not necessarily promote sentiment of national unity either. This study showed that encouraging individuals to pursue their own self-interest could have been the most fruitful policy in developing common sentiments and national interest among Malays and Chinese. An overtly based communal political formula could be pragmatic to gaining and holding political power in a polyethnic society, but the insistence to maintain an ethnic-based political structure does not reflect a realisation on the part of these ethnic leaders of the changing social reality in the Malay and Chinese relations. Those political parties having power, such as the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are blinded to these changing sentiments among the Malays and Chinese. The blindness of these political parties to this social transformation, with some exception observed among Pan-Islamic Party (PAS) and Democratic Action Party (DAP), has led them to be ethnic-based in their political orientation. Their blindness has led to the rise in numbers and membership of non-government organisations, noncommunal in character which emphasised community-based activities, such as Friends of the Earth, Human Rights Movement, Consumer Associations, DAP, and some along religious line such as Darul Arqam, PAS, etc., in these organisations, individuals mobilise other individuals beyond their own ethnic boundaries by appealing to societal issues that transcend ethnic cleavages. Analysing Osman's leadership question and this study's question on the choice of the political party best suited to a multi-ethnic society showed concurrence to the communally based political structure in Malaysia as they sacrificed personal preference to a long term national interest, but their changing sentiments and interests can be seen manifested in their behaviours as they turn away from political activities, even from voting, and instead organise and become members of a non-communal and non-governmental organisation. In the long run new political structures and leadership could emerge from these groups to meet the changing social reality.

Such a change can be better understood as a reflection of the feeling that in an increasing range of situations ethnic considerations are of declining importance. Government policy can now afford to change faster in giving due support to the changing nature of the society observed.

I have to confess that it was only by undergoing a lot of personal stress that I came to reconsider my own assumptions about the image of the Malaysian society and its conception of ethnic relations. I was like a participant in a game rather than an observer, and it caused a lot of upset when I had to come to terms with the results of the survey. Other commentators like Salim, Jesudason, Mutalib, Lee, etc., might not have been subjected to the same discipline. The dissertation has demonstrated the value of starting from individuals, looking for ways in which they are influenced by their social environment, and examining beliefs about beliefs because these can influence behaviour in ways which people take for granted and which rarely get examined systematically. This may help explain what seems like blindness among other sociologists.

I took a pride in my own personal experience of having close relationships with Chinese as schoolmates, varsity mates, workmates and neighbours. I was able to accept them as they are; the bond of belonging to a nation was a sufficient sentiment in uniting us together despite the differences in the phenotype, cultural, and religious characteristics. As I strive to practise Islam as a way of life, religious obligations tend to restrict my choice of actions especially in relations with the females, on food pollution, etc. Yet contrary to my beliefs, the survey showed that Malays in Petaling Jaya were not very concerned with religious obligations as the commercial ethos advanced and motivated their actions. I also expected ethnic solidarity to be strong among Malays and Chinese, especially their females as religious and generational differences reinforced their concern. Again the study proved me wrong; the findings showed the Chinese were least concerned with ethnic sentiment relative to universalist norms; it was the Malays who were often swayed by ethnic considerations; and variations by gender and age were minimal. However, Malays and Chinese, especially the males, proved sensitive to ethnic sentiment on important political relations. The popular misunderstanding had inhibited me from realising that many

aspects of Malays-Chinese relations were not defined in political terms. Others were making the same mistake. Malays failed to realise that Chinese were less concerned about ethnic considerations and Chinese were not aware of Malay concerns about political solidarity. Starting from these misunderstandings I found myself in an upsetting position.

My numerous conversations with Malays and Chinese individuals highlighted the often frustrating moments faced. A Malay nationalist individual I encountered ended any discussion we were to exchange on Malay-Chinese relations because of his distrust of the Chinese. Another discussion I had with a Malay-Muslim activist also surprised me by his distrust of the Chinese. He initially agreed to the danger of ethnocentrism if we were to propagate Islam to the Chinese, but stressed that Malay privileges as stipulated in the Constitution should be maintained and enforced. Only the Malay ethnic group should have access to these privileges and to positions of power in the country. A sense of distrust was observed as he narrated his story that his father worked with a Chinese sawmill factory for 30 years and was paid only M\$150 per month without any increment. His argument was that the Chinese exploited his father. I was arguing with him that if there were any exploitation in his father's case, it would be with that Chinese entrepreneur rather than the Chinese as a group. He failed to comprehend the argument that he has to be statistical rather than categorical in analysing such a situation. I posed a question; would he distrust all Malays if that sawmill entrepreneur happened to be a Malay and exploited his father? The discussion led nowhere because ethnic sentiment prevailed over any concern for religious obligation or common citizenship. I had a fruitful discussion with a Malay government servant who was surprised by the findings of the survey presented, but reckoned that Chinese must be changing for them to accept the country's national symbols such as the National Anthem, etc. He was surprised that Malays in Petaling Jaya were observed to be changing and able to recognise that Malaysia is not just for Malays. Malays often find it hard to accept that Chinese had accepted that Malaysia is their country. They have become Malaysians of Chinese extraction. A Chinese friend told me that he was asked to join a Chinese society at a university in London, but refused to do so as he is a Malaysian. Another said he would not want to go back to the Chinese mainland as there was no reason for him to do so. He had no blood tie there anymore. All he has, be it in

terms of family, wealth or future, is in Malaysia. While other Chinese said they might be working in England or other countries, but to them Malaysia is where their hearts lie and where they would go back to. Malays failed to see the changes in the image of the Malaysian society held by Chinese. They not only fail to understand the Chinese, but also the Chinese perception of them. Malays distrust the Chinese as they were regarded to be chauvinists, but Malays failed to realise that Chinese were too money-minded in their preference of actions. A Chinese family whose business failed gave away her daughter to a Malay family with one condition; give her education. The Chinese family was less concerned whether the daughter would be given a Malay name, or be a Muslim, but they were concerned about her passport to success in future; educational success. Chinese would relate to anyone as long as there were gains to be made out of such relationship, even with a Malay. As my own assumptions of Malaysian society and Malay-Chinese relations came under constant revaluation as the research work progressed, I had to adjust to the upsetting moment not only with myself, but with my own peer group who failed to understand Chinese attitudes toward life, and failed also to notice the changing nature of Malay-Chinese social relations as these individuals were increasingly absorbed into a non-ethnic universalist sphere. Watching the recorded live performance of the badminton final between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Thomas Cup of May 1992, I saw what many commentators on Malaysian ethnic relations failed to realise, that Malays and Chinese, encouraged by economic individualism were pursuing their own interest and that this was not necessarily ethnic. A group of Chinese girls was chanting in unison the name of the Malay singles-player as he progressed to win the first game in the rubber set. The Indonesian supporters drowned the cheers of the Malays and Chinese as their doubles-players led and beat the Malay doubles-players. The morale of the Malaysian audience was again raised by the prospects of the country's winning the cup as the Chinese singles-player won in the third game. Young and old, irrespective of ethnic origins shouted his name, and jumped in their seats as they celebrated the latest success. Malaysia needed another game to win the Thomas Cup from Indonesia. As the Chinese doubles-players took the court to start the fourth game, Malays, Chinese and their leaders were encouraging them, cheering them all the way and as the last point was won by Malaysia, the crowd rushed to the centre court; the Chinese doubles-players were touched and cuddled by Malays and Chinese spectators and

officials. They were led to meet the King who stood up to receive them, clapping and smiling over their success, while the Prime Minister's wife came down rushing to congratulate and cuddled them too! These Malays and Chinese players were warriors of the nation as they beat the Indonesians to regain the Thomas Cup which Malaysia last won in 1967. Ethnic origin was meaningless in such a situation. The player's success was regarded by Malaysians as the success of the nation. Watching such an event made me realise that the society is changing just as the research findings had indicated, and whatever stressful moment I went through in reconsidering my own assumptions about the society and its ethnic relations was a worthwhile one. I hope others will be brave enough to undertake a systematic examination of their own assumptions.

Awkward questions have to be asked whenever ethnicity as a theoretical and conceptual tool is characterised as unalterable. The theory and concept employed should relate to the reality of experience and not be reified. This study disputes Miles' (1982) claims that the sociology of race relations necessarily reifies race. Failure to notice other important influences have blinded many scholars to the way Malays and Chinese are being increasingly absorbed into a non-ethnic universalist sphere. Sociologists are often more interested in large scale social trends and have failed to heed Barth's (1969) advice to explore the different processes involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups. Cox (1948:320) argued that "... by race relations we do not mean all social contact between person of different 'races', but only those contacts the social characteristics of which are determined by a consciousness of 'racial differences'. Two people of different race could have a relation that was not racial". To discover the conditions under which such a relation could be attained would point to a strategy for reducing racial tension. To observe such conditions, the focus of investigation should be shifted from studying the internal constitution and history of separate groups to the examination of ethnic boundary maintenance. The utility of such a bottom-up approach is indicated by the way this study has shown Malays and Chinese to share sentiments and interests influenced by universalist norms of materialism, respectability and personal obligation. Previous studies of ethnic relations in Malaysia have concentrated upon Malay-Chinese differences and over-looked the similarities.

The determinants of ethnic alignment are virtually infinite. The present study indicates that ethnic identities are not primordial characteristics programmed into individuals, but have continually to be established from the actions of people as they choose to align themselves in one way or another, and make use of shared notions about who belongs in what social category. It is not just that some members forsake one ethnic group, or pull it in a different direction, but that members of the other ethnic groups are engaged in changing their group too. Groups interact. Ethnic alignment interacts with most of the institutions and is influenced by them. Since the Malaysian society itself is changing relatively rapidly because of economic growth, the interdependencies are extraordinary complex. Ethnic loyalty is both a cause and an effect. Therefore, the only satisfactory way of studying ethnic alignment is on the individual plane, while searching at every point for the influence of collective patterns. Features of one historical period persist only if there are factors which keep them alive. This study gives reason to conclude that, in urban areas at least, the strength of ethnic loyalty has been declining and has outlined the process by which the changes have taken place. Malays and Chinese should recognise this changing social reality of which they are only imperfectly aware. This social change seems to have been more rapid than they had realised. If Malaysian's future is to be as fortunate as its recent past, it will be important not to encourage unrealistic expectations and to have a more accurate understanding of the determinants of ethnic alignment.

Appendices

Section A

1. What is your age?
 - [1] 30 and below
 - [2] 31 - 50
 - [3] 51 and above

2. In which state you spend your childhood days? State of
 - [1] Malay form more than 60%
 - [2] Malay form the majority but less than 60%
 - [3] Chinese form the majority
 - [4] No community form the majority but the non-Malay out-numbered the Malays
 - [5] Other

3. What is your occupation?
 - [1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, petty trader
 - [2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant
 - [3] General services, general office administrator, technician, teacher, nurse
 - [4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler
 - [5] Executive in the private and government sectors and professional

4. How many languages can you speak?
 - [1] Own ethnic language
 - [2] Bilingual
 - [3] Multi-lingual

5. With which ethnic subgroup and your ethnic group you identify yourself?

[1] Malay	[2] Javanese	[3] Minangkabau
[4] Rawa	[5] Banjar	[6] Bugis
[7] Achehnese	[8] Kelantanese	[9] Pattani
[10] Hokkien	[11] Hakka	[12] Hainanese
[13] Cantonese	[14] Tiochew	[15] Telegu
[16] Malayali	[17] Tamil	[18] Sinhalese
[19] Sikh	[20] Eurasian	[21] Portuguese
[22] English	[23] Dutch	[24] Siamese
[25] Burmese	[26] Cambodian	
[27] Origin by state		[28] Other

6. With which ethnic subgroup would your spouse identify?

- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| [1] Malay | [2] Javanese | [3] Minangkabau |
| [4] Rawa | [5] Banjar | [6] Bugis |
| [7] Achehnese | [8] Kelantanese | [9] Pattani |
| [10] Hokkien | [11] Hakka | [12] Hainanese |
| [13] Cantonese | [14] Tiochew | [15] Telegu |
| [16] Malayali | [17] Tamil | [18] Sinhalese |
| [19] Sikh | [20] Eurasian | [21] Portuguese |
| [22] English | [23] Dutch | [24] Siamese |
| [25] Burmese | [26] Cambodian | |
| [27] Origin by state | | [28] Other |

7. Which language-based newspaper do you read?

[a multiple choice answer]

- [1] Malay
- [2] Chinese
- [3] Tamil/Urdu
- [4] English
- [5] Mixture
- [6] Other

8. Which language-based TV programmes do you watch?

[a multiple choice answer]

- [1] Malay
- [2] Chinese
- [3] Tamil/Urdu
- [4] English
- [5] Mixture
- [6] Other

9. Do you consider yourself religious?

- [1] Religious
- [2] Normal
- [3] Not very
- [4] Not at all

10. What is your religion?

- [1] Muslim
- [2] Buddhist
- [3] Hindu
- [4] Sikh
- [5] Christian
- [6] Agnostic
- [7] No religion
- [8] Other

11. Given a choice, which political party would you prefer to govern a multi-ethnic Malaysia?

- [1] The National Front - the pragmatic approach
- [2] DAP - Malaysian Malaysia
- [3] PAS - an Islamic based
- [4] A socialist party
- [5] Do not know
- [6] Other

12. To which sampling group does the respondent belong?

- [1] Malay male
- [2] Malay female
- [3] Chinese male
- [4] Chinese female
- [5] Other male
- [6] Other female

Section B

1. Do you come into contact with members of other ethnic groups?
 - [1] Frequently
 - [2] Sometimes
 - [3] Seldom
 - [4] Never

2. With which ethnic group do you come into contact?
 - [1] Malay
 - [2] Chinese
 - [3] Indian
 - [4] Other

3. Where do you come into contact with them?
 - [1] Residential area
 - [2] Workplace
 - [3] Shopping centre
 - [4] At the children's school
 - [5] Public gatherings and festivals
 - [6] Organisation meetings
 - [7] Other

4. In which occupational categories are most of them?
[a maximum of two choice answers]
 - [1] Fisherman, trishaw peddler, small farmer, odd job worker, petty trader
 - [2] Manual worker, factory worker, sales assistant
 - [3] General services, general office administrator, technician, teacher, nurse
 - [4] Businessman, merchant, wholesaler
 - [5] Executive in the private and government sectors and professional

5. How would you describe the relationship between ethnic groups in Malaysia today?
 - [1] Good
 - [2] Moderate
 - [3] Bad
 - [4] Other

-
6. How would you describe the relationship between ethnic groups in your locality today?
- [1] Good
 - [2] Moderate
 - [3] Bad
 - [4] Other
7. How do you expect the relations between ethnic groups in Malaysia to change over the next five years?
- [1] Better
 - [2] The same
 - [3] Worse
 - [4] Other
8. How do you expect the relations between ethnic groups in your locality to change over the next five years?
- [1] Better
 - [2] The same
 - [3] Worse
 - [4] Other
 - [5] Do not know
9. Do you remember the Rukunegara?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] Slightly
 - [3] Not really

I am going to read six statements. Please tell me if you agree with them very strongly or strongly, or whether you disagree with them very strongly or strongly, or if you have no particular feelings on the subject.

- [1] Very strongly agree
 - [2] Strongly agree
 - [3] Very strongly disagree
 - [4] Strongly disagree
 - [5] No particular feelings
10. It is disgraceful if people fail to stand while the country's National Anthem is being played.
- [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

-
11. Compared to other countries, there is much racial discrimination in Malaysia.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
12. People should not be dependent on government programmes, these destroy people's ability to look after themselves.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
13. The Indonesian migrants are socially undesirable, they take our jobs away.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
14. Those who are dissatisfied with Malaysia should emigrate to another country of their choice.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
15. This country does not belong to Malays alone, it belongs to all Malaysians.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
16. What are the main problems faced in this country.
[1] Drug addiction
[2] Corruption
[3] Religious deviation
[4] Factionalism
[5] Unequal access to education
[6] Ethnic differences
[7] Other

Section C

How would you respond to this hypothetical case?

- 1. Which one of the following persons do you consider would be a better leader of Malaysia and why?
 - [a] Mr. Halim is from a royal family; educated at a university in England; served many years in the Malaysian Civil Service; entered Parliament and became the leader of his party.
 - [b] Mr. Ong Cheng Piau is the son of a big businessman; educated at a university in England; active in Parliament and became the leader of his party.
 - [c] Mr. Zulkifli is the son of a rubber-tapper; educated at the University of Malaya and then a university in England; active in trade unions; entered Parliament and became the leader of his party.
 - [d] Mr. Wong Ting Seng is a son of a factory worker; educated at a university in England; active in trade unions; entered Parliament and became the leader of his party.

- i) Whom do you choose?
 - [1] Mr. Halim
 - [2] Mr. Ong Cheng Piau
 - [3] Mr. Zulkifli
 - [4] Mr. Wong Ting Seng
 - [5] Other

- ii) Why the choice?
 -
 -
 -
 -

*In the hypothetical cases below, Husin Ali is a clerk with a multi-national engineering firm.
How would you react to these cases?*

-
2. Husin Ali is going to bring his children to the zoo this coming Sunday. Husin Ali's son has been pestering his father to take along one of his friends on this trip.
- a) Whom will Husin Ali suggest to his son to take along on this trip?
- [1] Ah Seng, a doctor's son
 - [2] Ali, whose mother works as a housemaid
 - [3] Other
- b) Whom would Husin Ali's mother wish his son to take along on the trip?
- [1] Ah Seng
 - [2] Ali
 - [3] Other
3. Husin Ali has been patronising Mr. Ah Kow's grocery shop - noted for its cheapness and nearest to his house. Husin Ali has been informed that in a week's time, Ahmad will be opening a second grocery shop in his neighbourhood.
- a) Where will Husin Ali go?
- [1] Ahmad's shop
 - [2] Ah Kow's shop
 - [3] Other
- b) Where would his mother wish him to go?
- [1] Ahmad's shop
 - [2] Ah Kow's shop
 - [3] Other
4. Husin Ali's daughter, attending one of the local universities, is wondering for whom should she vote as president of the university's Students Union.
- i) For whom will Husin Ali's daughter vote?
- [1] Malik, who takes religion as a personal choice
 - [2] Akhbar, who prefers religion to be seen as a separate issue from politics
 - [3] Daud, who is a committee member of the students' Islamic Society
 - [4] Other
- ii) For whom would Husin Ali's mother wish her granddaughter to vote?
- [1] Malik
 - [2] Akhbar
 - [3] Daud
 - [4] Other

-
5. Husin Ali received two wedding invitations which happen to fall on the same day.
- a) To whom will he go first?
- [1] Leong's house, a company director
 - [2] Ismail's house, who works as a store-keeper
 - [3] Other
- b) To whose house would Husin Ali's mother wish him to go first?
- [1] Leong's house
 - [2] Ismail's house
 - [3] Other
6. Husin Ali will be attending his local branch political party's election next week. The treasurer's post is a keenly contested three-cornered fight. The previous treasurer was found to have embezzled the party's fund.
- a) For whom will Husin Ali vote?
- [1] Ramli, a businessman linked to the Chinese elites
 - [2] Hamzah, a school teacher with grass-root support from the local Malays
 - [3] Salleh, a candidate backed by the Islamic group
 - [4] Other
- b) Whom would Husin Ali's mother wish him to vote?
- [1] Ramli
 - [2] Hamzah
 - [3] Salleh
 - [4] Other
7. Husin Ali has to leave his house in a hurry to fetch his own family from the hospital. He has been expecting his sister to come at any moment to assist with his family, but he has waited as long as he could. He wonders whether to leave his front door unlocked or to leave the key with his next-door Chinese neighbour.
- a) What will Husin Ali do?
- [1] Leave the front door unlocked
 - [2] Leave the key with his next-door Chinese neighbour
 - [3] Other

-
- b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
- [1] Leave the front door unlocked
 - [2] Leave the key with his next-door Chinese neighbour
 - [3] Other
8. Husin Ali is arranging a marriage for his son to one of his cousin's daughters. Given a choice, which will his son choose - the fair-skin elder sister or her dark-skin younger sister?
- a) Whom will Husin Ali's son choose?
- [1] The fair-skin elder sister
 - [2] The dark-skin younger sister
 - [3] Other
- b) Whom would Husin Ali's mother wish her grandson to choose?
- [1] The fair-skin elder sister
 - [2] The dark-skin younger sister
 - [3] Other
9. Husin Ali's daughter, Halimah, who works in a factory making electronic components was seen going out with her company's assistant personnel manager, a Chinese, driving a silver metallic Volvo 340.
- a) How will Husin Ali react?
- [1] Approve
 - [2] Disapprove
 - [3] Other
- b) How would Husin Ali's mother wish him to react?
- [1] Approve
 - [2] Disapprove
 - [3] Other
10. Husin Ali wants to adopt a child. The Social Welfare Department has sent him some forms to be filled and two colour photographs of a fair-skin Chinese child and a dark-skin Malay child.
- a) Which will Husin Ali choose?
- [1] The dark-skin Malay child
 - [2] The fair-skin Chinese child
 - [3] Other

-
- b) Whom would his mother wish him to adopt?
- [1] The dark-skin Malay child
 - [2] The fair-skin Chinese child
 - [3] Other
12. Husin Ali has an Indian friend as his workmate. His Indian friend is throwing a wedding party for his daughter at his house.
- a) Will Husin Ali go?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- b) Would Husin Ali's mother wish him to go?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
13. Mr. Tay, a mechanical engineer who graduated from Oxford, has been the head of Husin Ali's Mechanical Department for the past three years. A Malay group within his department is trying to replace his boss with a Malay candidate.
- a) Will Husin Ali support his boss?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
14. Husin Ali has a next-door Chinese neighbour who likes her child to play with Husin Ali's two year old daughter. Will he allow the Chinese neighbour to take his daughter to their house for an afternoon?
- a) What would Husin Ali say?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

-
- b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to do?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
15. A Chinese accountant with two young children and his wife wants to rent Husin Ali's house. The house has been left unoccupied for the past six months.
- a) Will Husin Ali say yes?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to say?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
16. Husin Ali has a niece whose husband works as a school gardener. Theirs is a big family, living in a small rented Malay house next to a housing scheme. The wife supplements the meagre earnings of the husband by taking care of four tiny-tots. One day, a young Chinese school teacher came to her house inquiring if she could take care of her one-year old son as well.
- a) Will Husin Ali's niece say yes?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
- b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish her granddaughter to say?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other
17. Husin Ali's wife has been persuading her daughter to marry Muhammad Lee - a son of her Chinese Muslim friend.
- a) Will the daughter say yes to her mother?
- [1] Yes
 - [2] No
 - [3] Other

b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish her to say?

[1] Yes

[2] No

[3] Other

18. Husin Ali's twelve year old son wants to bring his Chinese friends home to play.

a) Will Husin Ali say yes?

[1] Yes

[2] No

[3] Other

b) What would Husin Ali's mother wish him to say?

[1] Yes

[2] No

[3] Other

A. Self-Interest of the Material and Status Kinds versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-1: Halimah's Volvo. by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Yes	21	54	10	21
No	69	37	84	70
Other	10	9	6	9
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table A-2 Halimah's Volvo. by Ethnic Group and Gender(%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	MM	MF	CM	CF	MM	MF	CM	CF
Yes	21	20	51	60	11	9	22	19
No	67	71	40	33	82	85	69	71
Other	12	9	9	7	7	6	9	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

B. Religious Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-1 : Treasurer's Post. by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Ramli	13	35	5	15
Hamzah	40	39	39	28
Salleh	39	6	47	39
Other	8	20	9	18
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table B-2 : Treasurer's Post. by Ethnic Group and Gender(%)

[illegible]

Table B-3: Students Union Election by Ethnic Group (%)

	Husin Ali		Husin Ali's Mother	
	Malays	Chinese	Malays	Chinese
Malik	24	15	28	13
Akhbar	31	51	22	21
Daud	39	22	46	53
Other	6	12	4	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table B-4 : Students Union Election, by Ethnic Group and Gender(%)

[illegible]

Note:

Halimah's Volvo was not included in the analysis of Chapter 5 as the two influences of self-interest of the material and status kinds were not that easily separated in this situation. While the religious obligation situations were found not to invalidate the hypotheses obtained from the other situations selected and thus best kept for future analysis.

A. Findings by Ethnic Group and Age

a) Self-Interest of the Material Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-1 : Shopping Choice, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Ahmad	46	16	47	61	60	40	61	43
Ah Kow	49	80	46	35	35	49	30	54
Other	5	4	7	4	5	11	9	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-2 : House Key, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Unlocked	-	-	2	-	2	3	1	2
Neighbour	83	93	90	96	77	89	87	92
Other	17	7	8	4	21	8	12	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-3 : Renting-Out of House, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Yes	73	87	54	83	44	73	38	71
No	24	5	39	15	52	18	54	25
Other	3	8	7	2	4	9	8	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-4 : Child Minding, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin All				Husin All's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Yes	69	84	75	79	49	76	59	67
No	25	7	19	13	45	18	35	25
Other	6	9	6	8	6	6	6	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

b) Self-Interest of the Status Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-5 : Zoo Trip, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin All				Husin All's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Ah Seng	12	40	15	56	9	27	5	23
Ali	74	42	74	40	78	51	86	71
Other	14	18	11	4	13	22	9	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-6 : Skin Complexion, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin All				Husin All's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Fair	61	73	81	73	69	71	85	71
Dark	5	2	5	4	5	4	6	8
Other	34	25	14	23	26	25	9	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-7: Child Adoption, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

Table A-8 : Wedding Invitation, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

c) Personal Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-9 : Supporting the Boss, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

**Table A-10 : Mother's Wishes,
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)**

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Yes	47	64	54	73	33	40	38	54
No	28	16	27	12	35	36	45	25
Other	25	20	19	15	32	24	17	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-11 : Child's Playmate, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Yes	85	93	83	96	64	78	72	79
No	12	4	16	2	30	18	27	17
Other	3	3	1	2	6	4	1	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

**Table A-12 : Attending a Wedding Party,
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)**

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Yes	75	95	76	96	59	89	63	88
No	19	-	18	2	34	6	29	9
Other	6	5	6	2	7	5	8	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-13: Bringing a Friend Home,
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

d) Self-Interest of the Material and Status Kinds versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-14 : Halimah's Volvo
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

e) Religious Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table A-15: Treasurer's Post
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

[illegible]

Table A-16 : Students' Elections, by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali				Husin Ali's Mother			
	Below 30		Above 30		Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Malik	25	16	22	12	31	9	25	17
Akhbar	28	49	34	52	18	18	26	25
Daud	42	22	36	23	48	58	43	48
Other	5	13	8	13	3	15	6	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

f) Leadership Question

Table A-17 : Osman's Leadership Question,
by Ethnic Group and Age (%)

	Husin Ali			
	Below 30		Above 30	
	My	Ch	My	Ch
Mr. Halim	7	13	11	7
Mr. Ong	1	7	-	12
Mr. Zukifli	84	42	84	35
Mr. Wong	0	25	0	27
Other	8	13	5	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

B. Findings by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status

a) Self-Interest of the Material Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-1 : Shopping Choice
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-2 : House Key.
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-3 : Renting-Out the House,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-4 : Child-Minding,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

b) Self-Interest of the Status Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-5 : Zoo Trip,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-6 : Skin Complexion,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-7 : Child Adoption,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-8 : Wedding Invitation,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

c) Personal Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-9 : Supporting the Boss,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-10: Mother's Wishes,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-11 : Child's Playmate,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

**Table B-12 : Attending a Wedding Party,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)**

[illegible]

**Table B-13 : Bringing a Friend Home,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)**

[illegible]

d) Self-Interest of the Material and Status Kinds versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-14: Halimah's Volvo,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

e) Religious Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

Table B-15 : Treasurer's Post, by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

Table B-16 : Students' Elections,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)

[illegible]

f) Leadership Question

**Table B-17 : Osman's Leadership Question,
by Ethnic Group and Socio-Economic Status (%)**

	Husin Ali					
	Lower		Middle		Upper	
	My	Ch	My	Ch	My	Ch
Mr. Halim	16	-	6	20	9	2
Mr. Ong	-	11	1	5	-	10
Mr. Zulkifli	80	44	84	41	91	36
Mr. Wong	0	34	0	20	-	31
Other	4	11	9	14	0	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

C. Chi-Squared (c^2) Analysis

I. Self-Interest of the Material Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

a) Shopping Choice

- §^a $c^2 = 31.08$ and $c^2 = 11.67$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 2.86$ and $c^2 = 2.49$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 2.69$ and $c^2 = 1.23$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the material kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

b) House Key

- §^a $c^2 = 4.52$ and $c^2 = 4.85$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 1.03$ and $c^2 = 0.44$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 0.54$ and $c^2 = 0.11$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures do not indicate any significant differences in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the material kind between ethnic groups and between gender within each ethnic group.

c) Renting-Out the House

- §^a $c^2 = 17.0$ and $c^2 = 28.9$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 1.32$ and $c^2 = 2.72$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 3.66$ and $c^2 = 1.13$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the material kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

d) Child Minding

- §^a $c^2 = 7.72$ and $c^2 = 11.2$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 0.72$ and $c^2 = 1.01$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 0.21$ and $c^2 = 0.29$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the material kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

II. Self-Interest of the Status Kind versus Ethnic Loyalty

a) Zoo Trip

- §^a $c^2 = 45.15$ and $c^2 = 23.39$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 1.91$ and $c^2 = 2.11$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 1.40$ and $c^2 = 0.05$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the status kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

b) Skin Complexion

- §^a $c^2 = 0.32$ and $c^2 = 1.12$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 0.71$ and $c^2 = 2.17$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 3.10$ and $c^2 = 2.12$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures do not indicate any significant differences in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the status kind between ethnic groups and between gender within each ethnic group.

c) Child Adoption

- §^a $c^2 = 30.86$ and $c^2 = 18.26$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 0.17$ and $c^2 = 1.51$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 1.70$ and $c^2 = 0.61$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the status kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

d) Wedding Invitation

- §^a $c^2 = 58.94$ and $c^2 = 20.37$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)
 §^{bi} $c^2 = 4.67$ and $c^2 = 2.01$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)
 §^{bii} $c^2 = 1.67$ and $c^2 = 1.35$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus self-interest of the status kind between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

I

II. Personal Obligation versus Ethnic Loyalty

a) Supporting the Boss

§^a $c^2 = 13.60$ and $c^2 = 22.91$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)

§^{bi} $c^2 = 0.87$ and $c^2 = 1.24$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

§^{bii} $c^2 = 0.74$ and $c^2 = 4.00$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus personal obligation between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

b) Mother's Wishes

§^a $c^2 = 10.13$ and $c^2 = 4.2$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$ and not significant at $p \leq 0.05$, respectively)

§^{bi} $c^2 = 0.23$ and $c^2 = 10.17$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$ and significant at $p \leq 0.01$, respectively)

§^{bii} $c^2 = 0.93$ and $c^2 = 2.18$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus personal obligation between ethnic groups at Husin Ali's mother's level of analysis, but do not indicate any significant differences between ethnic groups at Husin Ali's level of analysis and between gender within each ethnic group.

c) Child's Playmate

§^a $c^2 = 9.34$ and $c^2 = 4.53$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$ and not significant at $p \leq 0.05$, respectively)

§^{bi} $c^2 = 0.91$ and $c^2 = 0.79$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

§^{bii} $c^2 = 1.01$ and $c^2 = 0.44$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus personal obligation between ethnic groups only at Husin Ali's level of analysis but do not indicate any significant differences between ethnic groups at Husin Ali's mother's level of analysis and between gender within each ethnic group.

d) Workmate's Daughter's Wedding Party

§^a $c^2 = 24.75$ and $c^2 = 26.6$ with 2 degrees of freedom (significant at $p \leq 0.01$)

§^{bi} $c^2 = 0.26$ and $c^2 = 1.36$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

§^{bii} $c^2 = 1.03$ and $c^2 = 1.15$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures indicate a significant association in ethnic loyalty versus personal obligation between ethnic groups but do not indicate any significant differences between gender within each ethnic group.

e) Bringing a Friend Home

§^a $c^2 = 1.96$ and $c^2 = 2.62$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

§^{bi} $c^2 = 0.47$ and $c^2 = 4.87$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

§^{bii} $c^2 = 1.99$ and $c^2 = 0.47$ with 2 degrees of freedom (not significant at $p \leq 0.05$)

The c^2 figures do not indicate any significant differences in ethnic loyalty versus personal obligation between ethnic groups and between gender within each ethnic group.

Notes:

§^a between ethnic groups

§^{bi} between gender of Malay group

§^{bii} between gender of Chinese group

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